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SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT ADVERTISE?

By CHESTER J. LA ROCHE, ARTHUR PRICE, ARTHUR T. ROBB, RALPH COGHLAN, and LEONARD DREYFUSS

Simple as this question may seem, it has proved perplexing to public officials, advertisers, editors, and publishers alike. The nature and effectiveness of the informational and propaganda efforts of the government, the financial future of the advertising profession and of publishing enterprises, to say nothing of the editorial freedom of the press, all are to an extent affected by the answer.

To focus public attention on the issues involved and to further the cause of clear thinking on the subject, the editors of the *Public Opinion Quarterly* invited a number of persons directly concerned to state their views. Not all of those invited to participate in the symposium were able to do so, and the array of statements herein presented, taken together, undoubtedly fails to give a carefully balanced

and properly weighed perspective of the considerations involved. These are the views, not of the editors of the *Quarterly*, nor of a representative cross-section of the American people. These are the statements of five men who have opinions which are eminently worth reading.

Mr. La Roche is chairman of the Advertising Council and chairman of the board of Young & Rubicam, Inc.; Mr. Price is mail order sales manager of Sears, Roebuck and Co.; Mr. Robb is editor of *Editor & Publisher*; Mr. Coghlan is editorial page editor of the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*; and Mr. Dreyfuss, in addition to his position as president of United Advertising Corporation of New York, is civilian defense director for the state of New Jersey. The opinions they express are their own, and not necessarily those of the organizations they represent.

CHESTER J. LA ROCHE

THE ANSWER to this question is simple. The government not only *should* advertise—it *is* advertising. The government is buying advertising in magazines and newspapers for the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard, and is using advertising which has been contributed to it at no cost, and in sizeable amounts, by public spirited national and local advertisers.

The government is not buying advertising for those who, under the generalship of the OWI, are charged with the responsibility of the psychological war and the organization of the Home Front,—nor is it buying advertising for the Treasury Department. This Department, while coordinating its efforts with the OWI, maintains a degree of autonomy, since it has the final responsibility for the sales of an individual product—War Bonds.

So the question is not, "Should the government advertise," which it is doing, but, "Should the government buy advertising to help carry

out the purposes for which the Office of War Information was organized,"—and the answer to that question is not so simple. A high percentage of advertising agencies, media owners and advertisers recognize the problems involved; but they have seen far more difficult problems solved. They feel the government should buy advertising.

But the advertising business is not united on this answer. A strong and vocal minority object on principle to the government buying advertising.

THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

The Scripps-Howard Newspapers and a small number of other newspapers fear for the domination of the press if the government extends its program of paid advertising; interferences with the press' editorial policies by those department and government officials who have advertising to place.

Government officials are not in agreement on the subject. Some of them, like John H. Morse of the Department of Commerce, are for a policy of government paid advertising. Others, like Dr. Peter Odegard, who is in charge of War Bond sales for the Treasury, are against paid advertising. Dr. Odegard believes, "The maintenance of a free press is fundamentally due to the multiplicity of economic interests of the advertisers who furnish most of its financial support." He fears that the government support of the press, through advertising as well as by more direct means, might well impair that freedom.

Some businessmen fear the results of government advertising appropriations. They fear that the political party responsible for the conduct of our national affairs might conceivably use an advertising appropriation for its own purposes rather than in the interest of all the people.

THE PROBLEMS OF GOVERNMENT INDECISION

The old Office of Facts and Figures never made up its mind one way or the other, through months of debate, and this indecision was typical of the government attitude as revealed by the following government memorandums:

Of the many arguments advanced in support of government advertising, perhaps the most fundamental is that advertising as distinguished from the normal government publicity permits constant repetition of themes, which repetition it is claimed is necessary in order effectively to influence public attitude. In addition, it permits control and pictorial presentation. The degree

of effectiveness of such advertising programs would, of course, depend among other things on the objective of the particular campaign under consideration. Such objective may be the promotion and specific action by individuals such as recruiting, bond purchasing, etc., or more general in nature, the promotion of general morale as understanding the war aim and the like. They also may be merely informational in character, announcing regulations and dates for individual action, in some cases where penalties are proscribed for failure to act, etc.

And here follows a statement of the opposite point of view, also from a government memorandum:

It may be argued that an increase of direct advertising by the government is not necessary as a means of presenting the government's point of view to the public. As distinguished from the commercial advertisers, the government has the unique opportunity of reaching the public. The persuasive character of the President's speeches is undoubtedly of prime importance in moulding public opinion. Other government spokesmen are constantly addressing the nation on the various aspects of the national effort. It is argued that the public is actually eager, at least for the most part, to adopt any suggestions that the President may make for the successful prosecution of the war. So, consequently, an ambitious program of paid advertising is hardly necessary under existing conditions.

It is further argued that a great task of public education lies ahead during the coming months of wartime sacrifice and effort. This may be met successfully by improving methods of government publicity short of paid advertising. For instance, as an example it has been suggested that a government column might be included in the daily newspapers.*

While the foregoing points of view were expressed five or six months ago, they still reflect the conflict of opinion as this article goes to press.

What does the new Office of War Information think about the purchase of advertising space for the government at this time? This department has taken the first steps to get itself, and other government departments with which it works, organized to use advertising and has whole-heartedly cooperated with business to give direction and meaning to the free and contributed paid space that has been placed at its disposal.

Despite its keen recognition of advertising's part in the war, the Office of War Information is not willing at this time to present the

* After reading the foregoing, the reader will no doubt wonder what time the President would have left, if he had to go on the air and tell the public all the things they should know and do about rubber, price ceilings, meat rationing, scrap, etc. and the thirty-two other jobs the OWI and the Advertising Council are now working on.

case for paid advertising to Congress. If it were, it would have asked Congress for an appropriation for the purchase of space, when it asked for \$26,000,000 to set up and carry on the duties of its office.

Now as to Congress. There are those who feel that Congress is against the government buying advertising and would not appropriate the money for paid advertising for the Office of War Information. But nobody can say whether Congress would or would not appropriate the money—no one has asked. The evidence is on the side that Congress would appropriate the money, for it has already done so for the armed forces, and it granted Secretary Morgenthau's request for an appropriation to advertise bonds.

Why is it, then, that the Office of War Information and those others responsible for informing the public have not gone to Congress for an advertising appropriation? The reasons are clear.

CHANNELS OF PUBLICITY OPEN TO GOVERNMENT

First of all, the government has open to it several channels of communication to the people that are not so readily available to business; and some that are not at all open to business—such as the speeches of the President and other high officials.

Let's see what those methods are:

They have the news and editorial pages of the press of the nation. What the government says is news. This is the product by which the press lives and the government is its biggest "customer."

There is radio sustaining time. Radio networks and stations make available time for top government executives, Congressmen and Senators.

The government can use for "exploitation purposes" governors, mayors and public-minded citizens throughout the country.

The government is in the process of creating a national house-to-house organization where a block or street leader will call upon neighbors and distribute information from material that is supplied through the Office of Civilian Defense's Service Corps.

There are other ways in which the government can reach the people. It is not necessary to lengthen the list—these will suffice.

These methods have certain definite advantages, but they lack the element of control. Depending too heavily upon them has brought to light many glaring weaknesses which George Creel learned by experience in World War I. He said the government spent \$5.00 worth of effort and money to get 5 cents worth of space.

If these were the only methods of reaching the public—the great cost of administration; the expenditure of millions to get undetermined amounts of “free” space; the lack of control would, by this time have proved so wasteful that the government would have been forced by the facts to buy advertising. But the government has added to its exploitation methods the considerable power of *free* and *contributed paid advertising space* made available by advertisers and media and it has reason to believe that the amount of such help will increase for at least another year.

THE ADVERTISING COUNCIL

With an understanding of their obligations in Total War, advertising leaders, large and small, from coast to coast, have given a good exhibition of service to the nation. Not only have they contributed space, time and talent, but they have gone even further: they have set up an all-industry organization—the Advertising Council, financed with \$100,000 out of their own pocket for the purpose of working with the government.

Shortly after Pearl Harbor, members of the Council went to Washington and recommended to Donald Nelson the appointment of an Advertising Manager of the United States, and it recommended to Archibald MacLeish, head of the O.F.F., that the government's problems be approached according to the best advertising practice; that is—that all of the available facts relating to a problem be analyzed, the public's grasp and understanding of the problem be determined, and the exact government policy as to what it wanted to say be agreed upon; that this policy should then be interpreted to the people; that advertisements and radio commercials, publicity releases, etc. written by the most experienced writers in the nation, should be supplied to publishers and advertisers, and to anyone offering free or paid-contributed space or radio time. The Council offered to get this work done at no cost to the government.

The Advertising Council said at that time, “Our first concern would be to deal with free space contributed by media owners and paid space contributed by local or national advertisers. Our initial step would be to *organize* the free and contributed space and radio time in a ‘pool,’ that is to say, we should know the amount of space already contributed, and try to predict with a reasonable degree of certainty how much would be available immediately in the next year.” The government immediately

accepted both the offer to organize available radio time, and to prepare advertisements.

Since most of the facilities offered by advertisers were in radio, and a high percentage of the time was held by and given to the Treasury Department, the Advertising Council had this to say:

It will be found in making a study, that the Treasury Department already has almost 90 per cent of this time. Therein lies the first problem. Will the Treasury Department put this time into a common pool? If not, other departments of the government would be left without any time, unless it were bought.

If the Treasury Department is willing to put its time in the common "pool," then the Advertising Council could recommend the relative needs of each government campaign, and the time could be apportioned accordingly.

Immediately upon this recommendation, the Office of Facts and Figures sent its radio coordinator to New York, a radio advisory committee of the Council was appointed, and the present allocation system was set up. Under it, almost without exception, every commercial radio advertiser allocates a definite amount of time, on specific dates, for specific government purposes (selling bonds, metal and fats salvage, rationing, etc.).

The Council's second offer—to write advertisements—was accepted by the Treasury Department and four different advertising agencies volunteering through the Council became the task-force in organizing and presenting the Treasury's 10 per cent Payroll Deduction Plan. In this instance, the Treasury paid the cost of printing the advertisements, and distributed them among newspaper owners, who sold them to local business interests. The Treasury regards the Payroll Deduction Plan as the most effective single item in the bond sales campaign.

THE SALVAGE CAMPAIGN

Another job undertaken by the Council was the organization of the Scrap Salvage Campaign for the War Production Board. Here was a case where the government's problem was identical with that of industry. The Leo Burnett Company of Chicago and a volunteer group of Chicago agency men worked out the campaign under the direction of the Advertising Council.

The Iron and Steel Institute, together with other advertisers, informed the War Production Board they would sponsor it and appropriated \$2,000,000. In order to avoid any appearance of self-interest, no

agency represented on the Executive Committee of the Council including Leo Burnett interested itself in handling the business.

The Fats Salvage Campaign was another example of how much help the government was getting from advertisers. The Executive Committee of the Council chose the Compton Agency as the task-force. When the glycerine and associated industries stepped in and put up \$500,000 to sponsor the campaign the Compton advertising agency, as Procter & Gamble's advertising agency, stepped out.

At the present time, the Council is working on thirty-two government projects, of which twenty-seven are far advanced.

In addition to the organized help offered by the Advertising Council, the government has been aided by the initiative of advertisers acting on their own. Department stores, banks and other local advertisers contributed large amounts of space to local war projects. Other help came to the government from national advertisers, like the rubber and oil companies, who in their advertising discussed proper care of tires, economical speeds at which to drive, fuel conservation, etc. Advertisers banded together, paid for campaigns warning against rumors; aviation companies discussed the problems of the peace.

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

Now with the amount of goods on the shelves shrinking, with less and less merchandise to sell, with our peacetime economy entirely out of joint, there is little doubt that advertising help from certain sources is going to shrink very greatly in the next year. But the shrinkage probably will be more than compensated for by the fact that four very unusual and powerful sources of help may be opened to the government.

The first of these is the recent offer which the Magazine Publishers of America, in cooperation with the Advertising Council, made to Elmer Davis. It is their plan to devote an advertising page in every issue of every magazine in America to some war subject the magazine publishers select and the government approves. The copy, art work, plates, together with the space, will be furnished without cost to the government.

In addition to the foregoing, the newspaper publishers of the country have demonstrated that they also have a grasp of their obligation in Total War and a great deal more help possibly may come from

this source. Already they have given evidence of this in the splendid editorial, advertising and organizational support supplied to the scrap campaign.

The third important source of advertising may be the advertisers who have no goods to sell the public, but have product names and institutional character to keep alive. These advertisers are all skilled and know how to direct and organize campaigns. They are in a position to render a great service by using their skills and experience to inform and inspire civilian soldiers on the Home Front.

I believe this is the best possible form of institutional advertising in time of war, because the decision to do it demonstrates that these institutions have a sense of their social obligations to the public; that they are devoting their advertising efforts to the most important task at hand and not worrying too much about competition now or two or three years hence.

The fourth source of help will come from an intensification of support at the local levels as a result of better government organization and increased ability to tell local advertisers its needs. This, in some way, is the most important help of all, for it is tied in with local problems and local organizations.

Now just how much help will be forthcoming from these four sources can and should be determined. First of all, the space can be measured. After it is measured, an estimate can be made as to whether or not it is sufficient to do the job.

Then there is a second measurement that should be made: the measurement of effect—the impact on the public. This can be done by known methods. We can determine the grasp the public has of the duties it is to perform. We can determine whether or not the people are getting enough information, and if that information has brought understanding. With this information at hand, we can then come to grips with the problem. We can determine whether or not the present way is the most effective way to do the job.

One thing certain is that the present method being followed can never be under the direct control of the government, although the government can continue to suggest and ask for cooperation. Commercial advertisers regularly make use of exploitation and publicity methods such as were used by the government. Sometimes in a major way—more often in a supplementary way. Advertisers, however, have long

since discovered that generally the cheapest and most effective way of reaching the public is through the purchase of time and space from national and local media—space that can be purchased in the size and frequency needed to do the job; and in the media designed to reach the right audiences.

THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT BUY SPACE NOW

Until we have more facts and the government is more completely staffed, and until we have used up the space and time available to the government, and can study the results of the total effect—including the speeches by the President, Nelson, Henderson, etc.—I am against any organized attempt to urge the purchase of space by the government. This is, of course, only my personal viewpoint.

Agencies often advise a client against advertising until he has a better product. I feel the government has great need of "a better product"—needs to develop more clearly defined policies.

If eventually it becomes clear to the government that the job is not being done right, the advertising business through these months of experience in working with the government will have helped those in government to lay the foundation to get the job done correctly. By that time government officials will have become more familiar with advertising practice and the questions to be answered then would be:

1. Will the freedom of the press be interfered with by government advertising?
2. Can government officials be trusted to "take over" an advertising appropriation and not use it in the interests of a political party?
3. Will Congress appropriate the money?
4. Once Congress has made an appropriation, will it interfere and take up the time of busy government executives to ask why local newspapers, or stations, or other media in their territory are not used?

As far as the freedom of the press is concerned, I believe that the press can take care of itself and that the public will back it up in its efforts. Furthermore, I do not think that our leaders in government will expect a newspaper or magazine to change its editorial policy because it is given advertising space. Any official who ever made such a suggestion—direct or indirect—would be publicly discredited when the facts were known.

Can a political party in power in charge of our government be trusted? I think that it can be. It is trusted to run the army and navy

and to deliver the mail. Once advertising is out in the open, should it not be handled properly, the minority can bring about needed correction.

Will Congress appropriate the money? I think they will, if it is necessary to do so. They appropriated \$85,000,000 for Kaiser to experiment in war plans. If and when they are given an understanding of what such a proved weapon as advertising would do toward unifying the country, I am sure they will respond to any reasonable request of Mr. Elmer Davis, head of the Office of War Information.

Will the congressmen and senators interfere? I think some might, if they are not properly informed—and that job is up to the advertising business. What advertising man has ever spent time with a senator or congressman to tell him how advertising works? There has been little or no interference with the sizeable Navy Campaign.

WHAT ADVERTISING CAN OFFER

I believe that advertising is a force that can make Goebbel's propaganda machine look like a peanut-whistle. I believe that the advertising business is giving the government the help it needs when and where it is needed. It is making that help available in the fastest possible way, without time-consuming arguments. It is, I think, giving an example of good citizenship.

Advertising finds itself, from the popular standpoint, in about the same position as aviation in Billy Mitchell's time. But, it is now making up for its unfortunate neglect to explain the great changes that have come over its own business during the last twenty years.

By combining the talents of editors and writers with those of advertising men, we can bring to the service of the people able leadership in the psychological war. From its daily work the first group has judgment of social and economic problems; the second group, from scientific approach to people's behavior, has a knowledge of public reaction and judgment concerning basic appeals. Together they form a team that can bring forth a clear-cut understanding of what this war is all about; and arouse a mighty wrath in this nation.

And that is why I think it is important for the government and the advertising business to work closely together. Results are starting to come and if we continue to work together, as we are now working, the result will be apparent and very satisfying to the American people.

ARTHUR PRICE

Is THERE any apparent *lack* of advertising, visible or audible, to support the government's war efforts? Would this vast volume of advertising increase or improve in quality if paid for by government subsidy? These two questions should in themselves relegate the problem before us to one of academic proportions.

Consider the outstanding and magnificent contribution to the nation's War Bond selling campaign as an example. The Treasury Department is selling billions of dollars worth of bonds. No advertising space or time has been paid for by the government. Its appropriation bill merely specifies "printing and binding . . . and miscellaneous expenses." Yet, in the first eleven months of the present fiscal year, it is estimated by Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Harold N. Graves that \$65,000,000 of free publicity was received via newspapers, periodicals and radio stations.

America has frowned consistently, to date, on all efforts to replace our voluntary Bond Buying Campaign with any plan that savors of compulsion. Typically American in purpose, economics and philosophy has been the consistent defense of Secretary Morgenthau and the administration of this voluntary effort. Its success cannot be debated.

Our Scrap Salvage Campaign was underwritten by all of a recommended \$2,000,000. It received vastly more than this amount in collateral aid, space and time through widespread local contributions. The splendid work of this first major project of the Advertising Council could hardly be improved by any official government effort, either in scope or effectiveness.

Automotive Conservation, Power Conservation and other campaigns, initiated privately by America's industries, publications and radio stations have supplemented the excellent efforts of the Bureau of Campaigns of the Office of War Information. Has any campaign yet been asked for, that has failed because of lack of financial support? Or could any campaign not now initiated be made possible, or superior in quality, if our government supplied the funds? I do not think this point needs enlarging.

Our government has spent some advertising sums officially—for recruiting, as an example. Have such campaigns not been small, weak,

faltering? Have they not definitely failed to register with the resounding smash of our privately supported campaigns? Are they not perhaps one of our best arguments *against* government support of advertising? Who can offer any visible record of success scored by government paid efforts? Where are the proofs that these methods are superior?

EXPERIENCE ABROAD

Weak in logic and harmful in effect are the arguments raised that other countries have used government supported advertising effectively, such as Canada and England. In England, for example, it is true that the government currently is supporting approximately ten per cent of the entire advertising volume. But look at the figures! Britain's total advertising is now only \$100,000,000 a year. The government is spending only \$10,000,000. There are private businesses in this country that alone spend more!

We have been told by able American advertising men, in support of the proposal, that government sponsorship has raised Britain's advertising standards. Also, that the public's respect for advertising has increased as a result. Does American advertising seek these objectives—in this manner? And would it accomplish any such results here? Britain's standards of advertising and their current practices certainly are far below those of this country. Public acceptance is proportionately smaller. Britain may possibly benefit in these ways, but American imitation can make no visible change in either our standards or public acceptance. Frankly, I do not see any benefits along these lines.

PROBLEMS AND DANGERS

How shall we bring about the proposed changeover to government supported advertising? Let anyone make such a proposal officially and a torrent of heated debate will follow. A drastic dislocation of present activities would threaten us. Advertising as a profession might suffer badly in the process. Advertising media might be accused of bad faith and selfish motives. Confusion would be compounded. We would not enjoy such a debate. Certainly these are not the days to slow up any of the vitally important war efforts.

It is definitely *not* my contention that the proposal is made for purely selfish motives on the part of those that might benefit. It is seriously questioned whether *media* would benefit. The government

probably would not appropriate as much money as is now being spent voluntarily. Some of our media have spoken out boldly against the proposal. Many more realize that the difficulties of avoiding any semblance of favoritism would indeed be considerable.

These practical aspects themselves constitute a potential danger. No one can ignore the possible harm to the cherished "Freedom of the Press." Who can write the formula for the spending of vast government advertising funds throughout the nation's thousands of newspapers, periodicals and radio stations in a manner that would prevent discrimination, favoritism, or accidental oversights?

How shall we agree on the relative amounts to be spent by types of media—as well as in the individual medium? Such a precedent runs against the grain of all America's traditions. It is inconceivable that harmony, freedom from abuse, and successful results would accompany such an experiment in America.

Probably of least importance is the question of who foots the bill. The astronomical aspect of government war expenditures has ceased to frighten us. The horizon of our so-called national debt limit has been obliterated. No one can foretell its eventual location. But those who look ahead to the days when these debts must be liquidated often pause to reflect upon the dangerous philosophy that accompanies such spending. The naive suggestions of our politico-economic fakirs to give us \$30 every Tuesday or \$40 every Thursday or other ridiculous reallocations of the country's wealth constitute one of the most virulent strains in our national makeup today. At war's end, these voices will clamor loudly: first for the expected bonus demands of the soldier veterans; then for renewed subsidies for the unemployed, for make-work projects, for subsidies of every kind. All sorts of schemes that saw birth during the past decade in this country will rise again with renewed strength and be crowded with new fantasies of wealth distribution. These thoughts are frightening to every thinking person who has saved a dollar for the future.

Let not advertising set any added example to open wider the flood gates of government spending. The gates are too difficult to close. The floods sweep too strongly. And the many cross-currents can cut wickedly into our fine American institutions. Let us put away this question for the duration—if not forever.

ARTHUR T. ROBB

THE QUESTION that this paper is designed to answer is neither new nor academic. It has been discussed by practically every department the activities of which involve the influencing of public opinion. It has been debated in Congress. In at least two important instances, the answer has been in the affirmative—both the Army and the Navy, with their subordinate branches, the Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and Air Forces, have been employing advertising vigorously in several media.

It is a question that naturally breaks into three divisions: first, why should the government advertise? Second, what should the government advertise? And third, how should the government advertise?

To people who have devoted their lives to the printed word, supported by commercial advertising, the answer to the "why" question is obvious. Half a century of intensive experience with advertising as an instrument of commerce has proven that no other method of bringing a name, an article, a service, or a need, to public attention produces the desired result so speedily and so economically.

If an actual or a latent public desire for what is advertised exists, advertising affords the proven method of closing the gap between the supply and the demand. That most certainly applies to the present national situation of the United States government. The government has need of all the money that can be raised from its citizens. It has need of the personal services of its sons and daughters in the armed services, in the factories, and on the farm—need, as has been said of the right people at the right place at the right time. It needs the cooperation of all in the conservation of finished goods that are needed for war purposes, and for stringent rationing of goods based on raw materials that are no longer available from foreign sources. And there is not the slightest doubt that the active desire exists on the part of the public to give government whatever it may need to win the war.

Let government state its needs clearly, and the response will be instant and enthusiastic. That was clearly proven in the second campaign for scrap metals and scrap rubber, when the War Production Board presented the newspapers of the country with a candid statement of its problem and put it up to the press to make the program successful. As this is written, reports arrive that the steel industry is working at 145 per cent of its rated capacity, using the scrap that has

been collected during the past month. Early in September, the publishers were informed that shortage of scrap, unless corrected, would force the shutdown of many mills before the month was over. That situation illustrates the positive side of an organized appeal to the public.

The negative side is exemplified by the confusion which existed in the early stages of the rationing program. Conflicting statements were issued by various departments concerned in control of the supply of sugar, gasoline, rubber, etc.—resulting in a rush to corner existing supplies, the threat of “black markets,” and a general feeling that Washington did not know what it was doing. That situation prevails now with respect to the utilization of the country’s vast population. The problem has been stated in general terms by the President, but the divisions of government which must carry the program to its conclusion are still muddling along with proposed solutions that can wreck the national economy without necessarily finding and allocating the human energy that we need to wage a successful war.

If advertising processes are applied to these problems, business and engineering thought will have to be substituted for the political fumbling that has hampered our war progress in so many respects up to now. That fact is as important as the advertising itself. It will compel a realistic approach, adequate organization, selection of personnel on the basis of ability and experience rather than by political acquaintance.

WHAT SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT ADVERTISE?

Given this advertising approach, what then should be advertised?

The list of possible programs to which advertising can be applied has been issued by the Advertising Council. It is long and it will be longer. Most important, and therefore, most elaborate is the program laid out for the Treasury Department on war finance, all branches of which call for voluntary cooperation by private enterprises to furnish the needed funds. The British and Canadian governments have found opportunities to use advertising in almost every phase of their war effort, which, naturally, long ago reached a stage of intensity which is only now being attained in this country. And one has only to read the daily newspapers to realize that each day presents confusing developments against which advertising can be used to tell the people exactly what the government plans, not what conflicting self-seekers hope that it will plan.

HOW SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT ADVERTISE?

Exactly as any successful business firm advertises—to the most promising “market” for its “product.” In the case of war finance, every form of popular appeal should be used—daily and weekly newspapers, magazine campaigns, radio programs. Neither space nor time allotments need be large; in fact, frequency might be more effective than the emphasis of black-face type or radio dramatization. Other activities and projects should be advertised to the groups especially interested in them, on whatever scale is considered appropriate by the advertising experts whose services the government already has at command.

Space and time and whatever other advertising facilities can be used should be purchased on a strictly business basis. Politics should be as far out of the picture in the purchase of advertising as it is of steel for a tank or copper for shells. To cynics this will sound like a counsel of impossible perfection. It need not be. The newspaper publishers and the magazine publishers, the trade journal craft, and the radio broadcasters have shown themselves to be unselfishly patriotic in extending their facilities for government use. Once they are convinced that government advertising is being placed on strictly business principles, and not as political patronage, they will do nothing to upset that happy situation. The answer rests entirely with the machine that the government should, and, I believe, eventually will, set up to administer its advertising program. There should be no thought of using government advertising as a press or radio subsidy—a contingency which has been frequently mentioned both by government officials and by newspaper editors as a reason for avoiding paid advertising campaigns by the government. There should be no idea of using the advertising program as a means of controlling or suppressing editorial expression, or of stifling criticism of governmental mistakes.

Advertising has a job to do that is entirely independent of the news and editorial functions of the newspaper and magazine press and the radio business. Its particular function can be performed by no other instrumentality known to American commerce. And George Creel, who had more experience than any other man in American war publicity in 1917-1918, as head of the Committee on Public Information, declared a few months ago that the publicity job in the last war could

have been accomplished far more efficiently and economically than it had been, by the use of paid advertising. His experience should not be neglected in this far more inclusive struggle.

RALPH COGHLAN

GOD FORBID that the time will ever come when the newspapers of the United States depend for their revenues to any important or continuing extent upon government advertising. If that time comes, a cold and clammy hand will be laid upon Article I of the Bill of Rights and freedom of the press, as we now know it, will be gone with the wind. Nor do I mean necessarily that the ancient right would be impaired by insidious or overt attack by government officials; the impairment could easily take place by the psychological effect of government support upon publishers and editors themselves.

The recurring world crises—military and economic—since 1914 have revolutionized the old Jeffersonian concept, by which government was regarded as a necessary evil to perform only such primary functions as the preservation of order. In our own country, as elsewhere in the world, the exigencies of the times have required government to accept responsibility for the economic welfare of citizens. There is now hardly a field of life in which government has not intervened in some way or another.

Many persons regard this tendency with the gravest of apprehension and long for the return of a society governed by the political philosophy of Thomas Jefferson and the economic philosophy of Adam Smith. But what is the use of being apprehensive over a vast historical process as inexorable as time itself? I do think, however, the process can be altered, shaped and guided, and here is where a fiercely independent press can play an invaluable role.

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

If freedom of the press is impaired, as it would be if it had to look to the government treasury for funds to operate, would it not to a dangerous degree lose the objectivity and the power of will to play this role? Since we have entered an era of collectivism, it is vital, it seems to me, for the press to hold itself aloof, as an institution unique, as indeed a kind of government itself, to check the abuses of the govern-

ing power. So swiftly are we moving under the impact of war toward a changed order that it is hard to say what the morrow will bring. But let's cling as tenaciously as possible to press freedom, the greatest single agency for the scrutiny of government under our system.

If the cash register in the counting room were ringing up government money regularly, there would be a tendency of publishers and editors to pull their punches when it came to engaging in what is now the customary and often drastic criticism of government that has been so beneficial to our nation. The fine, free rapture would be gone because the counting room would begin whispering that, if this sort of thing keeps up, we lose our advertising contract with Mr. Morgenthau. That whisper would spread through the shop.

Now don't give me the buncombe that publishers and editors are above such paltry considerations. Don't tell me that the government, in advertising, would be getting value received in the form of white paper, ink and in spreading whatever messages it wants to spread. There is a trait in human nature—and it is a fine, fundamental trait in most cases—which makes it abhorrent for a person to bite the hand that feeds him. In this case, in the case of a newspaper softening or omitting criticism because of the box office receipts, it would be tragic for American journalism.

PRIVATE VERSUS GOVERNMENTAL ADVERTISING

At this point, let me make a sharp distinction between accepting important and continuing funds from the United States Government and accepting funds from private advertisers. Last spring, at the convention of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, where the subject of government advertising was discussed at some length and in some heat, Eugene Meyer, objecting to a resolution that had been offered, rose to make this statement:

Mr. Chairman, I merely wish to raise a question as to whether advertisers control newspapers by their advertising, the government any more than anybody else. Are we ready to admit that? I, for one, am not influenced by my advertisers. I am sorry I haven't got more [laughter], but nevertheless they do not control my paper. If we are going to refuse advertising for fear that the government will control it [the press] by advertising, why doesn't it apply to any other advertising?

That is a fine statement, but does it not overlook the fact that

Mr. Meyer's *Washington Post*, as well as all metropolitan newspapers, take ads from scores or hundreds of private advertisers and, if classified ads are included, from thousands of private advertisers as well, none of whom is strong enough to tell Mr. Meyer what his news or editorial policies shall be? Is there not a distinction between depending upon revenue from scores, hundreds or thousands of private advertisers and accepting—and I emphasize the words important and continuing—important and continuing advertising revenue from the United States Government?

If Mr. Meyer will permit me to embellish his own theme, I will be happy to do so. I will say that a corkingly good case can be made for the thesis that private advertising, instead of prostituting the American press, has in fact made it independent. Some months ago, Professor Fred S. Siebert of the University of Illinois School of Journalism made a speech on this subject in which he said:

As advertising was developed and became a source of revenue, making the publisher of a newspaper financially independent, it became more difficult for the government to devise methods of controlling it.

THE CASE OF FRANCE

Note well that, while Mr. Siebert breaks a lance for the beneficial influence of private advertising, he points out that it protected the press from what?—from the power of the government to control it. As a horrible example of the other kind of press—a press not self-supporting—we need only look at the late, unlamented, whorish press of France. This press did not receive sufficient funds, either from advertising or circulation, to live independently, so it lived by subsidies and secret gifts, gifts from government bureaucrats and officeholders who wanted to stay in power, gifts from aspiring politicians who wanted to get into power and even gifts from foreign agents who sought and succeeded in undermining French democracy. One of the reasons that the French Republic is dead today is because first the press of France was corrupted. The press, chloroformed by special interests, including government interests, could not tell the French people the truth about the French Government.

In opposing government advertising, I will not be pushed into a false position, any more than I will go the whole way and contend that private advertising has never affected newspaper policies. While I agree

in general with Mr. Siebert's point of view, there have been many instances when weak publishers and editors have yielded to the pressure of private advertisers. On the whole, however, the American press is as wholesomely independent as any in the history of nations.

The newspaper I work for, like most metropolitan newspapers, has accepted government advertising, particularly since the beginning of this war, for the purpose, among other things, of recruiting men for the armed forces. Some of this has been paid for directly by the government; other advertising has been submitted by the government and has been paid for by private individuals and companies as a contribution to the war effort. So far as the latter type is concerned, the newspaper I work for, as well as others, also as a contribution to the war effort, has established a special low rate which covers but little more than bare production costs. If I were a publisher, or a business manager, and the government came to me and said: "We have to advertise to produce a certain result," I would be less than patriotic to refuse to open the paper to such a request. But I hope it would be under such terms as would not in any way compromise the newspaper I represented.

THE ATTITUDE OF "EDITOR & PUBLISHER"

To be perfectly plain and brutally frank about this, what gives me a deep feeling of nausea is for the newspapers of the United States, or any agency which might be thought to represent the newspapers, to go to the Treasury like measly mendicants and beg for a sustained campaign of advertising by the United States Government. This is to invite the camel to get his nose under the tent and this is what the trade publication, *Editor & Publisher*, has attempted to do. For many months *Editor & Publisher* has consistently urged that the United States Government devote a huge sum of money for advertising war bonds and other things in the daily press, speciously denying that this would involve a subsidy, but piously insisting that the laborer is worthy of his hire.

As a protest against what seemed to me an arrant piece of hypocrisy, I went before the American Society of Newspaper Editors last spring with the following resolution:

Whereas a determined and protracted campaign is being conducted to induce the United States Government to appropriate funds to be spent for paid advertising in the newspapers of the nation; and

Whereas this campaign, however practical its intentions, tends to expose newspapers to the charge of putting a dollar sign on patriotism and capitalizing the war as a means of increasing their profits, and

Whereas newspapers generally have condemned profiteering by industry and unfair demands by labor unions and the farm bloc as hurtful to the national morale and to the war effort; and

Whereas acceptance by the newspapers of government money might be a first step toward threatening the independence of the American press and leading toward such a condition as engulfed the subsidized press of France, enabling government bureaucrats to penalize their newspaper enemies and reward their newspaper friends;

Be it resolved that this society, one of whose purposes is to hold high the ethics and integrity of the press, condemns the campaign to obtain what amounts to a subsidy from the United States Treasury.

After granting a hearing to Arthur Robb of *Editor & Publisher* and myself, the Resolutions Committee drafted and presented to the Convention the following resolution:

BE IT RESOLVED: That the American Society of Newspaper Editors is unalterably opposed to any governmental policy which may be construed or has resemblance to a wartime subsidy of the American press, since such a policy might gravely endanger the news and editorial integrity of newspapers; and

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED: That the patriotic services of the American press never have been and must never be evaluated in terms of dollars; therefore, from the standpoint of editors, we deplore any apparent solicitation or action which may be construed as an effort to bring pressure upon the government to buy advertising space in the newspapers of the nation.

STAND OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS

It might have been supposed that a convention of editors would have adopted this rather mild resolution as a matter of course; instead, there was a battle so heated as to astonish and dismay some of the veteran members. When in an attempt to dispose of the whole subject conveniently, one member made a motion to table the resolution, thus automatically cutting off debate, and the motion passed, I myself left the convention room in deep disappointment. In the lobby, a fellow member gently chided me for bringing up a controversial subject in what he reminded me was "nothing but a journalistic Rotary Club." But, it appears, this was to underestimate the temper of some of the members.

For example, Tom Wallace of the Louisville Times, so angry he could hardly articulate, rose to a point of personal privilege to say:

I move that in view of the fact that it seems to be the sense of this convention that we may not discuss anything in which publishers might be concerned, we forthwith dissolve.

The president of the society, Dwight Marvin, ruled that Tom Wallace was out of order, but a moment or two later the society's most distinguished member, William Allen White of Emporia, rose to a question of personal privilege to say:

I was elected director of this association this afternoon and consider it one of the highest honors of my life. But if I am going to go out and 'front' for a resolution which says that our job is to ring bells under the coattails of the American Publishers' Association, I am out.

This was a fair resolution. Haven't we a right, as members or employees of the press, to say anything in God's world about a matter that will put the finger, the dirty finger on us? Eugene Meyer knows there is a lot of difference between receiving money from Kahn's Dry Goods Co. and taking the money of the taxpayers of these United States in time of war. You can't make a parallel of that and I, for one, don't want to go before the American people as a director of an association that bends the knee to the business office.

I left the Kansas City Star on account of the business office. The Emporia Gazette runs the editorial page and the writing end of the business merely to give the business office something to do!

This is unfair. Our association will hear from this. We will be weakened from this, all of us. You have made a terrible, terrible mistake today. There were other ways to dispose of this. There are more ways of killing a cat than choking it to death on butter. But to deliberately go before the American people, saying that we won't take any position as editors toward which the publishers disagree—we are merely wearing a dog collar, not even with a name on it.

Despite these eloquent appeals, the American Society of Newspaper Editors shamefully compromised by accepting a hermaphroditic resolution offered by Richard Finnegan of the Chicago Times reading as follows: "It is an axiom of journalism that newspapers seek no favors or subsidies of government." This, of course, is tantamount to re-enacting the Ten Commandments or coming out four square against the seven capital sins.

Editor & Publisher enjoys freedom of press just as any other publication does, and if it wants to plug the box office view of journalism, it has a perfect right to do so. But so do others have the right to deny that this trade organ can set the ethical and philosophical pattern for the American press. If this statement is wrong, I daresay that John Peter Zenger, Elijah Lovejoy, Horace Greeley, Henry Grady, Murat Halstead,

Joseph Medill, Henry Watterson and Joseph Pulitzer are turning in their graves.

LEONARD DREYFUSS

THE QUESTION, "Should the Government advertise?," breaks down into two considerations. First, should the government advertise because that would be helpful to the war effort, to building morale, to *selling* the war? And second, is it sensible or morally right for the government to expect to spread its messages without paying for them?

Can advertising help win the War? The American public has been taught to believe in advertising. This is no mere accident. It resulted from the long, hard struggle of ethically-minded advertising men and women to teach the public to trust and believe in advertised products and services. Americans reach instinctively for advertised brands. They know that for the most part advertised articles are produced by honorable manufacturers who have spent millions in research and who have turned out a product that they can buy with complete confidence.

You may think it a sad commentary on our citizenship for me to make the positive statement that this war must be constantly advertised. It seems somewhat preposterous that our government, engaged in a righteous peoples' war that it did not seek, should find it necessary to sell this war to its citizens every day. If we face the truth, however, we must admit that this is so. This war differs from all other wars of our country in the past, in that the people are puzzled by it. It seems fantastic that we, a peaceful nation, should be fighting off gangsters and murderers such as Hitler, Mussolini, and Hirohito, who are not fighting for principle, but for loot. Millions of Americans must have it brought home to them that this time we are not, as Woodrow Wilson said, "fighting to make the world safe for democracy." We literally have our backs to the wall and are fighting for just one thing—to make the world safe for *decency*.

The government has before it a herculean task of constantly selling all phases of the war. It must condition people for adversity. It must ever and eternally sell its war bonds. It has a tremendous selling job in teaching America to save—save its scrap, its tin, its rubber, its fat, and in days to come, many other things. Week after week new selling jobs appear, and these will become more critical as the war lengthens. It must be very

apparent that there is great need for forceful, informative government advertising.

SHALL THE GOVERNMENT PAY FOR ADVERTISING

Fifty years ago we were still in the "horse and buggy—oil lamp" era. Since then America has become the foremost commercial nation in the world. Some fifty years ago we entered the era of invention when we began the quantity production of unheard-of gadgets and conveniences. It was the beginning of the era of mass production that could never have been possible without its running mate, mass selling. Mass selling was made possible by the use of a mass salesman, advertising. And so, America quickly became the world's number one inventor and producer, supplying all nations with automobiles, iceless refrigeration, vacuum cleaners and a thousand other helps to a "more abundant life" that have changed the pattern of our civilization. In taking an inventory we find that the people of the United States comprise seven per cent of the world's population and we live upon six per cent of the world's land area. Even before this war began we had half the wealth of the world. We have always used three-quarters of the world's rubber and produced none of it; that's why we are now so short of it. We always bought three-quarters of the world's silk and consumed three-quarters of the world's coffee. The list is endless. This, mind you, for seven per cent of the world's people. In other words, we built comforts into lives as necessities that are sheer luxuries everywhere else on the face of the globe. For instance, we have an automobile for every five people, and the nearest country to us, even before the war, was England with an automobile to every forty-one.

All of this was made possible by the ingenious employment of advertising. We invented something, and overnight we spread the news of it in the advertising columns of newspapers and magazines—on the billboards and by radio. Within a matter of days the whole country knew about it. We found we could take something out of the unknown and quickly make it customary. We created a desire to own the newest gadgets. Iceless refrigeration, air-conditioning, frozen foods, etc. became facts instead of theories. These things were bought and used universally in the short space of a few years. In any other country in the world it would have taken two decades.

Now this great force, advertising, for years has supported the newspapers and magazines of the country. A well-known weekly that for one hundred years has sold for five cents, and is now priced at ten, would have to sell for forty-eight cents were it not for its advertising pages. Radio in the United States is the finest in the world; the best programs, the most interesting entertainment made possible only by commercial sponsorship. Outdoor advertising in America can spread a message in 17,000 cities and towns, in large size and in color, practically overnight. Employing these media, a manufacturer can take an unknown product and make it a household word in a remarkably short space of time.

Within the past six months the government has taken over the automobile industry, the refrigerator business, has completely controlled gasoline and tires. It is reaching down and taking everything except non-essentials for the war. These were the country's greatest advertisers. They were the great users of advertising media. How are the advertising facilities to exist unless the government pays for the space it needs to tell its story? In England the government is today the largest advertiser. For instance, it buys some forty per cent of the billboard space available in England. It does so for two reasons, I am told—to get its war messages over to the public, and to assure the survival of the advertising industry. This is true, too, in Canada where the government buys twenty-five per cent of the space of the advertising media, for two reasons: first, of course, to tell its many stories and sell the people on its programs; and second, to keep alive this facility for expression, this opportunity to reach the people that is so critically important as the war drags on.

So I say very definitely—yes, the government should advertise;—yes, it should pay for its advertising.

CONTROL BOARD NEEDED

I feel, too, that there needs to be set up in Washington an Advertising Control Board. This Board should not be placed in the hands of novices. There should be no such thing as an Army Advertising Bureau or a Navy Advertising Bureau or various departmental advertising agencies. We badly need a "Donald Nelson" in charge of government advertising. He should gather around him the best brains of the advertising business. They should tell the government's story to the people as

forcefully and graphically as the Standard Oil Company sells its Esso Gas, Chevrolet or Ford its motor cars, or Heinz its pickles.

Advertising is essentially an American achievement, successful to the nth degree. It made us a great commercial nation. It can play a most important part in winning the war. No one doubts that the responsibility for winning the war is upon our armed forces. But the time it will take to win the war rests with the civilian. He who was formerly the consumer must now be the producer. The young men of the nation who used to produce are waging battle. The civilians who are left must provide food, munitions, clothing for the millions of men of our armed forces, and then, if there is anything left, the civilians are to have it.

There are dire days ahead for us. We civilians are asked to encourage our officials, but no one stops to think that we civilians need all the encouragement from government that we can get. The government can do a great job of building morale, of selling the winning of this war. Hundreds of thousands of citizens are stunned by the war's impact and are not awake to the fact that if each of us does a little, the result is colossal. Yes, there is a tremendous advertising job to be done by government. What a challenge it could be to some clear-thinking, patriotic advertising craftsmen!

COMPULSORY STUDY OF AMERICAN HISTORY—AN APPRAISAL

By JOSEPH R. STRAYER

Is it not important, especially in wartime, that every American citizen have a knowledge of the history of the country for which he is fighting? If so, why does it not follow that students, particularly those in our universities and colleges, should be required to take at least one course in American history? Professor Strayer gives the answer, pointing out forcefully and cogently why compulsory courses of this nature do not always produce the results desired; what dangers are pres-

ent; and how teachers of American history can best meet the new responsibilities they face.

Professor Strayer holds degrees from Princeton and Harvard. Since 1930 he has been a member of the Princeton faculty and is now Henry Charles Lea professor of history and chairman of the department. His published works are primarily in the fields of medieval and American history.

ON JUNE 21, 1942, the *New York Times* published a long article on the status of American history in the colleges and universities of the country. This article, based on answers to a questionnaire¹ sent to all heads of institutions of higher learning, established two facts. Most colleges do not require American history for entrance or graduation,² and most undergraduates never take a course in American history.³ Publication of these figures, backed up by a strong editorial, started a nationwide campaign to make American history a required subject for all undergraduates. Newspapers, politicians, professional and patriotic organizations have clamored for compulsory American history in the colleges, and several institutions have already made the study of American history a prerequisite to graduation.

The reasons for this agitation are easily understood. The crisis of the war, and what may be the even greater crisis of the peace, threaten our nation, our ideals, our way of life. We need patriotic, intelligent citizens as never before. How can a man be patriotic if he knows nothing of the history of his country? How can a man play his part as a citizen if he knows nothing of the aspirations and achievements

¹ 690 colleges or universities answered the questionnaire fully or in part. It does not seem likely that complete returns would have greatly altered the results.

² 171 out of 606 institutions (28%) require American history for admission. 127 out of 681 institutions (18%) require American history for graduation.

³ 54,826 undergraduates out of 587,554 (9%) took courses in American history during the academic year 1941-1942.

of American democracy? How can a man appreciate the American way of life if he knows nothing of the heroic struggle by which it was established?

IS COMPULSION ADVISABLE?

These arguments seem unanswerable, and yet many historians are very doubtful about the advisability of establishing required courses in American history in our colleges. This hesitation is due only in part to academic conservatism. Certainly the new courses would be a nuisance. Few teachers enjoy giving a required course—fighting the dead weight of students who resent the requirements and do just as little work as possible, lowering standards to the point where undergraduates with no aptitude for the subject may still have some chance of passing. Certainly the new courses would be a threat to academic freedom. Definitions of patriotism and good citizenship vary, and the pressure groups which insist on compulsory American history might soon decide that college courses in the subject did not measure up to their standards. There would be a constant fight against outside forces anxious to turn history into propaganda. But these inconveniences, serious though they might be, are not the basic reasons for rejecting the plan. Historians are as willing to sacrifice personal convenience to the national good as any other group, and if they were convinced that compulsory courses in American history would lead to a new birth of patriotism and civic responsibility, they would not hesitate to advocate the change. The real reason why so many historians are reluctant to make American history a required course is that they are not sure that it would produce the desired results. Study of American history is not equally valuable for all undergraduates, and it is not always the best way to gain an appreciation of American traditions and ideals.

In the first place, a required course in American history would have to be given in the first or second year of college work. During their last two years undergraduates usually begin to specialize, either because they have become interested in a particular subject or because they are preparing for a professional school. These men seldom are able to take all the courses they want, and it would be both difficult and unfair to impose the additional limitation of a required course in history. Moreover, under present conditions, very few men will be able to remain in

college for the full four years, and the only way to make sure that all undergraduates study American history would be to give it in freshman year. This, however, is the worst possible time to give a compulsory course in American history. Many undergraduates have just finished a course in American history at the secondary school level.⁴ These secondary school courses vary somewhat in content and value, but the better ones are not greatly inferior to the ordinary college survey of American history. In fact, college teachers of American history are constantly making the embarrassing discovery that books which they assign to sophomores or juniors have already been used in secondary school. Obviously students who have had a good course in American history in the years just before they enter college would gain little by a repetition of the course in freshman year. It is equally obvious that a freshman course which would interest these men would be too advanced for those who had not studied American history since the seventh or eighth grade.

This, of course, is a purely mechanical difficulty. It could be solved by exempting all undergraduates from the required course who had offered American history for entrance, perhaps by exempting all who had studied American history in the last two years of secondary school. It could also be solved by giving two courses in freshman year, one for beginners and one for advanced students of the subject. This second solution, however, is less satisfactory. It would create new administrative difficulties, especially in the smaller colleges, where the number of history courses that can be offered is necessarily limited. Moreover, for reasons which will be indicated below, it seems probable that students who already have a working knowledge of American history might gain a deeper appreciation of our civilization through the study of other subjects.

⁴ I have been unable to find any precise statement as to the number of freshmen who have had American history in the last two years of secondary school. A study made at Princeton two years ago indicated that 46% of the freshman class had had such a course. The 1941 Report of the College Entrance Examination Board shows that 2,580 of 10,003 students (26%) taking the subject-matter examinations offered American history. The figures for the preceding year are very similar; 2,649 candidates out of 10,751 offered American history. It is a reasonable supposition that most of these students studied the subject in the last two years of secondary school. Erling M. Hunt, "More American History?" *Social Education*, October 1942, p. 251, states that almost all students in senior high schools are required to take one year of American history, but he does not say in which year the course usually comes.

HISTORICAL SENSE NOT UNIVERSAL

A more serious objection is the fact that there are people—sometimes very intelligent people—who do not find it easy to think in historical terms. Every teacher of history knows the type—the student who is unable to grasp the idea of gradual development, who cannot feel the difference in social atmosphere as generation succeeds generation, who is unable to see any recognizable pattern in the events of the past. Such students have a sort of chronological myopia which makes everything which happened more than thirty or forty years ago blur into a shadowy background where there is neither form nor movement. It is true that we are all historians without knowing it, since we all base our actions on our own past experience, but it is not true that we can all use the experience of preceding generations with equal effectiveness. And this deficiency in the historical sense is apt to be especially acute in the adolescent about to enter college. He has passed the age at which he was interested in history as a story, and he has not yet reached the age at which he will be interested in history as a sort of extended reminiscence. Lacking these personal interests, lacking the ability to see history as process and development, he will flounder miserably in any course in the subject. He will learn facts without worrying about their significance and generalizations without worrying about the skeleton of facts which support them. Such a man will not gain any understanding of American life from a course in American history. He is much more apt to develop a profound antipathy to any discussion of American traditions, ideals, and aspirations.

AMERICANISM THROUGH OTHER FIELDS

This does not mean that students who have difficulty with history are forever debarred from an understanding of American civilization. They may be deeply interested in disciplines which do not require historical perspective. They may be able to analyze political and economic systems, to study great works of literature and art, to ponder problems of human conduct and belief. Knowledge may be organized systematically as well as historically, and many people can profit more from the systematic approach. To give a specific example, some students might gain a better understanding of American government by comparing it with the governments of several other countries than by studying its

development in this country since the seventeenth century. The essential thing is to give the undergraduate a wide range of experience so that he will find familiar elements in any new situation—and human experience extends in a horizontal as well as a vertical plane. If there are certain essential values in the American way of life they must exist outside of time as well as in time; they must be present in politics, economics, philosophy and the arts, as well as in history.

Failure to recognize this fact is a much more serious weakness in our college teaching than the lack of emphasis on American history. It is almost impossible for a student to come to college entirely ignorant of American history, but it is quite possible for him to know nothing of the American achievement in political and economic theory, in philosophy and the arts. There are too many institutions where this deficiency can never be remedied, where European forms of thought and expression are presented in their remote perfection with no indication that Americans have ever concerned themselves with such things. Fortunately this curious reverse isolationism is breaking down, and more and more colleges are studying American as well as European culture. Where this is true there is no excuse for a compulsory course in American history. A student who knows something of American literature, American art, American philosophy, American political or economic theory, will know a good deal about the American way of life. If we use the American experience as a point of reference in all our work in social and humanistic studies, no student will be able to remain in complete ignorance of the beliefs and aspirations of his own people.

FOREIGN HISTORIES CAN GIVE PERSPECTIVE

Let us suppose that the number of students who cannot profit from the study of history is very small, and that the number who have gained adequate knowledge of the subject in the last years of secondary school is not much greater. Let us suppose that college authorities devise tests which will reveal the undergraduates who fall in these two categories. Would it then be advisable to require all other members of the entering class to take a course in American history? Even though this procedure would assure a relatively homogeneous group of students able to profit from the course, it is not certain that it would be wise. There is much to be said for the old custom of studying European history during the first or second year of college. This may seem to contradict what was just

said about overemphasis on the European tradition in other disciplines, but the two cases are not quite the same. All entering students know something of American history; very few know anything of American art or philosophy. Almost all the states require the teaching of American history in the elementary schools, and the subject is regularly taught even in the schools which are not bound by state laws.⁵ In the great majority of school systems all students study American history twice, once in the lower grades and once in junior high school or its equivalent.⁶ As we have seen, many more take it a third time in the last two years of secondary school. The result is that most undergraduates know enough American history so that it can be used as a basis for other work. They may have forgotten many facts, they may be confused about certain episodes, but they have some idea of the main course of events.

There are historians who are so worried about the gaps in undergraduate knowledge of American history that they think the most important thing is to repair these defects at once, but this seems a short-sighted policy. It would be a remarkable man who remembered all the details of all the courses he had ever taken. The usual rule is that facts which are not used are soon forgotten. If undergraduates have forgotten the facts of American history after studying them two or three times it does not seem unreasonable to assume that the facts had little significance for them. The remedy for this is certainly not to teach the same facts to the same men for the third or fourth time. Even if the freshman course is full of new insights, new points of view and new information, it will look like the same old story. It may be so much the same old story that the student will not be forced to reconsider the meaning of familiar facts. The study of the history of another country or another period provides the element of contrast which gives American history its meaning. How can a student understand the American experience if he thinks it the normal, inevitable experience of all peoples? How can he realize the unique values in the American tradition if he knows no other tradition? How can he appreciate our institutions without comparing

⁵ J. K. Flanders, *Legislative Control of the Elementary Curriculum* (New York, 1925), pp. 29-33, found that thirty-five states required by law the teaching of American history in 1923, and that in the others American history was in practice compulsory. R. M. Tryon, *The Social Sciences as School Subjects* (New York, 1935), p. 62, found that 43 states in 1930 had laws requiring the teaching of the Federal Constitution, a subject usually closely associated with the study of American history.

⁶ Herbert B. Bruner and others, *What Our Schools Are Teaching* (New York, 1941), pp. 125, 135, 137-139; Tryon, *op. cit.*, pp. 215, 225, 233.

them with other institutions? It may even be argued that study of European policy is more conducive to patriotism than prolonged study of American history. In studying our own history the student is apt to take our virtues for granted and to be shocked by our wasted opportunities, our stupidities, our failures to live up to our ideals. If he studies European history he will discover that our faults can be matched in other countries, while our achievements cannot.

There is, of course, the danger that the student will not make such comparisons and contrasts. There are undergraduates who will think that because European history comes out of a red book and American history out of a blue one, the two subjects have no connection. Good teaching is probably a more effective cure for this weakness than any arrangement of courses, but there is one device which has been reasonably successful in encouraging students to make their own comparisons. This is the freshman, or freshman-sophomore course which studies American history as part of modern world history, or which discusses the parallel development of the different civilizations of the Americas.⁷ In either case, repetition of the facts of American history is reduced to a minimum, and yet the student is constantly invited to compare the American experience with that of Europe or Latin-America. Such treatment places familiar facts in a new light and gives significance to episodes which are rather dull studied alone. For example, the rapid extension of suffrage after the Revolution seems much more remarkable when contrasted with European experience. Our relations with the Indians become much more significant when the student realizes the importance of the Indian problem in Latin-America. Elaborate courses in Modern Civilization or the History of the Americas cannot be set up unless the college has properly trained teachers and a well equipped library, but the basic idea behind these courses can be carried out in any place which can afford a professor of European history. If European history is taught so that the student is constantly reminded of the facts of American history, he will gain a better understanding of both subjects.

PATRIOTISM MUST BE PRACTICED

Finally, it should be recognized that there are limits to the effectiveness of purely academic training. Even if, through compulsion or

⁷ Johns Hopkins and Barnard give courses of the first type; Princeton is experimenting with one of the second.

persuasion, we succeeded in making most of our undergraduates study American history, there would be no guarantee that it would make them responsible, patriotic citizens. History merely suggests, it cannot command; it can discuss the wisdom and effectiveness of past decisions, but it cannot dictate the decisions which we now have to make. History can amplify and clarify a tradition, but history alone cannot keep a tradition alive. If the American tradition exists only in books and classrooms it is already dead. Traditions and ideals are effective guides to conduct only if they are preserved in the minds and hearts of the people. We have a tendency in this country to expect the schools and colleges to teach our young people virtues which we ourselves do not practice. If there is a conflict between what is taught in the school and what is done in the community, it is not the school which will be victorious. The one thing which I remember from a compulsory course in civics is that the city official, who was brought in to speak to us on financial administration, was indicted a month later for misappropriation of funds.

The classic example of the ineffectiveness of academic patriotism is furnished by the recent experience of France. The French schools had an elaborate system for inculcating patriotism, a system which relied heavily on the detailed study of French history.⁸ The methods of instruction were excellent, the teachers were well trained, and the textbooks were superior to those found in any other country. But what the schools taught was the union of all citizens in unselfish support of their country, and what the students saw about them were irreconcilable cleavages between Right and Left, greedy politicians plotting for office, and cynical individuals seeking special favors from a corrupt government. When the test came, the ideals taught in the schools were not strong enough to overcome the habits of the people. Contrast this with the experience of England. English schools were rather uninterested in teaching patriotism; they did not always emphasize the study of English history and when they did it was not always taught effectively.⁹ But the English tradition was alive outside the schools; it was stronger than social cleavage, economic distress, and greediness for material comforts. When the great test came, the English people re-

⁸ C. J. H. Hayes, *France, A Nation of Patriots* (New York, 1930), pp. 35ff.

⁹ J. M. Gaus, *Great Britain; A Study of Civic Loyalty* (Chicago, 1929), pp. 155ff.

membered that they were English, that more than anything else they wanted England and the English way of life to survive, and that if they had to choose between the survival of their material environment and the survival of their ideals they would choose the latter. It is this spirit which we need, and which we can have only by living the American tradition as well as by talking about it. If all of us, not merely writers and teachers, but all of us, make a real effort to live up to the American ideal in our daily lives, we will not have to worry about preserving it in books and classes.

STEPS TO BE TAKEN

The argument so far has been largely negative. It has attempted to show that requiring all undergraduates to take a course in American history is not always the most effective way of making them appreciate the ideals and institutions of their country. This is not a defense of the *status quo*. Not all undergraduates should take American history, but certainly more than nine per cent should be interested in the subject. Something is wrong either with our teaching or with our students when so few of them are willing to study American history. College teachers can do little about the character of the student body, but they can do a good deal to make American history seem more important.

One of the obvious steps is to admit that many undergraduates do know a good deal about American history and will not be attracted by the old-fashioned outline of political events. There are still far too many college courses which are not much more than repetitions of secondary school courses. They have a little more reading, a little more detail, but they cover the same material and often use the same books. And yet there are wide areas of American history—such as our foreign policy—which can never be dealt with adequately in secondary school. There are topics—such as the growth of American corporations—which cannot be understood until the student has had the advantage of college work in the other social studies. It is true that undergraduates need a background of political history before they can study such topics intelligently, but very few of them need to take a two-semester course in order to gain the background. A little extra reading will remind them of the facts which they have half forgotten, and they can proceed at once to work which they find interesting instead of suffering through a long review period.

EMPHASIS UPON AMERICAN CIVILIZATION

If we make our college courses in American history discussions of the development of American civilization instead of detailed outlines of political history we should be able to interest more students in the subject. Such a change in emphasis would attract, not only undergraduates majoring in history, but also those working in the other social studies and the humanities. There are close connections between history and economics, history and literature, history and art, history and philosophy, but these relationships are not self-evident. They have to be pointed out to undergraduates. This may be done, both in the history course itself and through interdepartmental plans of study. Many colleges have already set up programs for the study of American civilization, based on the cooperation of several departments, and these programs have already increased enrollment in courses in American history. As these programs pass out of the experimental stage and spread to other institutions, they should become even more effective in stimulating interest in American history.

One more weakness in the teaching of American history must be remedied if students are to become interested in the subject. Many teachers of American history are reluctant to draw conclusions or to suggest the significance of their facts. There seems to be a tradition in many American history courses that the facts speak for themselves, and that it is both unscholarly and an insult to the intelligence of the student to suggest an interpretation. Teachers of European history are much less apt to have these scruples, and this may be one reason why their courses attract more students. There are good reasons for the emphasis on objectivity in teaching American history, but they are not irresistible. It is usually safe enough to risk a generalization about European history—no one is offended if the French Revolution is interpreted in terms of the class struggle. It would cause a good deal of unfavorable comment if the same hypothesis were used in discussing the American Revolution. The teacher of European history is usually covering far too much ground to dwell lovingly on every detail. He is often dealing with unfamiliar material which must be simplified and explained in terms which his students will understand. The teacher of American history usually covers no more than seventy-five years in one semester and is not under such pressure to summarize and generalize.

He is dealing with familiar facts which do not seem to need explanation. The result is that while courses in European history may become so general that they lose touch with reality, courses in American history become mere catalogues of facts. The student, instead of learning to think for himself, never learns to think at all. Even the values of objectivity may be lost in the end. Either the facts are so selected that the student gains the impression that the building of American civilization was an inevitable, and relatively painless process, or he acquires the even more misleading impression that American history has no significance of any sort.

DANGERS OF INDOCTRINATION

This brings up the touchy subject of indoctrination. If American history is to be more than a list of facts, will it not be necessary to have an official interpretation? If American history is taught honestly, if it is explained as the teacher really sees it, will it be conducive to patriotism? Will the American people, especially in time of war, permit history to be taught if it is not a direct stimulant to patriotism? It is not easy to answer these questions and no one historian can pretend to speak for all his colleagues in such matters. There is, however, one point on which most teachers would agree. Our undergraduates are very quick to detect insincerity and hypocrisy in their instructors. They are always a little suspicious of people who try to play on their emotions and the suspicion becomes open resentment when they feel that the speaker doesn't really believe what he is saying. If an official interpretation of American history were worked out, which every teacher had to follow in spite of his own beliefs, courses in American history would become almost useless. The students would learn the proper answers, and would then dismiss the whole subject from their minds as so much propaganda. The same thing would happen, on a less disastrous scale, if individual instructors tried to teach their students, not what they really believed, but what they thought was good for the students to believe. Even under the pressure of war it is very doubtful if direct propaganda, or anything which looks like direct propaganda, would be effective at the college level.

No historian who has any professional standards can teach a version of American history which he does not believe true. No historian can make his students more patriotic than he is himself. But within these

limits there is room for a certain shift in our approach to American history. The country has a right to ask historians to emphasize truths which they have been inclined to take for granted, to proclaim the patriotism which they have tended to hide under a mask of objectivity. It is not propaganda, but truth, to say that a people without ideals, a people without belief in its own destiny, perishes. It is not propaganda, but truth, to say that the American ideal is worth preserving, that it represents the culmination of that belief in the dignity and importance of the ordinary man which has been the distinctive characteristic of Western civilization. It is not propaganda, but truth, to say that with all our selfishness, all our short-sightedness, we have never completely lost that ideal. We have not been saying these things as often as we should or as strongly as we should. We have not said these things because we were afraid of being called propagandists, because we were afraid of undergraduate cynicism, because we did not wish to be associated with those who were using the American ideal for unworthy ends. We have not said these things because of a deep sense of sin, because we thought it indecent to glory in the American ideal when we had departed so far from it. The great enemy during the twenties and early thirties was complacency; our students believed that America had achieved perfection through her own surpassing merits and would continue to enjoy it without effort. We attacked that complacency by showing the opportunities for a better way of life which we had missed in the past and the dangers which threatened our way of life in the present. The most patriotic of our teachers were the most bitter; they exposed our sins because they felt that they were choking our ideals. But the time for denunciation has passed; the enemy now is not complacency but fear and uncertainty. Our students want to know where they stand, what they are fighting for, what they can believe. We will not sacrifice our professional integrity if we tell them what the American story has meant to us.¹⁰

¹⁰ This paragraph owes a great deal to conversations with my former colleague, Professor R. J. Sontag, now of the University of California.

THE MACHINERY FOR HEMISPHERE COOPERATION

By DUNCAN AIKMAN

THE Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs is an outgrowth and a solidification of the "good neighbor policy." It endeavors to build up a strong mutual respect and understanding among all the nations of the Americas, in order that together they may be better prepared to meet emergency wartime demands and post-war responsibilities. This is another in the *Quarterly* series of articles discussing the effects of the war upon the public opinion activities of the federal government.

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WAR, to paraphrase a familiar quotation, has its victories no less than peace. It is difficult to think of the state of relations between the countries of the Western Hemisphere today without having some such conclusion leap into the mind.

The war has lost us many things important to our precious comfort and convenience, important even to our immediate fighting effectiveness. It no doubt will confront us with even graver crises and emergencies. But there has been one enormous gain. The war has made government and enlightened public opinion in the United States fully conscious at last of the reality and vitality of our ties with the twenty republics of the other Americas.

From the war's pressures and menaces, we have learned, for example, that the Brazilian coast opposite Africa, the Chilean and Peruvian coasts opposite Australia, and the islands of the South Seas are integral parts of a continental defense problem. We have been forced to realize concretely that the military occupation in force of any part of the Hemisphere land mass by a strong foreign enemy would be a threat to our security and our war fortunes in a way in which few military developments overseas could be. We have come to see that the policy, first proclaimed by President Monroe 119 years ago, of forbidding territorial conquests by strong overseas imperialist nations on either of the American continents was a measure vital to our self-preservation in world

balance of power struggles as well as a sympathetic gesture toward fellow republics.

Equally to the point, we have learned that for supplying the armies and navies and air fleets, and feeding the industrial production lines of modern technological warfare, the countries of the American continents form a self-contained economic unit. If these twenty-one Western republics have common defensive—and offensive—problems, they also have in common the means of solving them.

Most important of all, the war has made clear to us that the common interests of these countries cannot be managed, nor their common efforts directed, by any single nation. Such vast undertakings as meeting continental defense problems and organizing a continental economy to supply the needs of huge modern fighting forces can only be accomplished through the support, the sympathetic cooperation and the active participation of all the nations concerned.

Finally, since there can hardly be sympathetic cooperation between nations and enthusiastic participation in common programs without an objective and rational understanding of each other's purposes and problems, we have learned that a basic need in a working inter-American relationship is for broader information about each other—not merely knowledge of each other's special war difficulties and resources, but of the deeper cultural values and historical experiences which have molded the minds of the Western Hemisphere peoples.

War, in short, has put an end to that long period during which practically all enlightened persons agreed that closer cooperative relations between the American republics were desirable but few people did anything specific about it. By the light of desperate experience we know now that, in a world in which a barbarian technology has let loose its forces against the deeper values of human civilization and liberty, the American republics cannot survive without each other; that, in order to survive, they must devise for themselves a functioning machinery for international cooperation, political, economic, psychological and military.

That machinery, with certain stumbling touches in the construction technique and a degree of amateur workmanship around the edges—after all there were no professionals to build it!—is now being provided.

One of the outstanding contributions of the United States, as a participating nation, to the total mechanism is the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs.

It is difficult, however, to describe the utility of the Coordinator's Office in terms of strict mechanical precision. Perhaps the best comparison is to the electrical transformer. The Office, if one had to sum up its functions in a sentence, is a channel through which most of the major projects of inter-American cooperation may flow, and by flowing be quickened.

One of the handicaps in putting down the activities of the Coordinator's Office on a neat government organization chart is that its basic instructions are simply to make itself useful. It has no executive authority, except over its own operating staff of seven hundred-odd men and women. Even in Inter-American relations, except in cases where its advice may be asked and accepted, it has no policy-making power.

PRINCIPAL TASK COORDINATION

Its job is to keep in touch with the principal practical phases of cooperation between the American republics, find out where and how cooperation needs to be expedited, and use its auspices to induce agencies with the proper authorities to do the expediting. Or, in certain cases, where no agency has previously existed to perform a specific service—for instance, in furnishing an information service about inter-American developments especially adapted to the needs of the Hemisphere—it may do the expediting directly itself.

All these wide-ranging responsibilities make the Inter-American Office a genuine agency of coordination in the Hemisphere. It may, for example, send out field parties of experts into another American republic to check with the technicians there on the possibilities of increasing the output of some strategic material vitally needed on the war production lines of United States industry. Or another group of experts may consult with their opposites in the government concerned about the manpower, supply and sanitation problems involved in stepping up a given war material's output. Members of the Office's financial staff may advise with the Export-Import Bank on how much of a loan is necessary to get such a production project under way. Or through the War Production Board or the Board of Economic Warfare it may put manufacturing and priorities authorities in touch with the basic information

about the tools and machinery that will be needed for the full span of the effort.

Between whiles, other specialists of the Office may be putting the case with the various shipping authorities in Washington for the desperate needs of an American republic to receive export licenses on goods and commodities necessary to keeping its people at work and alive; or pleading with the War and Navy Departments that for some particular emergency a neighbor nation needs a small consignment of manufactured imports even worse than the armed services need the materials involved.

But these are only the top layers of the Office's activities. Nowadays it has staff members in several South and Central American countries working with the various governments in developing sanitation programs and in building up new self-supporting occupations for groups economically distressed by the loss of their peace time exports.

It has established "coordination committees" in the capitals and principal population centers of the other American republics to assist in spreading information about current inter-American developments and the war progress of the United Nations. It has helped in setting up Development Commissions in each American country whose job is to survey special economic needs and possibilities of progress, and plan for the launching of new agricultural and industrial activities.

In Washington, the Office's representatives are in touch with Congress, with the Treasury, War, Navy, Agriculture and Commerce Departments and virtually all government agencies whose acts and decisions are capable of affecting any phase of inter-American relations.

Skilled men and women reporters in its press division are busy covering Washington activities and personalities for readers and listeners in the other American republics precisely as they would for a great metropolitan newspaper or radio news service. Script writers of long experience are preparing educational and entertainment programs for the other American peoples, informing them about life and the war effort in the United States and about newly discovered ties of tastes and cultural interests between the republics. Representatives of its Motion Picture Division are busy in Hollywood and in the educational studios planning pictures for the American audiences of two continents.

The Office is functioning constantly as a contact station. Both in Washington and beyond the Rio Grande, it brings together representa-

tives of the governments and the private producing agencies in the other American countries with United States officials and manufacturing groups interested in their products. Its educational departments have assisted hundreds of students and scholars from the neighbor nations to conduct special studies in the United States and scores of North Americans to work in the universities of the other republics.

It has prepared study courses and materials about inter-American relations for thousands of schools and universities in the United States. A separate division of inter-American activities within the United States is busy at the task of supplying information about inter-American issues to the adult public and its organizations.

Occasionally—with the approval of the State Department—the Office has acted as an adjustment agency in economic negotiations between the American republics and other members of the United Nations group.

There is, in fact, no way of setting boundaries to the activities of the Office as can be done with agencies whose authority and functions are more specific—agencies specially commissioned, for instance, to catch counterfeiters, or collect income taxes. The Inter-American Office—again without creating policies—does what is necessary in its relations with other government organizations, or with private agencies and the public at large, to make cooperation between the American countries swifter, more practical and more efficient.

THE OUTGROWTH OF COLLABORATION

But from the standpoint of public judgments, the practical question is—what comes out of all these variegated activities?

It is, of course, in no sense true that the Coordinator's Office invented inter-American cooperation or better international relations within the Hemisphere. On the contrary, it is the by-product of the improved understanding between the American nations which dates from President Roosevelt's declaration of the Good Neighbor Policy in 1933. The Inter-American Office was actually founded with Nelson A. Rockefeller, Coordinator, in August 1940, because cooperation had advanced to a point where it needed an instrument to channelize and coordinate its many-sided procedures.

It cannot be overemphasized that the organization came *after* an enormous and revolutionary program for collaboration between the

republics had been devised and put into operation by the policy-making arms of their governments. The Office, in fact, cannot be understood without viewing it against the perspectives of its background. And its background lies in the series of agreements made by the American nations at the epochal Pan-American Conferences between 1933 and 1940.

In these fruitful meetings—the regular Pan-American Conferences at Montevideo in 1933 and Lima in 1938, the Buenos Aires Conference in 1936, and the special consultation meetings of Foreign Ministers at Panama, 1939 and Havana, 1940—the twenty-one republics had agreed to adopt common policies toward wars within or without the hemisphere affecting their interests; to consider aggressions against one of them as aggressions against all; to assist each other in adjusting their economies to the strains of World War II, and to intensify cultural and informational exchanges within the Hemisphere. Policy and pure political activities apart, the Inter-American Office was established to further these objectives.

Necessarily, its work has been divided into two periods. Prior to Pearl Harbor, the Office functioned in a hemisphere immensely disturbed and inconvenienced by the war but still technically at peace. Since December 7 it has had to adapt its programs to a situation in which more than half the countries of the Hemisphere are belligerents and the rest exposed to many of the difficulties and hazards of belligerents.

WORK PRIOR TO PEARL HARBOR

During the first period, the Office's task was in some respects even more complex than in the second. One phase of its responsibilities was, of course, to help in preparing the Hemisphere's economic arrangements for war when and if the shock should come. Another was to assist in strengthening the facilities of the American nations for resisting—and preventing—activities of the Axis aimed at the destruction of inter-American unity and the demoralization of measures of cooperation within the Hemisphere even while peace was still "being waged." Meanwhile, numerous economic activities called for stimulation within the republics to tide the Hemisphere over its period of virtual isolation from its overseas markets.

Hence, an early contribution toward shoring up the Hemisphere's security was the "black list" of Axis firms and agencies doing business in the other American republics. The "black list"—more officially known

as "the proclaimed list of certain blocked nationals"—originated in part as a result of the attention given by the Inter-American Office to the problem of employees and sales and distribution agents of United States firms in the Hemisphere nations. In literally thousands of cases, they were using their profits from United States business to support Axis subversive and propaganda activities in the neighbor republics and their confidential relations with United States industry for espionage purposes.

Aided by the State Department, Commerce Department and other interested government agencies, the Inter-American Office compiled during the spring and summer of 1941, a list of 1,800 Axis-connected business establishments suspected of these practices. In July they were published, along with a presidential proclamation denying the agencies themselves, as well as their individual representatives, the right to receive export licenses from the United States. Meanwhile, as early as the winter of 1941, the Office had warned United States business organizations with trade connections anywhere in the Hemisphere to get rid of both agents and employees who were Axis nationals.

By these successive actions, the Axis was deprived of a vast amount of secret information about United States industry's defense plans for the Hemisphere. Equally important, millions of dollars, which normally the Axis agency firms would have contributed to the subversion and propaganda activities of the Nazis and Italians out of the profits of their United States business, was kept out of the Axis embassy war chests. Simply by being cut off from export supplies from the United States, numerous Axis agencies were forced out of business altogether.

Furthermore, since its proclamation, the "black list" has constantly grown. There have been deletions in cases where injustices were done or in which individual firms have got rid of their Axis connections. But hundreds of Japanese were added to the lists after Pearl Harbor, and continuous investigation has meanwhile disclosed scores of establishments aiding the Axis cause whose connections were not originally suspected.

Along with this decisive stroke against the enemy-to-be, the Office in the pre-declared war period inevitably launched, or laid plans for, a number of operations which with the coming of full belligerency either have had to be curtailed sharply in scope or have been rendered temporarily impracticable.

Through the Development Commissions and its own direct agencies, for example, it was surveying during 1940 and 1941 the possibilities of raising living standards and stimulating trade within the Hemisphere by using Export-Import Bank loans to develop new industries and new lines of agricultural production in the other American republics. Since Pearl Harbor, regardless of loan funds available, it has been practically impossible to allot machinery and equipment to development activities in the other Americas not directly connected with war production.

EDUCATIONAL COOPERATION ENCOURAGED

Down to December 1941, too, the Office was progressively concentrating on numerous activities to bring about a more direct acquaintance between the Hemisphere peoples. Largely through its efforts, the number of scholarship students from the countries below the Rio Grande was increased in the United States colleges and universities. Arrangements were being put into effect for bringing up hundreds more for training courses in United States aviation schools and in the shops of United States industries. Plans were approaching the operation stage for multiplying the volume of tourist travel between the American lands.

Problems of preparedness and the task of promoting a strong inter-American sustenance economy increasingly during the peace period involved the Office in undertakings of marked concrete benefit to the other American peoples. As prospects of involvement in the war drew the United States deeper and more intensively into a defense program, the Coordinator's representatives took a hand in negotiations with the neighbor republics for the larger and larger purchases of strategic materials—in some cases involving the preclusive buying of the entire output of certain commodities in individual countries. As shortages of shipping space developed, because of submarine sinkings and war transportation needs in other parts of the world, and particularly as priorities rationing of materials and manufactured products got under way in the United States, the Office took on the role of a special pleader for the import needs of the other Americas.

During the summer and fall of 1941, for example, it helped to stave off unemployment crises in Uruguay and Venezuela by explaining to the priorities authorities in Washington the need for releasing moderate quantities of building materials for export to these countries. It helped to secure tin allotments for Chile to tide farmers there over the fruit and

vegetable canning season. It worked to provide more liberal exports of newsprint to Argentina to prevent a curtailment of newspaper publication, and shipments of copper and steel products needed for electrical and industrial equipment in several South American republics.

Meanwhile, in the autumn of 1941, the press division of the Office began an intensive program of furnishing newspapers in the twenty republics with a vast quantity of feature articles concerning inter-American interests and the United States defense program, and of broadcasting, by shortwave and point-to-point distribution to local stations, daily news reports of inter-American and defense activities throughout the Hemisphere.

CHANGES WROUGHT BY WAR

Pearl Harbor, of course, changed the emphasis on several of these operations. Tourist travel, as a result of the commandeering of all inter-American passenger space for war needs, was, of course, out. Plans for increasing the number of scholarship students in the United States had to be limited by the scant available passenger facilities.

The Inter-American Office has continued to speak up for the import needs of the other republics in their basic economic activities. In the fields of war supply and information, the work of the Office has been sharply intensified. Within less than two months of Pearl Harbor, Coordinator Rockefeller was able to say at a Forum luncheon of the Foreign Policy Association in New York:

I can report, without misleading optimism, that your government is cooperating overtime, and *more*, at the task of adjusting defense requirements to the basic, day-by-day livelihood, economic needs of these twenty-one neighbor peoples. I can report that it has plans—and is constantly improving the practicality of those plans—over a period of months and years for building a better economic life for all of us than this hemisphere has ever known before: the stimulation of industries and agriculture; the development of tropical and jungle products; the extraction of minerals and chemicals; the growth of intra-hemisphere trade in complementary commodities, the stabilizing of our various finances; and the bringing about of a partnership of our wealth and our skills and our resources through which we should all thrive better through decades and generations.

But there was much more in the picture than the fact that the Inter-

American Office was making headway at a complex and difficult job. The Office was proving to the leaders and to informed opinion in the other American republics that the United States was really doing something about the common interests of the New World nations instead of merely talking about them; that, even more to the point, a practical agency was working with them in the development of those interests.

Day by day the other American peoples learned more about the attitude of the United States toward the war and the issues of the war as they affected the Western Hemisphere, through the Coordinator's information services. Day by day the Axis press and radio propaganda found the going harder below the Rio Grande because the stake of the American nations in the conflict was being given a more complete expression.

But mainly the Inter-American Office provided conviction that there was practical reality behind the Roosevelt administration's policy of the continental neighborhood. The statesmen and the thoughtful public in the neighbor countries knew by December 1941, that a way had been cleared for their friends to be helpful effectively in their difficulties and to become constructive partners in their future economic and social progress. The Office was a pledge by the United States of its faith that inter-American cooperation meant action.

How much the activities of the Office contributed to the crucial decisions of the American republics on war policies after the attack on Pearl Harbor must remain among the intangibles of history. But within less than two months of the aggression, there had been ten declarations of war by American powers—another, by Mexico, followed in May, and by Brazil in August—and nine breaks in diplomatic relations with the Axis. At the Rio de Janeiro Conference of the American Foreign Ministers in January, where the policy of diplomatic severance was officially recommended to all the American governments, the statesmen who spoke of common objectives, of common stakes in the outcome of the conflict and of "Hemisphere solidarity" no longer were applauded as charming practitioners of polite rhetoric. Their words had effect because they were laced with facts in the record.

ACTIVITIES SINCE PEARL HARBOR

Since Pearl Harbor, the story of the Inter-American Office's activities requires less detail. Its efforts, necessarily, have concentrated more directly upon the concrete and immediate. But the story of that

concentration cannot yet be fully told because the concrete and the immediate are often related to war plans which cannot be divulged.

In the economic field, the Office, in a general sense, has moved closer to the great war supply agencies—the War Production Board and the Board of Economic Warfare. Coordinator Rockefeller, indeed, took his seat on the latter's policy-making committee (its only member of non-cabinet rank) in the fall of 1941 while it was still the Economic Defense Board. Since the December developments, the Office has functioned as an expert informational agency for the Board on Hemisphere supply problems and as a connecting link with the producing agencies in the other Americas.

Mr. Rockefeller made a graphic reference to the scope of the Office's interests and services in war supply operations within the Hemisphere in a speech which he delivered on Pan-American Day last April before the Pan-American Council of Chicago. "The United States cannot expect to draw all the supplies it needs from the Hemisphere," he said, "simply by assuming that the war materials business is *good* business for the other American republics and that they will jump at the chance to sell us such materials as happen to be handy.

"We cannot pour all the tin of Bolivia into our war machine . . . merely by calling up some syndicate in La Paz and ordering it as you would order a dozen eggs from the grocery store. To get the tin in full quantity down to the shipping points, the Bolivians have to have more highways to truck it down on, and more trucks to truck it with."

Mr. Rockefeller knew what he was talking about, because some time before last April representatives of the Inter-American Office had pretty thoroughly examined the problems of enlarging Bolivian tin output—including the factors of transportation and workers' living conditions—and had a good deal to do with helping to arrange the Export-Import Bank financing through which these basic production problems are being solved.

This, as the Office would see it, is simply a typical coordination job—finding out what the problems are of increasing output of a basic strategic material, using its auspices and its knowledge in seeing that the effective government agencies go to work solving the problems and thus helping to get more of a basic material in the hands of the war supply authorities sooner than if the arrangements were left to catch-as-catch-can negotiations.

Every day that the war goes on, moreover, the Office is bearing its

part in similar emergencies: helping to create more favorable conditions for iron and copper and tungsten supply from the West Coast South American countries, for instance; for manganese production in Cuba and Brazil; for rubber-gathering in the South and Central American lowlands. In proportion as the loss of the tropical Far East as a source of vital raw materials has affected the supply problem, all of these coordinating assignments in the Western Hemisphere have increased in their crucial importance to the United Nations' cause.

"PROPAGANDA" FOR THE AMERICAS

War tensions, too, have immensely stepped up the activities of the Office's informational services—press (including news broadcasting), radio and motion pictures. There is nowadays far more to these operations than simply giving the audiences below the Rio Grande a close-up view of the United States war effort and of developments in the United States directly affecting the other Americas.

Among the millions of words sent out weekly over the ether or furnished to the newspapers of the other republics in their own languages are broadcast programs and articles interpreting the whole meaning of global warfare to the Western Hemisphere nations: the dangers to their security in Axis strategic plans; the threats to their independence, their cultural and religious traditions implied in Axis treatment of small nations and subject populations; the menace to Hemisphere export trade involved in Axis programs for the development of world-dominating economies within the conquered territories.

By all the presentation methods from straight news broadcasts to frankly dramatized programs, from light feature articles to reasoned interpretations of the war's issues for intellectual leaders, public opinion in the rest of the Americas is being constantly reminded of moral and realistic interests in a United Nations victory.

Every day, too, this sense of the all-American issues at stake in the war's outcome is brought to larger audiences. Point-to-point methods and special local broadcasts are bringing most of the popular programs of the Office to the millions of people throughout the Hemisphere who are not within reach of shortwave receiving sets. Broader distribution systems are bringing about publications of thousands of the newspaper feature articles contributed by the Office in the country weeklies and small city dailies of the neighbor republics.

The motion picture division, both before and since Pearl Harbor, has embarked on a far broader campaign of education in Hemisphere ties and issues than is suggested by the occasional use of a "simpatico" Hollywood film success on the inter-American front. Today its small films on the war effort and on industrial and agricultural processes in the twenty-one republics, and on the institutions and ways of living which bind the American peoples in a common interest, are finding their way on to the screens of hundreds of schoolhouses and into the halls and theaters of remote villages and rural areas where previously inter-American relationships have not even been given a name. Quite plausibly as a result of these services, more citizens of the American nations have become acquainted with each other during the past year through the eye than ever heard of each other before through all their authors and orators.

NEW FIELDS OF ACTION

Besides speeding up established operations, war demands have led the Coordinator's Office into new fields of action. Although certain plans for aiding in vast peace time industrial and agricultural expansions have had to be deferred, the necessities of population groups and regions acutely distressed by the war's disruptions of normal trade could not be neglected. Neither can the needs of working populations required to leave their homes and work under conditions of health risk and physical hardship in order to further the war effort.

Hence, shortly after the Rio de Janeiro conference the Inter-American Office established a Basic Economy program, with a divisional staff, to work with the technicians and social scientists of the other American governments in finding solutions for these problems. In practice, this means that model sanitation arrangements are being set up, pure water supply and disease control measures instituted and subsistence crop agriculture strengthened in a considerable number of regions.

Spade work on projects of this character is now being done in El Oro province in Ecuador, in the Amazon Valley rubber and tropical forest products regions, and in Central America where economic difficulties have been created for the population by the curtailment of banana exports. Eventually large areas of the mining country in the high Sierras of the Andes may share in similar developments, as well as populations affected by the loss of export trade with Europe.

From the Inter-American Office's standpoint, these are simply another series of coordination jobs—assignments in finding new needs vital to the stability of the Americas and to the relationship between them; and in bringing together the needs with the agencies and the resources which can meet them.

POST-WAR NEEDS

It would be a mistake, however, to consider the Inter-American Office as simply an emergency agency of a preparedness economy and a war period. The problems of international cooperation will not disappear with an armistice. Indeed, unless machinery for solving them is maintained in effective and progressively improved operating order, the peace itself is likely to turn into a prolonged "fake armistice."

The global wars of the Twentieth Century have come themselves out of the needs of peoples for higher living standards and a greater security for living—out of unsolved riddles of surplus production and nigardly distribution. If the cure for these sicknesses of world society is left once more to the steam roller methods of imperialism or to the tender mercies of nationalistic rugged individualism, there can be no insurance against even more destructive future global wars.

It is true that these needs and problems are not peculiar to the Western Hemisphere. But the experience of the past few years has made clear that the American continents provide a vast but extraordinarily apt demonstration area for developing basic solutions. The work of the Inter-American Office offers at least strong suggestive indications that, within the framework of the established policy-making machinery of international diplomacy, power mechanisms can be installed to make the wheels of concrete international action turn faster.

An individual Coordinator's Office, needless to say, is no better than its coordinations. The task of developing the resources and the living capacities of the American peoples should, by the Inter-American Office's own definition of its functions, be performed by the agency fittest to accomplish it. But one way or another the coordinating job must be carried on in the future—if there is to be a future.

"There are elements in our security," a spokesman for the Office said to an advertising convention in Atlantic City last summer, "which cannot be demobilized."

THE FEDERALIST ON PUBLIC OPINION

By FRANCIS G. WILSON

PROGRESS in the technique of ascertaining states and trends of mass opinion has revived interest in the question of representative versus direct democracy. What is the proper role of public opinion in the American system of government? The problem is by no means new, but needs to be reconsidered in the light, not only of improvements in polling techniques, but also in relation to the public

policy demands of our time and the capacities of the "average" man.

Dr. Wilson is professor of political science at the University of Illinois and the author of the well-known text in the field of political theory, *Elements of Modern Politics*. He brings to our attention the wisdom of the authors of the *Federalist* papers as it applies to the problem at hand.

THE MAXIM that all government rests on opinion became in 1788 in its way as venerable as *vox populi vox dei*. Those who framed our system of government knew both sayings, but they stressed the former more than the latter. "If it be true that all governments rest on opinion," we read in *The Federalist*, No. XLIX, "it is no less true that the strength of opinion in each individual, and its practical influence on his conduct, depend much on the number which he supposes to have entertained the same opinion. The reason of man, like man himself, is timid and cautious when left alone, and acquires firmness and confidence in proportion to the number with which it is associated. When the examples which fortify opinion are ancient as well as numerous, they are known to have a double effect. In a nation of philosophers, this consideration ought to be disregarded. A reverence for the laws would be sufficiently inculcated by the voice of an enlightened reason. But a nation of philosophers is as little to be expected as the philosophical race of kings wished for by Plato. And in every other nation, the most rational government will not find it a superfluous advantage to have the prejudices of the community on its side."¹

Our problem is to discuss the theoretical function of opinion as *The Federalist* states it. This issue is part of the more comprehensive theory of public opinion, but many would regard it as the initial and most essential phase of this larger subject.² Today, when the bald use of

¹ The numbering of the papers in *The Federalist* and the ascription of authorship follows here the Lodge edition of 1886. See introduction to Everyman edition of 1911 by W. J. Ashley.

² Cf. my article "Concepts of Public Opinion," *The American Political Science Review*, XXVII (1933), 371ff.

amoral political techniques by our enemies has forced the democracies to re-examine the fundamentals of social morality, it is essential that conflicting theories of the function of opinion should be clarified.

Now the central propositions to be argued here are that most modern discussions of the function of opinion do not face clearly certain fundamental issues, and that *The Federalist* can throw light on these issues, as well as assist in the formulation of a coherent, conservative theory of opinion. What is needed today is a frontal analysis of the function of public opinion in a revolutionary age. *The Federalist* was, in its time, just such a frontal attack, and it contains perhaps one of the few genuine theories of opinion stated in modern times. It is animated by charity toward ordinary mortals, but it also speaks with candor of the weaknesses of the political animal. Modern writers, like the authors of *The Federalist*, never say really that government rests entirely on opinion, or that government is justified wholly by the opinion of its citizens.

THEORIES OF THE FUNCTION OF OPINION

It may be said that, broadly, there are three theories of the function of opinion. In the first place, it may be argued that the operational basis and standard of government is what the public wants. Two assumptions are vitally important to this view. Its proponent must argue that the people can do or attain what they want, either in a particular state or by a kind of consensus gentium. It must also be argued that whatever is approved by such consent is right or is the standard by which a government should be directed. It is clear that while it may be easy to argue moral relativism, or that the very idea of morality is a kind of linguistic boner, it is much more difficult to say that in practical politics the people are able to do precisely what they may want. Briefly, whenever the desires of people go counter to the patterns of political control, the consequences of behavior differ from the purposes originally accepted.

More serious in our time, however, is the view that government must be in accordance with more than human caprice, or, indeed, that justice is more than simple whim or even long-standing prejudice. The moral relativist may have an easy time of it in periods of peaceful prosperity, but the condemnation of tyranny and irresponsible oligarchy, we have found, requires more than a mere "some people do and others don't." It requires a standard of justice, a theory of morality which ap-

plies to men in general. It requires a philosophy of right which cannot be stated simply in terms of a mathematical equation or a scientific formula; it must be stated in terms of the Greek-Christian theory of morality, which has been the fortress of Western humanity in times of social disaster. When Socrates in *The Republic* denounced and vivisected the theories asserting that what the people want and can get is the basis of justice, he was stating an argument which is all but as fresh as on the day it was written. Indeed, the grossest perverters of Machiavelli have hardly reached the proposition that the standard for the conduct of the state is merely what the public wants. We may, therefore, consider this point of view as something of a straw man, needing little further attention.

A second theory of the function of public opinion assumes the rationality of man and the binding character of the power of reason. Rational opinion discovers the rights of men and the moral criteria for action by the state. Upon this assumption the right of the majority to sovereignty is clear, and opinion so guided would be able to achieve its legitimate purposes. The rising defense of democracy during the period since the Enlightenment is closely associated with this interpretation of the function of opinion. We might call to witness Rousseau's conception of the general will, the contract theory of society propounded by John Locke, or many of the defenders of a democratic philosophy in America, such as Thomas Jefferson and his followers. But how will we reconcile the assertion that men have natural rights against society when we also say that a majority of the people have a right to govern? Professor Kendall has recently shown that Locke, at least, believed men would act rationally and therefore there could be no enduring conflict between the moral capacities of men and the will of the sovereign majority. He has called this Locke's "latent premise," which should have been elaborated in the *Two Treaties* but which was not.³ In adopting Kendall's interpretation, we argue that we have, in the second place, the latent premise theory of the function of opinion. It is the pervading reasonableness of man which gives opinion its legitimate majority authority in society.

It should be noted that this theoretical product of the age of reason did not stress the immediate participation of reason in the divine mind,

³ See Willmoore Kendall, *John Locke and the Doctrine of Majority-Rule* (Urbana, Ill., 1941), pp. 132ff.

since in general a deistic attitude was assumed. In its day this theory was radical enough and is to be distinguished from the historically more conservative theory which insisted on the divine origin of the moral order and the participation of human reason in the reason of God.

CONSERVATIVE THEORY

In the third place, there is what may be called the conservative theory of the function of opinion. In some respects we cannot separate this third view from the second, and like the second its adherents waver between an unshaken confidence in popular reason and a strong element of scepticism, asserting that the majority is not always or ultimately to be followed. Thus there is no latent premise that men will act rationally, and there is in general a theistic interpretation of the relation of human reason and the moral order. One immediate implication of this position is that democracy is a form of government, depending on a social theory of justice which is applicable to any form. In other words, the principles of justice are not directly democratic as in the second theory. The criteria of justice may or may not be accepted by the majority; the norms of behavior may or may not coincide with opinion. In this statement we have, it may be argued, the historic and conservative theory of the operation of opinion in the state.

Opinion here becomes a subdivision of a general theory of justice. Our third conception of the function of opinion involves a theory of truth not essentially different from the second point of view; but it involves also a conception of the pattern or characteristics of human behavior which is widely different. Under Hamilton's statement we could not say that men will in the end act rationally under mere majority control; but we could say that they may or may not act rationally depending upon various circumstances. It might be observed that even the Jeffersonians veered toward the third view whenever the majority went against them, and in their defense of the constitutional balance they were implicitly taking the conservative view of public opinion. It hardly needs to be mentioned that what Hamilton was saying was the echo of the ancient moral tradition of the East and the West. Confucius, the Laws of Manu, Plato, the Christian Fathers, John Calvin, Leo XIII in his great nineteenth-century Encyclicals, and in part the authors of the Declaration of Independence would find nothing strange in it.

AMERICAN TRADITION OF THE FUNCTION OF OPINION

Now the American tradition as expressed by the Philadelphia Convention and *The Federalist* holds that some opinion is estimable and some is not, and that it is the function of enlightened rulers to stand against that opinion which is either erroneous or impracticable under the circumstances. Yet withal we must say that *The Federalist* was kindly in its attitude toward the common man, and that never during the formative period of our tradition was the sovereignty of the rational people denied. Most people have reasoned judiciously in response to the patriotic appeal of the Philadelphia Convention, John Jay notes in *The Federalist* No. II. And Madison declared in No. XIV: "Is it not the glory of the people of America, that, whilst they have paid decent regard to the opinions of former times and other nations, they have not suffered a blind veneration for antiquity, for custom, or for names, to overrule the suggestions of their own good sense, the knowledge of their own situation, and the lessons of their own experience?"

Yet there are special problems regarding opinion which must be faced in a republic. "As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a certain degree of circumspection and distrust," we read in *The Federalist* No. LV, "so there are other qualities in human nature which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence. Republican government presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher degree than any other form." Further in No. LXXVI, Hamilton urges that the "supposition of universal venality in human nature is little less an error in political reasoning than the supposition of universal rectitude."

If the good and bad in opinion must be balanced by government, it is the organization of government that will reflect the principles of balance. Thus, the framers of the Constitution and the authors of *The Federalist* believed in a new application of the principle of the mixed constitution, combining democratic and aristocratic elements with a strong executive, and supported by a check and balance system or the separation of powers. In some of the discussions the separation of powers looms larger than the principle of mixed government, but it is clear that the framers wanted checks and separation in order to limit the people as well as the agencies of the government. In the government there must always be a clearly democratic element, in this case the House

of Representatives which would stand in close sympathy with the people.⁴

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

Our concern here is primarily with the popular branch, for it was in the representative system that opinion would have its fullest expression. Madison in the famous No. X of *The Federalist* shows that the effect of representation is "to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary and partial considerations." Hamilton, indeed, believed that the general government would be better administered than the local ones because, as he said in No. XXVII, the extension of the spheres of election in the House will give a greater choice to the people and it will be less responsive to the temporary aberrations of the people.

The evaluation of the action of opinion in *The Federalist* centers essentially on the legislative power of the people and neglects measurably the constituent function of opinion. *The Federalist* itself was an argument directed to the latter problem, but within the document the central issue is how the people act in the choice of representatives and the laws exemplified in the conduct of the delegates of the people. It was recognized that the House of Representatives must have a common interest and sympathy with the people. Specifically, Madison or Hamilton argued in No. LIII against the proposition "that where annual elections end, tyranny begins." The general character of the Republic, the kind of work to be done, the distance to be traveled, were against one year terms and for the moderate proposal for a term of two years. Likewise, while there must be enough representatives for consultation and discussion, the membership must be limited "to avoid the confusion and intemperance of a multitude." Thus in No. LV our authors declare: "Had every Athenian been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would

⁴ The Declaration of Resolves of the First Continental Congress, October 14, 1774, stated "that the foundation of English liberty, and of all free government, is a right in the people to participate in their legislative council." See *Documents Illustrative of the Formation of the Union of the American States*. 69th Congress, 1st Sess., House Document No. 398, 1927, p. 3. This idea runs through the work of the Constitutional Convention, but with varying emphasis on the part of the members. Madison, Wilson and Franklin especially defended the democratic element in the Constitution. We may assert that, broadly, the framers of the state constitutions were in agreement with the framers of the national constitution and the authors of *The Federalist*.

still have been a mob." The clear admission that the people must be checked by devices they accept themselves is crucial in the third theory of opinion we have discussed, but it is an idea that more radical exponents of the power of opinion today hardly like to accept.⁵

THE PATTERNS OF POLITICS

The conservative theory of the function of opinion centers, therefore, not only upon an objective and rational theory of moral validity, but also upon the proposition that part of the theory of opinion is a statement of the patterns of political behavior. The mixed constitution is an institutional statement of the same proposition, as are the devices associated with it. In addition to the disorderly inclinations of men, because of the distortion of passion and ignorance, government must be effective, and there is a pattern of effective government which leaders may carry into effect. *The Federalist* shows little concern with what we might call naturalistic limitations on governmental effectiveness; it is chiefly concerned with the limitations on government imposed by the known operations of human opinion.

In the light of these observations we may consider briefly Madison's utterances in No. X. This document has been regarded by many as an economic interpretation of politics, but a careful reading might show that the principal theme is the passions and ignorance of men reflected in their political opinions, whether or not such passion and ignorance arise from the unequal distribution of property. Madison makes himself clear that property is not the only cause for the disorder of faction and the repudiation of the common interests of the Republic. Popular governments, he urged, tend toward the dangerous vice of faction; confusion and violence in the public counsels will be remedied by the establishment of the Union. But the latent causes of faction are sown in the nature of man. Hamilton states a similar realism in No. XXVIII when he declares that ". . . seditions and insurrections are, unhappily, maladies as inseparable from the body politic as tumours and eruptions from the natural body. . . ." Under the Constitution force will be proportionate to the need.

⁵ The fact that the regulation of the right to vote was left to the states made it unnecessary to discuss this matter at length in *The Federalist*. In a sense it is outside the scope of this paper, since the suffrage is the most prominent device for defining the participating public. The framers of the Constitution were in favor, generally, of the conventional freehold qualification for voting.

This doctrine is further elaborated in No. LI. Government itself is the greatest adverse reflection on human nature, and government must first control the governed and then control itself. In controlling the governed, one part of society may need protection against another. If the majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure. Thus in America we need to create "a will in the community independent of the majority—that is, of the society itself." But in addition there should be such a diversity in interest that a majority combination will be improbable.

The modern analysis of oligarchy, the government of the few or the elite, was not wholly strange to *The Federalist*. In No. LVIII it is argued that the greater the number of representatives, the fewer will be the number who control. Moreover, the greater the number in the House of Representatives, the more will be the ascendancy of passion over reason, and the more will be found representatives with weak capacities and limited information. "The people can never err more than in supposing that by multiplying their representatives beyond a certain limit, they strengthen the barrier against the government of the few. . . . The countenance of the government may become more democratic, but the soul that animates it will be more oligarchic."⁶

CONSTITUTIONAL CHECKS ON OPINION

Politics must be more than mere technique, more than the manipulation of the passions of the population. Yet in the construction of the Constitution, the framers were conscious of the values of an arrangement of offices. The Senate, the President, and the judicial organization, as well as the guarantee of rights, all were related for the purpose of preventing one branch of the government, especially the predominant popular branch, from exercising a concentrated authority. That same balance in the Constitution, combined with the federal principle, served to check at the point of authority the power of opinion. Those who defended our Constitution did have a sense of political technique, but it was not, as in recent years in Europe, used for the purpose of establishing an irresponsible and concentrated authority; rather it was technique

⁶ See Franklin's speech on June 2, 1787, in the Constitutional Convention in opposition to the presidential veto. "It will be said that we don't propose to establish kings. I know it. But there is a natural inclination to kingly government. It sometimes relieves them from Aristocratic domination. They had rather have one tyrant than five hundred. It gives more the appearance of equality among citizens, and that they like."

in the service of moderated power in order that social and moral values might be realized in our government.

A Senate is necessary, we read in No. LXII, because of the propensity of "all single and numerous assemblies to yield to the impulse of sudden and violent passions, and to be seduced by factious leaders into intemperate and pernicious resolutions." It will avoid mutability in the public counsels arising from a rapid succession of new members; likewise, another effect of instability will be checked, that is, the "advantage it gives to the sagacious, the enterprising, and the moneyed few over the industrious and uninformed mass of the people." Historically, it could be observed also that there had been no long-lived republic which did not have a senate, and Sparta, Rome and Carthage were called to witness.

Much the same argument was advanced in defense of the presidential office. In No. LXVIII, Hamilton urged that the choice of electors is less apt to convulse the community with any extraordinary or violent movements "than the choice of *one* who was himself to be the final object of the public wishes." No. LXX insists that a plural executive would, on the other hand, deprive public opinion of its power to restrain executive authority, since responsibility would be shifted from one executive official to another. Some thought that the executive should show a "servile pliancy" before the prevailing currents of politics. This Hamilton denied in No. LXXI. The deliberate sense of the community should control the government, but this did not mean compliance with "every sudden breeze of passion" or every transient impulse which may come from the arts of men "who flatter their [the people's] prejudices to betray their interests." The wonder is, thought Hamilton, that the people so seldom err, beset as they are by the wiles of parasites and sycophants, by the snares of the ambitious, the avaricious and the desperate. Men who know must stand against popular delusions and serve the people at the peril of their displeasure.⁷

Naturally, the fundamental written law would be regarded as a stabilizing force in politics, as well as the judicial interpretation of the Constitution. The people have a right to alter the Constitution, Hamil-

⁷ Speaking of the veto power of the President, Hamilton said in *The Federalist*, No. LXXIII: "The primary inducement to conferring the power in question upon the Executive is, to enable him to defend himself; the secondary one is to increase the chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design."

ton affirmed in No. LXXVIII, but momentary inclination holding a majority of the people does not justify a violation of the Constitution. Only by solemn and authoritative act may it be changed; until then it is binding as it stands. Moreover, judges who interpret the Constitution should not be removed merely because of inability. "The mensuration of the faculties of the mind has, I believe, no place in the catalogue of known arts," said Hamilton in No. LXXIX.

The capstone of the conservative view of opinion is the theory of rights, rights which deserve protection in republican government against both the people and the officials of government. To the charge that the Constitution contained no bill of rights, Hamilton replied in No. LXXXIV that there are provisions protecting rights throughout the proposed instrument of government. And to the argument that there was no guarantee of the freedom of the press, he answered tartly that no such provision was to be found in the Constitution of New York. But who can define freedom of the press? Whatever security there is for the press must "depend on public opinion, and on the general spirit of the people and of the government. And here, after all, as is intimated upon another occasion, must we seek for the only solid basis of all our rights."

LIBERAL LIMITATIONS ON OPINION

Hamilton's appeal to public opinion for the protection of rights is of more than passing interest. For it is clear that the fundamental purpose of the Constitution as it came from the hands of the framers was to secure rights which social morality assigns to the individual. It is in the theory of rights of individuals or groups, i.e., minorities, that the theories of the function of opinion diverge in the final analysis most sharply. We have seen already that in fact no theory of opinion does actually accept the existing wish of a majority as the final test of what ought to be done by government. It is, as has been said, the limitation which counts.

We may take, for example, the work of V. L. Parrington, *Main Currents in American Thought*. Whenever the conservatives suggested limitations on the majority in regard to the rights of property, the Parringtonian scorn is directed against the evils of the reactionary mind. But when William E. Channing argued that the multitude could not determine what subjects ought to be discussed by the citizenry, Parrington is pleased. Here is clearly a principle of political

morality above the determination of the majority.⁸ The conservative would say that both the rights of property and free inquiry are morally above the determination of the majority. Edwin Mims, Jr., goes to great length in arguing the freedom and sovereignty of the majority; he asserts quite correctly that our tradition stands for the sovereignty of the people. What he seems to forget is that all defenders of majority principle were likewise defenders of rights and Constitutions as fundamental law; this situation eliminates a right of immediate revolution vested in the people. If so, the road back to the conservative theory of opinion is well-paved. Mims declares: ". . . the true alternative to the corporate will of the prince is the general will of a public-spirited, patriotic majority whose power is limited only by the stipulation that minority individuals shall be unrestrained in their efforts to form a new majority. . . ." The conservative denier of the latent premise theory would assert, first, that if there is one limitation on the majority there may be others; and, second, that the tradition of limitation on the majority in American history is broader than is stated in the above quotation, for it is based on a theory of morality and justice which guarantees other rights as sacredly as the one mentioned.⁹

The latent premise theory historically has tended toward the assertion of one natural right, the right of the majority. But even here the theory has never quite asserted that what the majority wants will really be rational. Conservatives, on the other hand, have maintained the plurality of rights inhering in the people, and have, in fact, often looked to the judiciary for the protection of rights associated with property. When John Quincy Adams in the articles signed *Publicola* in 1791 stated a theory of justice higher than a mere majority he was presenting the conservative theory of opinion. "This principle, that a whole nation has a right to do whatever it pleases, cannot in any sense whatever be admitted as true," he said. "The eternal and immutable laws of justice and of morality are paramount to all human legislation. The violation of those laws is certainly within the power, but it is not among the rights of nations."¹⁰

Both the latent premise and the conservative theories of opinion

⁸ V. L. Parrington, *Main Currents in American Thought* (New York, 1927), Vol. II, pp. 336-337, for the quotation from Channing, *Works*, Vol. II, p. 161.

⁹ Edward Mims, Jr., *The Majority of the People* (New York, 1941), p. 275.

¹⁰ See *The Writings of John Quincy Adams*, edited by W. C. Ford (7 vols., New York, 1913-1917), Vol. I, pp. 70-71.

admit limitations. In recent literature the former imposes only one significant limitation, and that is the right of the minority to talk. The latter would certainly accept this limitation, since freedom of speech and press are among the rights the majority may not invade. But the basis of this right (which is not clear in radical majoritarianism) in the conservative theory is the same as the other rights which may be accepted. For there is a norm above opinion, a standard of justice and morality which assures to the individual his freedoms in society. And these freedoms are more substantial than the right to grumble against the acts of a majority which may or may not be rational.

THE FEDERALIST TODAY

Specifically, *The Federalist* recognized two general sources of limitation on the function of public opinion. There were, in the first place, the principles of social morality from which specific rights were deduced, including the right of the majority to act so long as it remains within the framework of justice. But the failure of *The Federalist* to discuss the formation of opinion, or to sense the control mechanism in propaganda, is one of its greatest weaknesses. Today we are less concerned with constitutional limitations on the majority and more with the limitations which arise from the direct formation of the majority itself. In the second place, there are tendencies in political behavior which must be guarded against, since neither the people nor those in power always respect the principles of social morality. Thus the Constitution, the elements of the mixed constitution, the separation of powers, the restraining influence of the Senate, the veto of the President, and the right of judicial review, all tend in the same direction—to introduce responsibility into government. Not only do these structures, in the theory of *The Federalist*, assure the rights of individuals but they also prevent the normal toleration of the behavior patterns which result in oligarchy, the government of the few, or the concentration of authority.

No theory of the function of opinion remains unchanged in detail from generation to generation. It would be foolish to assert that what the authors of *The Federalist* believed to be the proper constitutional position of opinion should be followed slavishly today. Yet in the form of historical continuity much that they believed remains with us today. The spirit of limitation on public opinion as stated in *The Federalist*

is changed, but limitation remains. We do not believe that what the public wants is the applicable criterion of social justice; nor do we believe that the majority is always right, or that the representatives of that opinion need no enforcement of political responsibility. Today, as the civil servant becomes more and more the central issue in politics, we must assume that the principles of conservative limitation on opinion will in measure apply. Madison, Hamilton and Jay would argue no differently.

The study of public opinion must go beyond the descriptive phase through which it has been passing. Civilization, in this time of revolution, must embody principles of justice as they have been developed in Western thought, in the Greek-Christian tradition, for the past 2500 years. The norms of the people and the norms of the leaders must be subjected to rational criticism in the light of what we can know of social and individual morality. Here at least is one of the imperatives of the age of reconstruction we are sure to face. We cannot trust the mere passions of masses and leaders for the creation of a just peace.

FREEDOM OF INSTRUCTION IN WAR TIME

By WALTER CERF*

Freedom of speech in the hands of the teacher who is pacifist or anglophobe can be a very real hazard to our war effort. Must we, then, force our schools and colleges to abandon for the duration this principal tenet both of American liberty and the Atlantic Charter? Mr. Cerf thinks not and points the way toward a sound

program designed to counteract indoctrination and teach the student to think for himself. Mr. Cerf, who at the present time teaches philosophy at Northwestern, holds doctor's degrees from the Universities of Bonn, in Germany, and Princeton.

FREEDOM OF speech, an issue long regarded as settled, is again being hotly disputed in many quarters. On the campuses of the Midwest, for example, where scepticism and indifference concerning the war are still widespread, the problem is posed once more as to how far an educational institution, committed to the war effort, can go in allowing members of its staff the freedom to express ideas which are detrimental to that effort. May a teacher teach what he thinks is true if this "truth" impairs our common effort to win the war? Usually the discussion proceeds in old-fashioned terms of "individual liberty" and "state interference." These terms have lost their reality in both the political and economic sphere, but they find a kind of old-age asylum in what is considered the more humane side of life—in religion, education, and the arts.

Liberty has been shown to be a farce in the political and economic realm unless it is based upon equality of political and economic power. The democratic state is the result of the fight for equal distribution of political power. Dissociating itself from its laissez-faire beginnings, the democratic state is now becoming the instrument for establishing among its citizens another basic equality—that of economic power.

FREEDOM AND CULTURAL POWER

My contention is that in the sphere of culture, as well as in the sphere of politics and economics, a just use of freedom depends upon equality of power—in this case, cultural power. By cultural power I mean the social power wielded through speech and the other media of

* I wish to express my gratitude to Dr. Robert Bretall for his very helpful suggestions.

communication. Speech is an instrument of power just as money is. Both money and speech can be used to influence people in a direction deemed desirable by the owner of these means. The capitalist wields, or used to wield, a great deal of economic power—i.e., influence upon other people exerted through the (possible) use of his money and machines. The teacher wields a like amount of cultural power through the use of speech, which actualizes the latent power of his training, experience, and personality. It seems logical that the development which has taken place in our concept of economic liberty should be extended to the realm of culture. Freedom of thought and speech should be based upon equality of power. The liberalistic concept tying freedom to an abstract individual must be replaced by a social-democratic one which stresses the concrete condition of this liberty—viz., power—and demands its equal distribution.

The consequences may be unorthodox. So were the consequences of the idea that political and economic liberty should be based upon equality of political and economic power. We shall either have to maintain that this development in the political-economical field from an individualistic concept of liberty to a social-democratic one was wrong; or we shall have to interpret freedom of speech in new terms of a just distribution of cultural power.

The purpose of this article, however, is less universal. We are concerned not so much with freedom of speech in general as with the more particular freedom of instruction. I shall first try to interpret the freedom of instruction in terms of cultural power. All teaching exhibits a vast inequality of cultural power between teacher and student. Though unavoidable, this inequality entails great dangers to the wider public; and the public should be interested in eliminating these dangers.—In the second part of this discussion, concrete suggestions are made as to how this could be achieved. A fair balance must be struck between our old political "instincts" and the greater social control demanded by the future. In countries with other traditions different measures have been or will have to be adopted.

Great attention has been paid—mostly by Marxian sociologists—to the effects of economic (and political) conditions upon the so-called cultural fields of art, philosophy, education, religion. But few have recognized that there is a power properly designated as cultural—distinct from, and to a certain degree independent of, economic and po-

litical power. Just as economic freedom is based upon equality of economic power, and political freedom upon equality of political power, so cultural freedom should be considered in terms of equality of cultural power. Nobody will deny that political power may influence economy and culture, or that economic power influences politics and culture. These three fields are so intimately connected, that to separate them is really to falsify them. Yet for scientific purposes this separation must be made. The present paper is limited to the realm of culture and to the relation, holding there, between freedom and power. It does not take into consideration the influence exerted upon culture by outside powers, e.g. economic and political ones. This limitation does not prevent us from looking at these neighboring fields and observing the relation between freedom and power therein. On the contrary: just as the relationship between economic freedom and economic power and political freedom and political power is familiar even to the layman, we prefer to begin our analysis with a short résumé of the situation in these two spheres.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FREEDOM

Political freedom is a mere word, without reality, unless it is accompanied by every citizen's having equal power to avail himself of this freedom. Every citizen has one and only one vote; every citizen can, if he so desires, go before the public as a candidate for representative. Without these equal opportunities in the political sphere, there would be little reason to talk of political freedom.

Political equality of power means, then, that in principle, everyone has the same power in the establishment of the legislative (and executive) body politic: just one vote. The political power of the government in a representative democracy is derived from the political power of the individual citizen. All differences of financial, physical, and spiritual nature among the citizens are ignored. This expresses in a somewhat faded way the conviction that, while there may be all kinds of inequalities among men, justice in the political realm consists in everybody's being considered equal to everybody else. Behind this idea of justice and equality lie hidden, of course, the deepest moral convictions of our Greek and Christian inheritance.¹

Only of late has come the recognition that in the economic sphere also real freedom is based upon equal distribution of power. The worker

¹ cf. Walter T. Stace, *The Destiny of Western Man*, N.Y. 1942.

who signed an agreement promising twelve hours of work at starvation wages was compelled by nobody in particular to do so. He was considered just as free as his employer to enter or not to enter such an agreement. That he did it by his own free decision has always been the contention of the laissez-faire economists. And it has always been asked of them what meaning this freedom can have if the only alternative is no work at all and outright starvation for the worker and his family.

Equal distribution of economic power means that every party to an economic agreement should have equal power to shape the conditions of this agreement. Economic freedom without this equality of power is a farce. Unions are a means employed by labor to acquire economic power. When he joins a union, the single worker may lose some of his "freedom"; he has to do what the union tells him to do. He has gained, however, equal or almost equal economic power with the other party to the economic agreement. What he has lost—that is, the freedom of signing an agreement all by himself—he has gained back a thousand times in the form of various improvements of his lot, now available to him as a result of his greater economic power.

The idea of equal power as the basis of economic freedom has led and is leading more and more to an increase of the role of the state in our economic life. As neither of the principle parties in modern economic agreements, labor nor employer, is seeking justice for its own sake, the state has more and more encroached upon the "fighting spirit" of both. From the guarantor of *political* equality the state has become a pioneer in the equalization of *economic* power. Innumerable obstacles are still being thrown in the way of this development; but on the whole we can observe a trend toward the juster distribution of economic power and, as an instrument to this end, the entry of the state further and further into economic life.

CULTURAL FREEDOM

With this situation in mind we shall now turn to the realm of culture and try to express the concept of freedom of speech in terms of equality of power.² Freedom of speech includes the freedom of the

² Freedom of speech and freedom of thought are always coupled. However, freedom of thought is for practical reasons quite inviolate. Thoughts are of public relevance only when they are expressed, and expressed in such a way as to be communicable to a number of people. My thoughts may be murder; but as long as I keep them to myself, nobody (except, perhaps, a psycho-analyst) can do much about it.

artist to express himself in his particular medium as his artistic conscience dictates, as well as the individual's right to criticize his government. It embraces the musician's right to compose in cacophonies, and also the freedom which is of special interest to us today—that of the teacher to teach what he thinks is true. Freedom of speech is freedom of expression in all the media of cultural communication.

Culture may be provisionally defined as constituting all the expressive activities of the individual which have the purpose or use the media of communication with other individuals. The expression may be in words, written or spoken, or in a more esoteric medium. It may be addressed to millions or to a single individual. The old-fashioned liberalistic concept of the freedom of speech assumes, that culture, like religion and morality, is the individual's private affair. Liberalism asserts that the state must not interfere with the individual's "natural right" of self-expression—except to protect other individuals from abuses and the state itself from offenses against public security and morality. The state is thus closely and jealously watched by the citizen. He is so suspicious of it that he would rather see subversive propaganda go unchecked, than be protected against it by laws that might encroach upon his own right to express himself.

This liberalistic conception of the freedom of speech is too abstract to be of any value. It neglects entirely the actual, concrete character of our cultural communications—viz., that the individuals who are parties to a "cultural situation" possess "cultural power" and that this power is unequally distributed among them.

RELATION BETWEEN TEACHER AND STUDENT

The cultural situation of most interest to us in this paper is the relationship of teacher and student. Its decisive aspect, neglected by nearly all liberals, is the inequality of cultural power between teacher and student. The teacher turns the cultural stock accumulated in years of academic training and teaching practice into the ready cash of speech. The students have nothing but their untrained intelligence to offer as resistance to the bombardment of words, evocative and argumentative, to which the instructor can subject them. It is the hopeless fight of an unarmed boy against a powerful tank.

Where there is inequality of power there is necessarily power. More logically, we might first have shown what we mean by cultural power

and then pointed out how unequally it is distributed. But the opposite procedure recommended itself, since it is easier to show the inequality of cultural power than to define it *in abstracto*.

Cultural power is a kind of social power; and like any social power, it means the capacity of an individual (or group of individuals) to produce desired effects in other people and to prevent other people from exerting undesired influence upon him.³ If these effects are produced by economic means, we speak of economic power; if by cultural means, we speak of cultural power. Cultural means are all expressive media of communication between individuals (or groups of individuals). Not all media of communication are expressive; money is a non-expressive medium of communication. But all the expressive media of communication convey meaning, and convey it on a sensory basis. Thus painting is as much a cultural medium, hence a means of exerting cultural power, as speaking; and writing as much as composing.

To use these media efficiently, natural gifts, acquired education, and accumulated experience must be present. These are what make possible the exploitation of the cultural media in all their dimensions.

These abstract definitions take on significance when applied to the concrete relationship of teacher and student. The desired effect of teaching is the reception and, perhaps, acceptance by the student of material which the teacher wishes to put across. The medium used is that of speech, and the cultural power of the teacher consists in his being able to use the medium of speech to the desired end. This ability consists, to begin with, in a set of natural gifts such as intelligence, imagination, and the faculty of expressing himself fluently in the medium of speech. If he lacks these gifts, he can make up for it, to some extent at least, by education and training; they form the second condition of his cultural power. Finally, there is the slowly accumulated fund of teaching experience—his skill.⁴ Thus, just as economic power is based upon the

³ cf. R. H. Tawney, *Equality*, 1938, page 200.

⁴ There are, of course, non-cultural power ingredients in the relationship of teacher and student. The teacher is feared as the man who "can flunk me." This fear increases the student's readiness to accept the teacher's teachings. So does the authority that goes with academic position or a great name.—As we mentioned before, we are ignoring economic and political influences in the cultural sphere. To be sure, what the teacher teaches may be only a reflection of the political and economic set-up of the society to which he belongs. Such a statement, however, adds little to the understanding of the cultural situation as such. Whatever the economic power may be which determines him to teach what he teaches, the teacher's cultural power consists of his success in getting his ideas across to the student.

ownership of productive facilities and goods, both expressible in money, so cultural power consists in the possession of natural gifts, acquired education, and accumulated experience, all capable of being actualized in speech and other kinds of communication.

DISTRIBUTION OF CULTURAL POWER

All inequality in the distribution of power *may* become dangerous to the weaker party and therewith to the whole community. Such inequality of cultural power as obtains between the teacher and the yet uneducated student certainly lends itself to all kinds of abuse. Education and experience give the teacher a superiority in cultural power which is comparable to the financial superiority of the banker over the unemployed in the days of "rugged individualism"—and in certain respects no less dangerous today.

Still, is cultural power so inequitably distributed that it makes a farce of cultural freedom—just as inequality of cultural power has undermined economic liberty in the past? Does this inequality of cultural power bring about an exploitation of the "culturally weak" by the "culturally strong"? Have we, therefore, to aim at a "just distribution of cultural power" in order to have true cultural liberty? Is not education itself a process of redistributing cultural power, such as may almost be called automatic?

In a democracy, education is indeed the organized process of distributing and transferring cultural power from the culturally strong to the culturally weak. The culturally strong himself helps the culturally weak to become strong. Cultural power re-distributes itself in the process of education—in our form of society, at least. Here is a crucial difference between the economic and the cultural sphere. In the latter, cultural activities themselves, such as teaching, take care of the re-distribution of cultural power; in the economic sphere no such self-regulator has been found, and the state has thus had to take over the function of equalization and redistribution.

Education has the function of equalization only within the framework of a liberal or social democracy. Under theocratic and fascist forms of government, education, far from equalizing cultural power, is rather the perpetuator of cultural inequality.

Even in a democracy, however, education is constantly in danger of being misused, just because education is inherently a relationship

between the strong and the weak. The misuse does not always consist in the deliberate continuation of inequality of cultural power; other dangers, no less pernicious, lurk behind the splendid façade of education in a liberal democracy. Education may be used to instil theories and ideas in the souls of the culturally weak which are inimical to the ultimate standards of decency and morality acknowledged by the community. It is better to have bad standards than no standards at all. Much of the so-called liberal education purveyed in our institutions of learning is more concerned with destroying our traditional standards—simply because they are standards and traditional—than with building up an understanding of the role of standards. Again, the teacher may convey ideas not because he believes them to be true, but because they serve some ulterior purpose. Finally, he may influence his students in certain directions which under ordinary circumstances would pass muster as irrelevant to the welfare of the community, but which become exceedingly dangerous to the public in times of emergency such as war.

All this makes it obvious that the public should be greatly interested in a situation which, while unavoidable, entails extraordinary dangers to the political, moral, and intellectual health of the community.

ROLE OF THE STATE

The abstract, liberalistic concept of economic freedom led to the intolerable situation of millions being left free to starve, had not the state intervened. The *laissez-faire* concept of freedom is now being replaced by a more concrete notion, basing freedom on the equal distribution of economic power—even if this equal distribution has to be effected with “tender force” by that scarecrow of all liberalists, the state.

It would seem, then, that the state must come to control the redistribution of cultural as well as economic power. However, we must be careful not to transfer mechanically to the cultural field considerations and practices which are helpful in the sphere of economics. The structural differences between the two realms are too important to permit of any such easy solution. The most important difference in the present context, is between the impersonal character of economic relationships and the personal character of cultural relationships.

Economic relationships are quite impersonal. Even in the time of rugged individualism, the individual himself disappeared behind his

"initiative." Each individual was replaceable if only another individual of the same "initiative power" could be found. How much personality do we discover in the great economic structures founded by the financial and economic pioneers? Scarcely any at all.

The teacher, on the other hand, is no mere impersonal instrument for transmitting knowledge. His teaching is suffused with his personality. His teaching is "expression"—expression of himself, as well as of his subject-matter.

Can we permit the state to interfere with activities so intimately bound up with the individual? Shall we ever willingly accede to the state's encroaching upon the individual's right of self-expression and, in particular, upon the teacher's right to teach what he considers to be true? Our deepest political "instincts"—the instincts of liberal democrats—revolt against anything that looks like an invasion by the state into our cultural liberties.

On the other hand, the fact remains that the various cultural media wield a power the equal distribution and just use of which are clearly public in relevance. How, then, are we to reconcile the new request for public control with our old political feelings and prejudices?

The solution of this problem is a matter of practice rather than of theory. In what remains of our paper, we shall make a few suggestions as to how the need for public control of cultural relationships might be harmonized with our dislike of state interference in what we are still wont to consider the private realm of cultural liberties. As in the preceding pages, our interest is entirely with the freedom of instruction.

PUBLIC CONTROL AND FREEDOM OF INSTRUCTION

The solution lies, it seems, in forming at every higher educational institution a local committee which has the task (a) of picking out from the subjects taught those controversial issues which are considered to be of special relevance to the moral, social, and political health of our country, and (b) of taking care that every student who attends a course in which the "dangerous" side of the controversial issue is taught attends also such courses, lectures, or discussion groups as are necessary to acquaint him thoroughly with the other side of the issue. If no such classes are offered, the committee will have to insist that this gap be filled. No student shall be permitted to hear only the "dangerous" side of the issue—he must hear the other side as well. The committee will see to it that

both sides are well represented on the campus and exert a certain compulsion over the students who attend, for example, a pacifist's classes, to acquaint themselves with the reasoning of the other side.

The personnel of this committee is important. I believe that it should include not only representatives of faculty, staff, and student body, but also members of the local community and, perhaps, of the federal government. The prevalence of a merely academic point of view in selecting the controversial issues would be detrimental to the purpose of the committee and might be easily avoided by adding representatives of the local community and of the federal government to the academic members. While, for example, the issue of birth control is usually a settled one in academic circles, the local community may justifiably ask that if birth control is advocated in any courses, the students exposed to these doctrines should at least get to know the reasons that might possibly be brought forward against birth control.

The issues to be selected by the committee will concern theories and doctrines which affect the student's relation to society and his attitude toward the moral and social standards of the community. It would be a mistake to include the broader metaphysical systems. To be sure, a student may come under the spell of Schopenhauer's pessimism and be changed from an eager participant in the organization of human welfare into a melancholic and ironical bystander. But we do not feel it the moral duty of our teachers to direct their students toward *Weltanschauungen* which will make them healthy, optimistic members of the commonwealth. Instead, we leave it to chance (euphemistically called freedom) what kind of world outlook a boy develops by his acquaintance with the great thinkers of human history. Today at least, there would be a decidedly negative response to any suggestion that the student's world view should be controlled by anyone but the student himself, i.e., by the accidental influences determining his development.

We must exclude, too, all subjects whose relevance to moral, religious, and social issues is an indirect one only. The Nazis have made a human issue of the theory of relativity, which to us is purely scientific in character. In this country, scientific theories in the natural sciences are and will always remain, we hope, something the acceptance or rejection of which is entirely left to the individual and his intellectual conscience. The public remains indifferent to these theories in the conviction that, if science proves something to be true or probable, we would

act irrationally in objecting to it on other than scientific grounds. Although the more general theories in the natural sciences have, or may have, social, moral, or religious consequences, these consequences are too remote to outweigh our conviction that "science is science."⁵

ADAPTATION TO LOCAL NEEDS

We have limited negatively the group of issues the teaching of which is of direct public interest and ought, therefore, to be controlled by our committee. To define this group in *positive* terms is quite impossible; the public relevance of problems depends largely upon temporal, local, and social circumstances. "Birth control" may be a settled issue in the East when the very term may still be unknown in Georgia. Pacifism may still be debated in the center of this continent when it has long been a dead issue at both coasts. And while the question of a just distribution of economic power is already settled among the great mass of the workers, a few bankers, professors, and newspapers still believe in a revival of economic liberalism.

A certain latitude, then, must be preserved in the scope of our committee. At different times, in different places, under different political circumstances, the committee will select different topics as "publicly relevant." Today, the teaching of pacifism has become almost subversive. Although pacifism might have been picked even in more peaceful times as potentially dangerous to the existence of the state, in periods of national emergency the local educational committees will insist upon their right to send all students who attend pacifistic courses to discussion groups where the pacifists' arguments are critically analyzed and a positive attitude toward our war effort is advocated. Suppose there is a teacher on the campus whose moral, philosophical, religious, or political convictions make him a pacifist, and that the subject matter of his course is such that pacifism may easily be dragged in. The difference in cultural power between teacher and student makes, as we have seen, for an undue influence of the teacher over his students, particularly if the teacher has what is called a "dynamic personality." The task of the committee would be, not to forbid the treatment of pacifism or to

⁵ An example to the contrary is the theory of evolution, whose religious consequences were too obvious to let it pass without public controversy. In cases such as this, the committee of a college situated in a Fundamentalist community will certainly insist on the student's hearing both sides of the question.

threaten the pacifist professor with dismissal; the task is rather to see that all students who attend the course given by the pacifist teacher have occasion to hear a good man from the other side of the fence. It is then up to the student to decide the issue for himself.

This latitude may be considered a handicap. Its advantages, however, seem far to outweigh the apparent disadvantage:

(1) The control exerted by the committee is not centralized and directed from Washington; it is strictly localized. This is in the American spirit and tradition.

(2) The committee does not exert censorship. It does not discriminate between things to be taught and things not to be taught. It merely selects certain controversial issues and requests that they be presented to the student from both sides. It is not left to chance with which side of the issue the student gets acquainted. He is "compelled" to familiarize himself with both sides of the questions selected by the committee as "publicly relevant."

(3) Our liberalistic instincts remain, for the time being, unhurt. If a man believes in pacifism, he may preach it, although his students will also have to attend a course representing the opposite view. Education thus comes to equalize cultural power by preventing the "culturally strong" teacher from exerting undue influence over his "culturally weak" students.

(4) The public interest is thus protected without the intrusion of the state into cultural relationships of individuals or groups of individuals.

(5) By asking the student to hear both sides and to decide for himself, we further the intellectual and moral development of the younger generation. The lifeblood of democracy is a faith in each other's decency and rationality. We have faith in our young people's desire and capacity to think for themselves. Only in this atmosphere of mutual trust can our education produce true citizens of a true democracy.

BROADCASTING FOR MARGINAL AMERICANS

By JEANETTE SAYRE SMITH*

BROADCASTING in the public interest is in times of war more than an editorial catchword and certainly more than a part-time activity. And when radio reaches an audience whose integration into the war effort is a pressing problem of the day, its responsibility becomes even more profound. The public interest is, under such circumstances, the public safety. Foreign language broadcasts, long the step-child of the radio industry, reach just such an audience. Domestic programs in Italian can reach almost an eighth of our foreign-born population. Yet in spite of the fact that foreign language broadcasting in this country is at least a decade old, little is known about it, either as to the nature of programs broadcast, or as to its effect upon listeners.¹

This paper is a partial report of the findings of an investigation into the social and political attitudes, and the relation of broadcasting to those attitudes, in the North End of Boston.² The neighborhood is densely populated, almost exclusively Italian, and consists of about twenty thousand people. In June 1941 a survey was conducted of listen-

ing habits in the district, with reference to both long and short wave radio. Interviews were made in every eighth house along representative streets to discover language preferences, program preferences, and shortwave listening habits, if any. From these interviews, respondents were divided according to constellations of listening habits, and subsequent intensive interviews were conducted with sixty-two people chosen to represent the various constellations. These interviews were directed at the deeper lying social and psychological factors which influence and are influenced by radio listening.³ After the outbreak of war this study would have been very difficult; it was difficult enough to conduct with the tension of the group a year ago. In spite of the fact that some of the material is dated, it does permit an appraisal of the wartime problem of foreign language broadcasting "in the public interest."

LOCAL ITALIAN BROADCASTING

The function of local Italian broadcasting, both actual and potential, must be viewed in relation to its setting, the

*The author is indebted to Dr. Jerome S. Bruner who was co-director of the study. He contributed many valuable ideas to the article.

¹For a recent study of the content of foreign language broadcasts see: Arnheim and Bayne "Foreign Language Broadcasts over Local American Stations," *Radio Research 1941*. Edited by P. F. Lazarsfeld and F. Stanton. (Duell, Sloan and Pearce, New York, 1941)

²The study was financed by two grants: one from the Princeton Listening Center, a project of the Rockefeller Foundation and Princeton University and the other from the

Radiobroadcasting Research Project, also a project of the General Education Board of the Rockefeller Foundation. The writer is indebted to Professors Harwood L. Childs of Princeton and C. J. Friedrich of Harvard for support in this work.

³A part of this investigation has already been reported in the pages of this journal. For a more detailed description of the community studied, the methods used, and the questionnaires, see Bruner, J. S. and Sayre, J. "Short-wave Listening in an Italian Community," *Public Opinion Quarterly*. 1941. No. 5, Vol. 4, pps. 640-656.

mind of Italian Americans who now find themselves engaged in a struggle against their mother country. That state of mind in the months preceding the war was such as to make one fear for their active enthusiasm in the struggle. Seventy-two per cent of the people asked said "This is not America's war," while less than ten per cent felt that America had a part to play in defeating Fascism. In a community strongly organized by the Democratic Party it is significant that one-third of the people disapproved of President Roosevelt merely because of his foreign policy, while another third (mostly recipients of Federal Aid) approved of his internal, but not external policies. When asked to name the men they admired most in the world today, only a quarter of the group named the President, while almost a half named Lindbergh and/or Senator Wheeler. This question was significant for indicating what these people *are not* as well as what they *are*. Some admired Mussolini most, but Coughlin, Toscanini and Joe DiMaggio were more popular than he. About a third of the group admired the Pope the most.

But these people are not politically sophisticated on the whole. Their world view is a part of their general outlook on life. Afraid, insecure, hemmed in by a community they find strange, they retreated from the conflict. Four out of every five thought Italian-Americans had a harder time getting jobs than people from other countries. (They often told specific tales of discrimination.) They felt war would mean further discrimination against them. In their feelings of insecurity they have sentimentally glorified Italy in their

minds, though not necessarily Mussolini or the Fascist regime, and they hated to see this allegiance challenged. And finally, many have come here to escape persecution abroad. They want no more trouble here. As one remarked, "I came to this country for peace, and all I get is war, war, war!" Their adjustment to the political views of this country is part and parcel of their adjustment to the mores of the country.

INFLUENCE OF FOREIGN LANGUAGE PRESS

On the whole, the information these people received about the war was not such as to make them change their minds, for the world view of the news sources to which they turned was on the whole isolationist. Thirteen per cent never read a paper, and another 13 per cent read only the Italian press which was predominantly Fascist. (The one anti-Fascist Italian paper had a negligible circulation in this section.) Of those who read an English paper, 87 per cent read an isolationist one.

In view of this record of newspaper reading, one might have hoped that news broadcasts in English would have served as a link between these people and the views of the greater community about them, but this was only in part the case. Almost 70 per cent reported listening at some time or other to radio news programs in English, but 60 per cent listened to the news in Italian before it was cut out when Italy entered the European phase of the war. Reports vary as to how Fascist this news used to be, but it is certain that it did not do a constructive job for the democracies. Considering that the favorite Italian news commentator was Ubaldo Guidi,

notoriously undemocratic in his point of view, it may be assumed that the news in Italian was no help in adjusting to the new world. For the large group (about a fourth of the total) who cannot understand English, the loss of news in Italian was crucial. Only a quarter of those who did not or could not read a newspaper when they could no longer hear news in Italian found that they could pick up enough of the English to make it worthwhile for them to try to listen. About a half of those who read an Italian paper checked up on what they heard by listening to news in English, but on the whole their attitude toward English news announcers was that "somebody told them what to say." (The only commentator whom those who favored him thought absolutely trustworthy and uncensored was Ubaldo Guidi.) As we have seen, some of the listeners when they could no longer get Italian news from American stations turned to short wave from Italy. This was to be expected, of course, for with a democratic competition in the news field, people choose what suits them best. These people on the whole chose announcers or commentators with an isolationist point of view.

Broader than the question of specific news broadcasts available to these people is the problem of broadcasting as a whole. In general what were the attitudes engendered by local Italian broadcasting? Were they such as to hinder or further the Americanization process in the community? The answers to these questions may be found in an analysis of the role of such broadcasts in the lives of various types of listeners. But before we turn to this analysis we must examine the material which was

offered to them over local Boston stations.

ITALIAN BROADCASTING IN BOSTON

During June 1941 the listener wishing to hear Italian programs in Boston might choose from thirteen hours and forty-five minutes of Italian on Station WCOP each week, one hour and forty-five minutes on Station WHDH, three hours and thirty minutes on WAAB, and a one-hour program on Station WMEX, announced in English but consisting of Italian records and singing in Italian.⁴ With a good radio he might hear Salem, Fall River, Providence, Hartford, and New York. If he understood only Italian there was little real choice for him, for at only one time during the day was there a chance for him to hear more than one Italian program: the 12 to 12:30 noontime period when three programs might be heard. Compared with the richness of alternatives presented to the listener to English programs this was very slim indeed.

There were ten individual programs presented in these twenty hours, two an hour long once a week, two half hour shows every day but Sunday, and the remainder fifteen minute programs. Three were dramatizations, the remainder variety programs sprinkled with commercials for typically Italian products such as wine, olive oil, macaroni and the like. Unlike other broadcasting in foreign languages the majority of these programs were paid for outright by one sponsor, and only three were participating shows. One dramatic show was a continued family serial

⁴ Prior to 1940 there were several Italian programs on WMEX, but these were discontinued. Most of them shifted to WCOP.

written and produced locally, another was a dramatization of famous books such as *The Count of Monte Cristo*, or *The Three Musketeers*, while the third was produced in New York and consisted of still other dramatizations of heroic figures—having recently played the *Lives of the Saints*. On only one program was there any commentary on the world, and this consisted of little chats about the saint whose day it happened to be, and trivia. Only two of these programs produced radio personalities who were as vivid and important to listeners as any one of a number of figures are to those listening today to programs in English, but they were so important that no analysis of the role of Italian broadcasting in the community would be complete without a sketch of these men.

UBALDO GUIDI

The most popular single personality on the Boston Italian programs was Ubaldo Guidi. A man of mysterious comings and goings, of unexplained wealth, he was, to the neighborhood, a romantic figure. When he spoke in the North End, there was no hall big enough to hold the crowd. Benefits for settlement houses, church functions, political rallies tried to get him as stellar attraction.⁵ He speaks a "pure Italian" which even those who understand only a dialect claim they can comprehend. What he said with his golden voice is another matter.

At the time of the study, Mr. Guidi said that the products he advertised were the most wonderful things that ever happened; that he tried them himself, and "if you like me, you will like

⁵ There are indications that Guidi is not so popular as he was once.

the oil, or macaroni, or restaurant, or wine, or what have you that I like." Before Italy entered the war Mr. Guidi was giving the news. By the statement of the woman who was hired to censor his broadcasts "Sure he was a Fascist, and he thought he had a right to be one." He was anti-Semitic, but did not advocate violence. He was much exercised over the Ethiopian war and the "double dealing attitude" of the British toward Italy at the time. He mentioned that Germany was a nice country because she did not censure Italy for the African adventure. In general he gave the Fascist party line.

His daughter and a Mr. Galluci (see below) have both worked with him in producing programs.

BIAGO FARESE

It was surprising that there was so little humor in Italian available on Boston stations, for humor has always been good radio. One exception was a program of long standing in Boston owned by Galluci and Farese. Mr. Galluci's part in it was to solicit advertising; Mr. Farese wrote the story, directed the show, announced, and has been known to take the leading role. He drew on material used by Boccaccio, and situations from the folk lore of the ages—the battle between the sexes, but he jazzed it up to modern times by having the shrew a modern young woman more Americanized than her Italian immigrant husband.

Farese was a good showman: he mixed three essential ingredients and came out with a winner. He used a serial story with enough plot to keep the listener coming back to find out what happens next. He made the pro-

gram funny when there was no other outside source of humor for many of these people who cannot understand English programs, do not go to the movies, and cannot read; and in so doing he used a peasant humor familiar to many of them. And not least important, his characters spoke Italian dialects. One spoke Neapolitan, one Sicilian, and a third "pure Italian." This added another comedy possibility, for the humor often consisted of the difference in the meaning of words in various dialects.

Italian broadcasting in Boston, then, drew neither on the grandeur that was Rome, nor on the world today. Records of Italian folk songs or light operetta were its backbone; for the most part the advertising was of local products. With the exception of two dramas concerned with heroics there was little to draw the listener out of his everyday world.

OF LISTENERS AND THEIR RADIO FARE

In spite of the meagerness of the offerings in Italian, these programs were and are tremendously popular in the North End. Of the sample population studied, 85.4 per cent listened to some Italian programs, while only 76.6 per cent listened to some English programs. As would be expected, English programs were listened to *more often* than Italian ones, but individual Italian programs were far more popular than individual English programs. When asked their favorite program, one in three named the La Rosa Macaroni Hour (the noon time drama of the *Lives of the Saints*), one in five named the Ciullo Variety Hour (Italian recorded music) and one in six mentioned Ubaldo Guidi's program. Five Italian programs were more popular than the

most popular English one, the Lux radio theater, named by one in ten. These Italian programs do reach their market.

But it is obvious as soon as one knows the community that it is not homogeneous. Radio tastes vary as much as they do among listeners to English programs in any community. After analysis of sixty-two detailed case studies, and numerous conversations with people in the North End, it became evident that there were seven types of adjustment to the problem of being an Italian newcomer to this country during a period of tensions such as this. An examination of the radio needs and tastes and habits of these groups sheds light on our central problems: the function of local Italian broadcasting in the lives of marginal Americans during war time.

The people of Italian (as of other foreign) background are torn by conflicts inherent in their situation. These conflicts are aggravated by the war; for then rises the problem of allegiance which is made more difficult by the contrast between old world and new world folkways. The conflicts are not on an abstract ideological plane. By and large, the people were not interested in broad ideological considerations, but in such specific matters as the possibility of their sons fighting against the Old Country, the specter of discrimination against Italians in America, the Alien Registration Act, or the comments of hostile critics of Italian Americans. Although there were many individual variations, there were roughly seven types of solution to the conflict in habit and loyalty: the simple peasant, the striving immigrant, the militant Italian, the North End ostriches, the young Italian Americans, the North End matrons, the

"solid citizen." For each group of people radio did perform certain functions, and might have performed others.

The Simple Peasant: "I like to hear Italian singing and speaking, just like the old country."

Before the days of the Nazis and Fascists the immigrants who came to this country from Italy were chiefly simple peasants who escaped from the poverty of Southern Italy to the land of opportunity. Once here they banded together into relatively self-contained communities, and never had much need to solve the dilemma of the Old World versus the New. They have remained poor. Today twenty, thirty, and forty years after their arrival, they still remain relatively unchanged from the simple folk who came over the sea in steerage. Many of them have not become citizens, although in the last few years they have taken out their first papers because of the agitation against aliens.⁶ Predominantly illiterate and still largely unversed in the American language, they constitute the enthusiastic core of the audience for local Italian programs. That fifth of the North End community which speaks only Italian and listens only to Italian radio programs, are largely of this peasant type. On the whole this group is composed of older people in the community, although there are a few recent younger immigrants who have like reactions.

As a group they are suspicious, fearing particularly exploitation by strangers—an old story to them. They revere

the "Great Man." When asked which three men they admired most, their answers centered on two names: the King of Italy, and the Pope. Many also mentioned President Roosevelt, commenting "He is so good for the poor people." What marks these people above all other things is their narrow range of interest, scarcely exceeding the limits of the North End community. They are on the whole contented and settled people compared with other members of their community. They have, probably, almost as well integrated a community here as they left behind them.

Since most of these peasants can understand only Italian, they are the bulk of the audience for local Italian programs. They love the old language, the old music, the old jokes. As one commented about Farese's sketch: "This is an old fashioned Italian comedy, and I like it. The jokes are just like those in Italy. It makes me think I am in Italy when I listen to Farese."

Under pressure from an American scene which they do not understand, and which they feel is hostile to them, they escape gratefully into the old familiar Italian ways. So long as a program is in the only language they know they are very uncritical of it. As one remarked: "I like any program fine so long as it is in Italian." And their attitude is often similar to that of simple radio listeners anywhere, of gratitude for the fine things this superior organization above them hands out, heightened in their case by a realization of the tensions of the war. Over and over again they said: "I think I am lucky to be able to hear any Italian programs."

Italian programs are for them a neighborhood matter. The Gloria Chain

⁶ The Alien Registration Act caused much alarm in the community. Since November 1940 many of these people have taken out their first papers, and have attended classes to learn to read and write.

program, for instance, used to have an amateur hour drawing on talent from the North End. They followed the radio to listen to their children or their neighbor's children. Ciullo Brothers store in the North End advertised its programs by placards in the store. The announcer was an employee in the store, who often discussed the program with customers, finding out what they wanted to hear as they dropped in to make a purchase. They felt such a personal interest in Guidi, who often appeared at North End social events, that when he stopped giving the news and concentrated on a half hour of almost solid advertising they continued listening because they "like him." Farese was also a well known figure who organized a social club in the neighborhood and announced meetings on his program.

Even the La Rosa program, the drama of heroic figures, was made a part of the community life because the actors appear from time to time in Italian shows at the Casino. There is none of the distance between these people and their radio idols that there is between those who hear the Lux Hour and, say, Marlene Dietrich. The peasants like this localizing of their programs. They universally prefer local advertising to national. As one said, "I like to hear about our local products—oil, tomatoes, and wine."

Italian radio programs in Boston help to give these people a feeling of security in the strange new world.

The Striving Immigrant: "Of Course I'm an American."

Slightly younger as a group than the peasant group above is another which, rather than being content with trans-

posing old folk ways to America, have been actively striving to make themselves into Americans and to better themselves in every way. Horatio Alger-like, many have managed to get better jobs than they had in Italy, and often to become economically independent. It is interesting that often, while these men actively break with the old culture, their wives remain "peasants." Some of the women, however, have made an effort to catch up to this new world because of their children, who have been educated in its ways.

The striving immigrant group has become more literate, less suspicious, and better informed than their folk-bound neighbors. Many of them have made a great effort to read and write, often when they were well passed middle age. They have taken out citizenship papers. Like the peasant group, they still revere the "Great Man," although their first choice among men has shifted most often to the President. Their taste in things cultural, food, music, drama and the like still runs to things Italian, but they are acutely conscious of wanting to become good Americans. They represent the bridge of transition from one culture to another.

In many respects the program preferences of this group are identical with those of the peasant group: they like the old Italian music particularly. However, being more Americanized they also listen to English programs, often, interestingly, because they have been urged to do so by their children. When asked whether they had ever heard of "I'm an American," the Department of Justice radio program on which famous naturalized Americans

explain what it means to them to be an American citizen, few people had either heard of it, or if they had, ever listened to it. The few who had were apt to be "striving immigrants." It strengthened their feeling of prestige in taking new citizenship. Said one of them: "I like 'I'm an American' because I'm going to become a citizen myself," while another remarked "I listen to 'I'm an American' because it makes me feel good to hear foreign born people, especially Italians, showing their loyalty to America." Another interesting program preference of this group was the "advice mongering" programs of such people as J. J. Anthony. Because they feel very conscious of the transition from one culture to another they seem to want advice on how to behave in the new world. These people are not as yet truly American in their radio tastes, probably more because of language difficulty than because of the attitude of opposition to the new radio culture, for indeed English programs have a prestige for this group not enjoyed by the Italian programs to which they also listen.

The Militant Italian: "I was born in Italy so of course I'm an Italian."

The age, economic status, and education of this group is almost identical with that of the striving immigrant group. Too, most of them have taken out citizenship. However, they have solved the conflict between the two cultures—especially in the political realm—by a militant allegiance to Italy, an equally militant hatred of Roosevelt, and an admiration for American isolationists. Lindbergh shares first place on their list of great men with Musso-

lini. They blame England and France for the war, and think Germany and Italy justified in wanting more land or power. Their theories for the cause of the war reflect their pride in Italy, for often they think that Germany would not have succeeded in any way if it had not been for Italy's initiative and aid. Sometimes they so closely identify themselves with Italy that they quote Mussolini's statements to back up their own objections to American foreign policy.

They are often belligerent about what they consider to be the bad deal Italians have gotten in America and they resent the fact that many local Italian programs have been taken off the air. The program preferences of this group are much like those of the peasants described above, differing chiefly in the attitude they have toward them. The peasants regard them as manna from Heaven, while the militant Italians can usually think of ways they can be improved. They are aware of themselves as an Italian group, and they jolly well want someone to take their tastes into account.

They are particularly ardent followers of Mr. Guidi. They were angry over the fact that he no longer gave the news and have turned to Radio Roma for their party line information. They were concerned with Guidi's point of view while others thought him just a golden voice. The others wished he would give the news again, but they have not turned to any other source for news, lacking his. This loss of news the militant Italians have interpreted as another indication of the Machiavellian ways in which the Americans are out to misuse them. Having been here for

a fairly long time, most of these people understand English. They comment that the news in English is "censored by the government," and maintain that news from Radio Roma is not, because it gives the Italians their due. Whatever the program, it is approached from the fairly well integrated point of view of the Militant Italian, and accordingly whatever is presented on it he can interpret in his own way.

The North End Matrons: "In the evening my husband decides what programs we listen to."

Reared by peasant mothers to the role of the submissive wife, yet born and educated in America, the young North End matron is an uninspired mixture of the new and the old. In a superficial way, this group has taken over the points of view of the men they married. Being in a somewhat better economic position than the less assimilated people, they have little sympathy with the struggles of the other people in their community. They are intensely religious. Their home and husband are the center of the world. The notions about world affairs to which they profess are apt to be confused and shallow—imperfect reflections of the husband's better integrated world views. They tend to be poorly informed conservatives in politics, and some of them whose husbands have achieved a measure of economic security oppose Roosevelt for his internal policies, a rare phenomenon in the North End where even rabid isolationists are apt to "like what the President did for the poor man."

These women are ardent followers of the women's daytime serial story,⁷

and are apt to stress over and over the "moral tone" such stories have, and the guides to action they present. Some commented that they specifically disliked the kind of emotional story so prevalent on the Italian radio, although they do follow the heroic struggles portrayed in "The Lives of the Saints" on the La Rosa Hour. Their comments on the bawdy Farese farce are indicative. A typical response was, "I believe the Farese show should not be concerned so much with divorce and constant attacking of in-laws—I like a helpful program which sets a good example for people." The young matron of the North End is fast becoming a typical American housewife, and on the way she is picking up some of the typical escapist patterns of that group: a taste for soft romantic music like that on the Lady Esther program, and an identification with more successful women in the women's daytime serial.

The North End Ostriches: "I turn off the radio when any war news come on."

As in every community there were people here who were refusing to face the world today. They retreated from the fact of the war by refusing to read about it or hear it on the radio. Without exception the cases of this type interviewed were poorly informed and strongly isolationist. The few "ostriches" studied, young and Americanized, were oddly enough, ardent followers of Father Coughlin, who has been very influential in the Boston

⁷ Herzog, H., *On Borrowed Experience. Study in Phil. & Soc. Sci.*, 1941, 9, 65-95. See Herzog's study for an analysis of reactions to serial stories.

Catholic community. The radio tastes of these people were much like those of the young housewife, or of the "sporty jitterbugs" (see below). They were chiefly distinguishable from the others by their refusal to have anything to do with the news. Their lack of information was not due to lack of interest, as with others, but to a definite "Let's see only the rosy side" attitude. Considering the seriousness of the conflict which these people are facing, it is not surprising that such a reaction exists.

The Sporty Jitterbugs: "The man I admire most is Glenn Miller."

The two American institutions which have had the most profound effect on young people in the North End are swing and sports. Cut off from the old peasant folkways of their parents, and subjected to the tin horn ballyhoo of the modern American City, they have become shallow and insecure young adults. They are not "rebels" from things Italian; their shift has been unthinking and inevitable. Although they work with non-Italians in factory jobs or as salesgirls, they feel tied to the North End, "their part of town."⁸ The reverence for the "Great Men" expressed by their parents' generation has largely been supplanted in this generation by admiration for the "good guy." Prominent among the men they admire most are Walter Winchell, Joe DiMaggio, Lindbergh, Joe Louis, Lou

Gehrig, Phil Bretton (a singer in one Al Donahue's band), and Glenn Miller.

Politically, they think not so much of Italy as America, but most of them are isolationists.

So far as their radio tastes are concerned, they are much like those of young people in other parts of the country. Swing music, sports programs, fast variety—these are the center of their world. They talk about them, bet about them, fight about them. Around these have grown up a critical cult with a special set of standards and a special lingo. Their sophistication in judging the arrangements of jazz music far outstrips their critical ability in other spheres. The sports followers live with their heroes and follow their batting averages. They felt a personal interest in their heroes, who are often radio personalities. Rather than liking E. G. Robinson, as their parents do because of the moral of his Big Town stories, many of them liked him because "he's a tough guy." Their typical criticisms were that a favorite program does not appear twice a week rather than once, or that advertising cut into the middle of their favorite swing band. This intense interest in radio fare might be interpreted as an indication that these young people feel insecure in the greater community because of their Italian background, and so develop an over strong allegiance to those figures and symbols which seem to them typ-

⁸ In a study of the Italian community in New Haven, I. L. Childs found three types of adjustment to the acculturation process among young men in the community: the "in-group" reaction in which the individual becomes more intensely Italian, the "rebel" reaction away from things Italian, and another which is best summed up as an unthinking reaction by


which the individual avoids the whole problem of cultural conflict. The group described here is predominately of this last type. Insufficient material on the listening habits of the other two types was gathered to warrant a discussion of them here. Childs, I. L. Doctoral Dissertation. 1939. Yale University. Yale University Library.

ically American. One might speculate, however, that such allegiances are common to all urban youths in a similar economic class whatever the nationality strain. This is a point which needs further investigation.

One would only know that these youths were of Italian descent by their occasional listening to Italian programs which they hear at home when their parents listen. The following graph shows the proportion of people in various age groups who can speak Italian, whose favorite program is in Italian, or who listen to any Italian program. Seventy percent who listen to any Italian programs is very high for the youngest age group represented when one considers that most of these

young people have been born in this country and educated in English speaking schools. The programs they listen to are mostly musical ones, and the young people report that they like Italian music even though they like swing. This at least of their cultural heritage has remained.

An interesting sidelight on the place of radio in the lives of these people may be found in the number of families which reported that now that news was no longer given in Italian, the father and mother had to ask the children who could understand the news in English to translate it for them and tell them what was going on. Even under the best conditions the children had more contact with the community than



did their parents; this reliance on the children for news was another blow to the traditional Italian patriarchal system.

Integrated Americans of Italian Descent: "I love . . . the way things go here."

Perhaps the best integrated people in the community are those who have identified themselves almost completely with the American way of life. Whether it be in the realm of mores or politics, they have taken over American standards. They judge political events in terms of the American scene, and model their ambitions on American ideals. This is not to say that they have cast out as the Devil all things Italian, for many of these people still listen with pleasure to Italian programs, and accept their own Italian background rather than fighting it. But where Italian folkways have hindered adjustments to American life, they have deserted them. These people are adults, many of them in middle age, and more than any of the other groups discussed above take an active part in the social and political life of the community. Some are native Americans, others immigrants who have been here for many years. Economically these people are well off, for the North End, and are apt to be skilled artisans or independent merchants rather than unskilled laborers. More than any other group, they are wholeheartedly behind the domestic and foreign policies of the President. Most prominent among men they admire most are such major and minor American political figures as the President, Paul Dever, La Guardia, and Curley. These are solid cit-

izens, whether in the North End or South Bend.⁹

As we have defined this group, "loyal Americans" can be many different kinds of persons. Their chief distinguishing characteristic is that they have a mature view of their role in American life, and are trying to live up to it. They have faced squarely the problem of being brought up in an alien culture and living in America, and are solving the conflict by being good American citizens in their own way. On the whole they listen to few Italian programs, although they do so occasionally, particularly to music, because they like that particular kind of music. Their radio tastes vary widely, for they are different kinds of people, but on the whole they listen less than others do and rely less upon radio as an outlet for their emotions. The one preference they seem to have in common is a taste for "realistic" programs. What they call "realistic" is not our concern: suffice it to say that their assessment of radio programs tends to be in terms of their resemblance to "real life." Some have definitely stopped listening to Italian programs because they do not ring true here. One woman, for example, had

⁹ The typology developed above is not intended to be exhaustive. It is a distillation of 62 intensive case studies of North Enders, of innumerable conversations with residents by the writers, and reports by the interviewers. The numerical representation of the types in the total population is difficult to estimate. Probably there is a high correlation between the one-fifth of the population who can speak only Italian and the peasant reaction. The high concentration of militant Italians among the shortwave listeners studied would indicate that some ten or fifteen percent of the sample might fall into this type. Other estimates are too shaky for statement here.

given up listening to Italian serials. She commented: "I have heard Italian stories on the air but I don't like them. They are passionately overdone and not educational. They are unwholesome and too sensual. They are exaggerated and not true to life." Some prefer the "realism" of "We the People," others "Fibber McGee and Molly" or "Big Town"—all for similar reasons, "They are true to life." One must not think that this group is above listening to the usual amusement programs. Like other Americans they enjoy such programs as Jack Benny, Kate Smith, Bing Crosby. But it is significant here that they far prefer such programs, and any English programs, to the La Rosa Hour.

AN ASSESSMENT OF ITALIAN BROADCASTING

An examination of the programs available in Italian in Boston, and of listeners' attitudes and preferences for them lead us to the conclusion that the job being done by such broadcasting was not a constructive one for two reasons. First, it failed to give in any form specific information, either in current news or background material, on the nature of the world today and the struggle of the Democracies against Fascism. And second, it retarded the broader process of Americanization (i.e. the acquiring of new habits and attitudes which would support a loyalty for this country) by catering to the most constricted attitudes in the community. As we have seen, the audience to local Italian programs is not Fascist, but there are few Fascistically minded persons in it who may make headway in selling their gospel if positive steps are not taken to inform the community of the case for the Democ-

racies. The lack of information on world affairs is pitiable. For people who honestly believe that the war was caused by such things as "Hitler wanted a clear passage to the sea," "England wanted to keep Italy down," "There are too many people so every once in a while a war comes to kill some off," there is need for a good deal of basic education before there can be any real feeling of active participation in a worthwhile struggle. There are few people in the community who are able to, and willing to, follow the war on the radio in English. Because of the inadequacy of newspapers in Italian, and the high rate of illiteracy, radio might have helped those who could have been reached by the Italian programs. It did not.

Probably the most valuable function the Italian radio serves is that of giving the listeners a feeling of security in a world in which they feel very insecure and shut out. They hear their own language, familiar jokes, familiar music. They hear advertisements for their own food preferences, hear talks by people who figure as leaders in their small community, hear commercials for stores just around the corner. There is a good deal of the Catholic religion on the air (particularly religious drama), supporting their intense affiliation to the church. By this very token, however, their world is constricted by the Italian radio. They are confirmed in their tendency to hide in the familiar; they learn nothing of the American world about them, either its habits or humor or music. Their world is kept narrow by the radio rather than broadened by new contacts. In at least two instances also the radio keeps before them figures

who are identified in the community with groups which are distinctly undemocratic in their point of view.

WHERE LIES THE BLAME?

In seeking the source of the lack of responsible leadership in the field, one is first aware that Italian broadcasting is the orphan child of the radio industry in Boston. For the most part station managers do not speak languages other than English. They have lost control over these programs by selling time on the air to brokers, who in turn create the program, find advertisers, and do pretty much as they please. Only occasionally does the station demand or offer audience surveys to find out whether anyone is listening to these programs. So long as they are paid for their time on the air little else is really important. No records are kept of most of the programs, so that it is impossible to make an accurate estimate of the content of these broadcasts. Most of the employees interviewed at the stations now carrying foreign programs in Boston had no idea at all of the content of the programs. The manager of the station carrying the largest amount of Italian broadcasting gave the writers a completely inaccurate description of two of his programs and confessed that he had no idea what the others were about. No one at the Yankee Network could be found who knew the content of a half-hour program they broadcast every day which they pick up from Station WOV in New York. "This program is censored at the source," they said, "There is no reason why we should know what is in it."

With this laissez faire attitude on

the part of broadcasting officials, one wonders why Guidi, for instance, changed his tune. Although his daughter and Galluci, known to be a Fascist, are carrying on for him, he has ceased to present news with a Fascist point of view. The answer seems to be that American-minded community leadership challenged his power within the community. An Italian American secretary of Mayor Tobin reports that Guidi, who at one time openly supported Mayor Curley, came in to ask for Tobin's backing if he, Guidi, would shift to Tobin. After checking with other political leaders in the area, the Italian American secretary decided that the gain to Tobin's camp was not worth Guidi's price. The Vice-President of the Sons of Italy reports that Guidi, formerly an official of the organization, has been eased out by a new group which favors an Americanization policy. In the early twenties, when the Sons of Italy had definite ties with the Fascist regime, Guidi was a very influential figure in urging the group to take a Fascist line. City Councillor Russo, who originally protested when Italian news programs were taken off the air, thinking that this was going to lead to a boycott of all Italian programs, didn't follow through with his protest when he discovered that it was only Guidi's news comments which were to be missed. By pressure from other community leaders, then, rather than by direct government action, or by the broadcasters who will take his money, Guidi is being eased out of his influential opinion-forming position.

Farese, too, has been challenged, chiefly because of his activity in local politics. Two years ago he formed a

United Front group in the North End, supposedly to unify all Italian political groups in order to bargain with any administration in power for favors for the North End. When the United Front came out for Curley, Tobin's supporters saw to it that Farese was taken off the air.

Both Guidi and Farese were able to shift to another station, WCOP, but they did cut out their pro-Fascist broadcasting. Their business associate in all this has been Galluci, whose power has continued behind the scenes, regardless of the content of the broadcasts. He was known to be a Fascist to the people in Boston radio stations, but what their definition of this is varies widely. When Farese went on vacation, Galluci carried on for him, giving commentaries on world events, two of which caused especial trouble. A WPA painting of Italian laborers was to be hung in an East Boston school room. Galluci blasted the WPA and in the bargain the entire American government for so degrading Italians in this country. The WPA answered that this painting showed the Italians as the builders of America, but the fat was in the fire. When Westbrook Pegler followed through a statement by Mussolini that America was a nation of gangsters by saying "Sure we are" and listing two hundred criminals who happened to be of Italian extraction, Galluci replied to him in a broadcast. According to the engineer on duty at the time, Galluci practically melted the microphone in praise of Mussolini. While Guidi and Farese have been challenged, their business manager has continued selling their services, and building up for himself a virtual monopoly as agent

for Italian broadcasting in Boston. Recently attempts have been made to break this power, but this struggle is still going on.

Broadcasters claim that radio reflects the community around it, and this is in the broad sense true. Such steps as have been taken (mostly negative ones) toward controlling the content of Italian broadcasting in Boston in the public interest have come from leadership in the community rather than from broadcasters.¹⁰ And of course, as many commentators have pointed out, a thorough-going solution to the problem of the Italian American must embrace all his relations with the larger community, especially his social and economic life. In the ultimate analysis, it is a good job here and not a talk from a government official which will make the insecure immigrant feel at home. But broadcasters in this field have been small business men conducting marginal operations. They have not turned down potential income because they did not like what the program director said; and they have not done a constructive job in the field simply because it did not present any immediate monetary rewards. Whether they like it or not, this is a situation which the country can no longer tolerate. The group to whom they are broadcasting must be reached with material which will help these people to be better Americans and to work actively with the rest of America for a victory for democracy. If they do not do the job themselves, rabid Americanism groups may agitate to

¹⁰ As this article goes to press, we are told that WMEX has started broadcasting a series of programs sponsored by the New England Branch of the Council for Democracy, and anti-Fascist in content.

take foreign language broadcasting off the air, and the Federal government may step in to take over their job. If they would keep this source of income, and their own initiative in the matter, they had better start thinking constructively about the problem.

It is not our task here to outline specific programs which would solve the broadcasters' problem, but merely to suggest the type of material they should seek to put on the air. Broadly speaking, the needs of this group to whom they are broadcasting are for adequate information about the world, and for programs which will help lead them to a feeling of security in the greater world about them, not merely in little Italy. This need can and should be answered within the framework of usual radio programs. The material should be presented in an entertaining manner, and might well be commercial. The most obvious program lack is a news broadcast. Considering the paucity of information most of these people have on simple geography it would be well to make this detailed and to give frequent explanations of geography and terms used. It would be well too, to make what might be to other groups obvious comments on the role played by leaders mentioned in the news. If the news is to hold interest and attract attention it must not be assumed that the listener is familiar with such names as Nehru, Auchinleck, or Wavell.

There are two ways in which radio might help in the complicated job of transferring the feeling of security these people draw from their little particular world to the larger community—one in the realm of mores, the other in the realm of politics. A well-written amus-

ing daytime serial, giving the story of an Italian American family successfully becoming good Americans, might serve to present in a palatable form a good deal of useful information on how people act here, and at the same time make the transition from one culture to another a simpler process than some have been wont to find it. A program stressing the contributions of Italians to the country as a whole would be of value. Interesting and valuable, too, might be a series of letters from Italian American soldiers on their life and service. Politically two ideas should be stressed: the power and potentiality of the United States, and the falsity and weakness of the Fascist regime in Italy (without denouncing Italy as such). A program of letters from "relatives in Italy" telling of their reactions to the Fascist government might be well received, and certainly commentary on the resources of America, stressing our wealth and power, and the importance of diversity in our human resources would do no harm.

An outsider cannot tell the broadcaster how this should be done; this is his job. We can merely point out that treatment of minority groups in this country, whether it be at the employment office or in the radio fare they are offered, is a problem whose solution is crucial to our national unity in war time and, for many of us, to the kind of world we wish to see after the war. Italian radio in Boston has essentially failed in this job. But the answer is not to stop broadcasting in Italian (this is probably true of other foreign languages as well) but to encourage broadcasters to adopt a constructive attitude toward their public.

BRITISH DOCUMENTARIES AND THE WAR EFFORT

By H. D. WALEY, National Film Library, London

AS A METHOD of disseminating information the cinema must be compared for efficacy with the radio, the press and the poster.

The advantages which the cinema can claim over radio are, of course, the completion of aural impressions with visual ones, and the degree of concentration which is induced by a darkened room with the attention focussed on a single brightly-lit screen. Against this, we must concede the fact that radio reaches its audiences in their own homes, which perhaps they cannot at that moment conveniently leave, and in their own country, which the sender may well be unable to enter.

The press can to a limited extent supplement the verbal with the visual, but its impressions are not as vivid as movies or radio. And posters are, in the nature of things, confined to appeals of such brevity that they can hardly challenge the documentary film.

The main point where the movie falls behind its three rivals is in the length of time required for film-production, which makes topicality difficult. Thus the completion of a five-minute film on *The War in the Pacific* by the "Shell Film Unit" for the Ministry of Information in eight days from first scripting to the receipt of the first projection print constitutes something of a record in this respect.

The British documentary film, as a consciously-planned type of production, dates back to 1929, when John Grierson

produced for the Atlas Film Company an anglicized version of the Russian film *Turksib*—the epic of the railroad linking Turkestan with Siberia—and, for the Empire Marketing Board,¹ *Drifters*, the story of the North Sea herring fleet.

The two films stand in no adventitious relationship to one another. Grierson has always been the first to acknowledge his debt to the Russians. From them he learnt to look for drama in the normal activities of industry and to render it in the idiom of the cinema. From them he learnt that, while it is possible, though extremely difficult, to make a workman perform his daily job in a natural manner before the camera, it is quite impossible to make a professional actor impersonate a workman at his job in a convincing manner.

There is, after all, nothing paradoxical about this fact. A man who climbs the same ship's ladder daily for several years will look very different, when climbing it, from any man, however agile and imitative, who is an amateur ladder-climber. The dignity of such human skill is just the sort of theme to which the documentary movie directs the attention of its audience.

From the Russians too, Grierson learned to build up and sustain excitement by making a direct appeal to the fundamental sense of rhythm, rather

¹ A committee appointed after the Ottawa Conference in 1926 to promote the distribution of Empire products in Great Britain and to finance agricultural research.

than by raking together a series of sensational episodes. In his best sequences the visual images are arranged with the absolute rightness of a musical harmony.

Experimental film-making is an expensive activity, and Grierson was fortunate in having at his back a man of artistic sensibility and progressive vision, Sir Stephen Tallents, the Secretary of the Empire Marketing Board. The Board's life was, however, a short one, being forfeit to the economy drive which followed the world economic crisis, but before its demise Grierson had had time to collect a band of enthusiasts in the Empire Marketing Board Film Unit.

For a short time the Unit seemed in danger of dispersal, but in 1932 it was taken over by the Public Relations department of the General Post Office. Soon too, industries and public utility companies began to realize the prestige value of the documentary film, and the British Commercial Gas Association and Shell-Mex and British Petroleum, Ltd. commissioned a large number of information movies which secured public cooperation and interest.

At the outbreak of World War II, therefore, Britain possessed a vigorous tradition of documentary film making which reached back ten years—a considerable period in movie history. The Ministry of Information was the department responsible for government wartime documentaries. It went through a period of experimental modification before the wheels began to rotate smoothly and speedily.

FIRST YEAR OF WAR

The number of official movies com-

pleted for the Ministry during the first twelve months of the war amounted to nine only. Among these were two by the official G.P.O. unit—*The First Days* and *Squadron 992* (balloon barrage)—and, by other companies, three anti-gossip films and a movie on the evacuation of children. The unofficial propaganda movies produced during this period certainly exceeded the official ones in number, but for the most part failed to evoke any enthusiastic response. Korda's *The Lion Has Wings* was an exception.

In the fall of 1940 Jack Beddington, who had been Director of Publicity for Shell-Mex and B.P., took charge of the Ministry of Information Films Division and its various problems.

An uncertain factor in the Ministry's position in the film world had for long been its relation to the newsreel companies. These, as private commercial undertakings, were nervous of official film-production, which might overlap their activities, and official censorship, which might curtail them.

An agreement was reached to the effect that the Ministry should see all home issues after release and advise on the composition of reels for distribution abroad. There is no film censorship other than by the three fighting services in the interests of security. The Ministry is able to perform services to the newsreel companies by giving them advice beforehand of events likely to merit their attention and by releasing to them officially photographed material.

RELATIONS WITH THE ARMED SERVICES

The relationship of the Ministry of Information with the film-units of the fighting services is also clearly defined.

The Ministry is in control of the *public* release of all official films and film material. The Ministry of Information is also responsible for the film work of all other government departments, such as the Ministry of Food, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Home Security who may only produce through the agency of the M. of I.

In the matter of film-production the Ministry has, over a period of two years, released one short movie ("five minute films" as they were christened) per week. This scheme did not, of course, preclude the production of other longer movies.

The Ministry's official producing unit is the Crown Film Unit, which is a recreated General Post Office unit. This, however, only produces about ten per cent of the Ministry's total output, the balance being commissioned from the various producers who have experience in documentary film making. The present situation is, in fact, that there is more work for short-film producers than staff to execute it.

The Ministry's Central Film Library (from which films are withdrawn as soon as they become non-topical) contains 217 titles grouped under twelve headings:

Fighting Forces	24
British Empire	29
Allies	24
Arms	19
Women at War	10
Civil Defense	25
Farming & Gardening	26
Food	19
Education & Youth	11
Health	18
Salvage	5
Miscellaneous	7

TARGET FOR TONIGHT

The film which has earned the widest interest and highest commendation has been *Target For Tonight*, made by the Crown Film Unit. This film received an award from The Academy of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences as the best picture of its kind made in 1941 and it has been shown in nine thousand theaters in the United States.

Its outlook and method embody all that is best in the British documentary film movement. No professional actors were employed, and the events depicted are those of normal R.A.F. routine, devoid of freak coincidences and feminine entanglements.

As an experiment in an entirely different technique may be mentioned Paul Rotha's salvage film *A Few Ounces A Day*, made in collaboration with "The Isotype Institute" and consisting entirely of diagram work.

To meet changing conditions the Ministry proposed at the end of the summer of 1942 to modify its program and substitute the monthly release of 13-minute films for the weekly release of 5-minute films. In addition, an annual release of at least twelve 20-minute movies is now being aimed at, together with a certain number of longer films, such as the recently released *Coastal Command*.

FOURFOLD DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM

A fourfold system of distribution for the Ministry's releases has now been in operation for over a year.

1) Every theater in Britain is pledged to include one M. of I. free short film in every program. Other longer M. of I. films are rented in the usual commercial fashion.

2) The Ministry hires theaters, at hours when they would normally not be in use, for special free shows.

3) The Ministry organizes non-theatrical shows in rural districts through a fleet of over one hundred trucks, equipped with 16 mm. sound-film projectors, screen, darkening materials, electric generator and operator.

These present 80-minute programs in village halls, and 25-minute programs in factory canteens, returning to the same audience about once every two months. In this way a thousand shows a week are arranged and the weekly audience numbers some 170,000 people.

The steady increase in the demand for factory canteen shows has been striking. A year ago the average number given was one a week. It is now three hundred. These shows are given after meals during the midday and midnight meal break. The audiences are naturally most interested in movies linking industry with the theaters of war, and to meet this demand new films are in production, of which the first two will be *The Life Of A Tank* and *Worker To War Front*.

Special instructional programs are from time to time shown by the Ministry's mobile units to selected audiences. Thus movies on silage, hedging and ditching, and ploughing have been shown to farmers, with the cooperation of local War Agricultural Committees and Ministry of Agricultural Divisional Inspectors. Gardening films have been shown to Allotment and Produce Associations during "Dig For Victory" weeks. At

the request of the Ministry of Home Security, films are being made for Civil Defense and National Fire Service personnel. Already some 1,250,000 people have seen *Fire Guard* during the first three months of its non-theatrical release. For the Ministry of Health a film on diphtheria immunization has been made, and for the Ministry of Food films on wartime diet.

4) From the Central Film Library, now established at The Imperial Institute, London, copies are distributed free, mainly on 16 mm. film, to schools and other institutions owning projectors. Ten thousand dispatches per month go out to approved borrowers.

Publicity for War Savings is handled by a small fleet of trucks working under the National War Savings Committee, who also arrange theatrical distribution of their films.

COOPERATION WITH THE DOMINIONS

A few years before the war Grierson left the General Post Office Film Unit and undertook an official tour through the Dominions to collect information and offer advice on their problems of cultural film-production. At the end of this tour he was appointed Government Film Adviser by the Canadian government, and has since forwarded an active policy of documentary film production there and the interchange of movies between Canada and Britain.

Thus Britain has sent to Canada *A Letter From Aldershot* describing the experiences of a Canadian soldier in Britain, while Canada has sent to Britain *Wings Of Youth*, describing the Canadian air-training centers where,

alongside born Canadians, many young British airmen, including some who were sent to Canada as schoolboys on the outbreak of war, are now learning to fly.

The Ministry has also commissioned from South Africa and India respectively, for distribution in Britain, *South Africa Marches* and *India Marches*. Australia has contributed *Forty Thousand Horsemen*, based on the Palestinian campaign of the World War I.

From Britain the Ministry of Information sends out a selection of its movies for theatrical and non-theatrical distribution in all the Dominions.

AMERICANS HAVE SEEN SOME

A certain number of movies made by the British Ministry of Information have been distributed in the United States. Among these have been *London Can Take It*, with a commentary by Quentin Reynolds (General Post Office Film Unit, November 1940), *Floating Elephants* (known as *Squadron 992* in England), *A Letter from Home* and *Men of the Lightship*.

Meanwhile British newsreels have kept British audiences informed, as far as security has permitted, of the doings of the American armed forces. Officials of the Ministry of Information Films Branch have on several recent occasions visited the United States in order to ensure the closest possible liaison between the two countries in respect of documentary film production and distribution.

The Ministry is now organizing the regular importation and distribution of Russian movies with English commentary, such as *A Day In Soviet Russia* and *The German Defeat Before Mos-*

cow. One theater in London is specializing in programs of Russian films. The preparation of specially dubbed versions of British documentary films for distribution in Russia is also undertaken by the M. of I.

The British Council² assists in the compilation of "British News" which is produced by each of the five newsreel companies in rotation. This scheme was originally devised for the British Pavilion's film shows at the New York World's Fair.

The Council also sponsors a library of 52 movies listed under the following headings:

Industry & Commerce	9
Social Services	6
Technical	9
Physical Training	7
Educational	3
Miscellaneous	18

These movies are distributed to theaters in neutral countries and the Dominions through the usual commercial channels, and also non-theatrically to neutral countries through the British Institutes,³ which give shows on their own premises. In the Dominions non-theatrical distribution takes place through educational film libraries and the High Commissioners' offices.

During the period March 1941 to March 1942, 995 prints were distributed commercially in 66 territories and 1,743 prints were distributed non-commercially in 38 territories.

² An organization established in 1934 by the British Foreign office to promote a wider knowledge of the United Kingdom and the English language abroad and to develop closer cultural relations between the United Kingdom and other countries.

³ Information and cultural centers established by the British Council.

SPECIAL MOVIES FOR COLONIES

Special movies are produced for instructional work among African native peoples by the British Colonial Film Unit which is under the control of the M. of I. Valuable previous experience in this field was obtained by the Bantu Film Experiment (1934-1937), financed by a Rockefeller grant. The Colonial Film Unit is directed by W. Sellers, who has had long experience in activities of this nature. The distribution is by mobile units. Each show is announced shortly beforehand by loud-speaker, and audiences ranging in number from two to fifteen thousand quickly gather in the open air.

The movies themselves are silent, the commentary being supplied either from a disc or by a native commentator in the dialect of the district.

It has been found essential to follow four guiding principles in the construction of these films:—

1) The tempo must be slow.

2) The content of each scene must be simple. Natives view all parts of the screen with equal interest. Accordingly close-up views and mid-distance views are preferable to distant views.

3) Absolute accuracy is essential. The least slip is quickly noticed by a native audience and provokes uproarious laughter.

4) There must be no camera tricks—these only confuse the audience. Closer continuity is required than for European audiences. Thus action which might be made clear to a European audience in two or three shots may require four or five shots.

Copies of almost all wartime documentary films are being handed over for preservation to the National Film Library, which stores them in specially designed temperature-controlled vaults, so that there will be a record of World War II for posterity to examine in all its detail.

TESTING POLLS IN OFFICIAL ELECTION BOOTHS

By HARRY H. FIELD and GORDON M. CONNELLY, National Opinion Research Center

ALTHOUGH sampling surveys since the 1936 presidential election have succeeded in predicting the outcome of several hundred local, state and national elections with a range of error seldom exceeding six per cent, critics have maintained that the results of surveys on social and economic questions do not express the true opinions people would reveal if allowed actually to vote on them.

To test the justification of this criticism and to throw light on the reliability of opinion surveys on issues, the National Opinion Research Center attempted to locate a city which could be transformed into an open-air laboratory. The city of Boulder, Colorado, was selected, largely because the University of Colorado expressed a willingness to participate in the experiment and other authorities were ready to cooperate.

This report discloses the opinions secured from a sample of Boulder's electorate on three public issues, and comparable opinions secured in the actual polling stations on election day on the three identical questions, which were presented to all voters. Also, for purposes of comparing results of a sampling forecast with actual election returns, the representative respondents were asked their pre-election preferences in the senatorial and gubernatorial contests. Results of both the survey and the election are for the city of Boulder only. Similarity of the findings provides a measure of the accuracy of the sampling technique whether applied to candidates or issues.

WHY OFFICIAL ELECTION BOOTHS USED

To determine whether a stratified sampling survey on issues represents not only the honest opinions of those interviewed but also of those not interviewed, the Center had to find some system for ascertaining the secret opinions of all voters (or a preponderant number of them). Since the critic, especially he who thinks the average citizen will not reveal his honest opinion to an interviewer, would hardly accept a 100 per cent house-to-house canvass by interviewers as a test of the reliability of sampling results, the Center was obliged to devise another plan for "total enumeration." The logical choice was the private polling booth, where Americans, without fear of authoritarian reprisal or public censure or individual coercion, traditionally express their own secret opinions.

Be it understood, the Center does not necessarily subscribe to the notion that elections *per se* are the final authorities on the reliability of surveys. As a matter of fact, in attempting to predict an election, a research organization faces a world of problems not directly related to opinion at all. Many opinion analysts contend that scientific surveys, more than elections themselves, are the most reliable expression of public opinion. They claim that surveys are not subject to political-machine manipulations in getting out a disproportionately large Republican or Democratic vote, to "short-pencil artists," to dead persons' voting, to gerrymandering, to the effect

of weather keeping the elderly and infirm from the polls, nor to the poll tax. Scientific surveys, experts maintain, represent all types of persons in the degree to which they exist in the entire population, while elections seldom do. It is common for less than half of the registered voters to go to the polls, not to mention the unregistered. The Center realizes, however, that to test the reliability of surveys, it must use the popular election as the yardstick, for no other measure would have general acceptance. In so doing, N.O.R.C. runs the risk of having its work discredited in the public eye without its accuracy actually being disproved.

While N.O.R.C. generally uses a social cross section, representing all types of persons according to their actual numbers in the total adult population, in this case, where it desired to show results comparable to those of an election, the Center found it necessary to sample only those who were eligible, and by their own statements intended voters. How well it anticipated male and female voters under and over forty years of age may be seen in the fol-

lowing table, where a comparison of the sample and vote is made. Probably never before in American history had representatives of an unofficial organization been permitted to operate in any way whatsoever within an official polling station. Before the Center could enter such stations to ask voters to record their opinions on a special ballot, many steps were taken.

ENLISTING OFFICIAL COOPERATION

After enlisting the cooperation of the regents, president and faculty of the University of Colorado at Boulder, the Center received permission to enter the polls from the following officials: The Secretary of State of Colorado, the Attorney General of Colorado, the county commissioners of Boulder County, the county clerk of Boulder County, the election judges of Boulder and the Republican and Democratic county committees. The Boulder Chamber of Commerce and the daily newspaper, respectively, endorsed the experiment and promised sufficient publicity to acquaint voters with the reason for the Center's appearance at the polls.

FACTUAL COMPARISONS

Vote on N.O.R.C. Ballot at Polls						
	1940 Census	Pre-election Survey	Unofficial 1942 Vote	Total	Voters Interviewed In Survey	Voters Not Interviewed Previously
Men						
21-40 Years	19.7%	15.1%	10.7%	11.8%	12.4%	11.6%
Over 40 Years	24.8	34.1	31.3	30.3	31.6	29.8
Women						
21-40 Years	21.5	20.1	16.4	17.8	18.7	17.4
Over 40 Years	34.0	30.7	41.6	40.1	37.3	41.2
In cases						
100% equals	9,077	1,221	3,926	3,300	969	2,331

Questions as diverse as possible seemed desirable for this test. Finally chosen were those dealing with a national sales tax, old age pensions and a world union. Inasmuch as the extent of voter cooperation in filling out opinion ballots had never previously been determined, the Center limited its questions to three, rather than provoke the doubtfully-cooperative citizen. Also, as a part of the sampling survey, it seemed desirable to forecast two political contests involving personalities. Twenty-nine interviewers, twenty-five of whom were University students, were especially trained to interview a sample of voters. Interviewing was done in the customary manner. All questions were asked exactly as worded, and no explanations or interpretations were offered. Opinions were gathered by personal calls.

A "pilot study" of 196 cases was made October 23 and 24, after which a number of improvements was made in the questionnaire. Consequently, none of the figures from this first sample were included in the results recorded the evening before the election, or are printed herein. The sample upon which all predictions were made included 1,224 cases gathered on the following dates: October 26, 406; October 28, 397; October 30-31, 421.

PROCEDURE AT THE POLLS

In each of the sixteen official precinct polling stations on November 3, an authorized representative of the Center was present during all voting hours from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. to hand to every voter one ballot to be marked secretly and placed in a sealed ballot box. In order not to interfere in any way with

the election, voters were not given their opinion ballots until they had completed the official voting. N.O.R.C. representatives in each station were permitted to display prominently a large poster informing voters of their part in the experiment. Regardless of whether or not they were interviewed in the sampling survey, all voters were requested to mark a ballot and place it in a special sealed ballot box. The representatives recorded by sex and age all those who for any reason whatsoever declined to "vote." After the polls had closed, the sixteen sealed ballot boxes were delivered to a special University of Colorado committee, which supervised the tabulation.

RESULTS OF EXPERIMENT

The significance of the Boulder experiment is that scientific methods of opinion measurement can predict within a small degree of error how people would vote on issues, as well as how they would vote on candidates. While one test is far from conclusive evidence of the reliability of sampling surveys, the fact cannot be overlooked that in this one instance, at least, a survey proved capable of ascertaining public opinion on three separate issues with a reasonable degree of accuracy, particularly on two of the three.

The following table includes the predictions based on the sample, the actual vote, the error within which the results should presumably have fallen provided the cross section was an accurate miniature of the Boulder voting population with opinions and provided there were no other biasing factors, and the actual error in predicting the opinion of those who voted:

Topic	Answer Given	Prediction	Actual Result	Margin Of Error On Prediction ¹	Actual Error
National Sales Tax	Affirmative	42.4%	35.2%	3.7%	7.2%
Old Age Pensions	Federal	60.5%	61.6%	3.7%	1.1%
Union of Nations	Good Idea	81.8%	78.6%	3.0%	3.2%
Carr vs. Johnson	Carr	53.3%	53.0%	4.2%	0.3%
Vivian vs. Bedford	Vivian	61.6%	61.4%	4.2%	0.2%

Assuming that those who cast the official vote in Boulder on election day were actually representative of all registered persons, it may be argued that even this vote was nothing more than a sample itself, being subject to a margin of error of 1.4 per cent on candidates and 1.8 per cent on issues, insofar as it represented all registered voters. That is, if all those registered had voted, the result might have varied as much as 1.4 per cent on candidates and 1.8 per cent on issues from the actual vote, merely on the basis of a mathematical sampling error. (Boulderites who voted for Carr and Johnson totaled approximately 5,000 out of about 8,900 registered voters in the city, and those who participated in the experiment at the polls totaled a little over 3,700.)

Specific results showed 61.6 per cent of those voting at the polls on election day in favor of federal rather than state control of old age pensions, whereas 60.5 per cent of those interviewed in their homes favored federal control. In the election 78.6 per cent supported American participation in a union of

nations after the war, compared to 81.8 per cent in the sample. The secret ballot boxes yielded a 64.8 per cent opposition to a national sales tax of 2 per cent "on everything that people buy," as against a 57.6 per cent negative vote given to interviewers. The Center's prediction of the outcome of the United States Senatorial election between Governor Ralph L. Carr, Republican, and Senator Edwin C. Johnson, Democratic incumbent, was virtually perfect, 53.3 to 53.0 per cent in the city of Boulder. Even closer was the forecast that John C. Vivian, Republican, would receive 61.6 per cent of the gubernatorial vote in Boulder. Actually he got 61.4 per cent.²

VALUE OF EXPERIMENT

Never before have issues used in surveys been put to a "total enumeration" before there has been extensive campaigning and public discussion about them. Surveys covering issues already coming to a vote have been conducted with amazing accuracy, but in such cases public thinking had become crys-

¹ For the benefit of the statistician, the margin of error is based on three Standard Deviations from the obtained sample percentage. This formula was used:

$$S.E. = \sqrt{\frac{PQ}{n(N-1)}} \\ \sqrt{\frac{(N-n)}{(N-n)}}$$

² Final returns differ slightly from the figures released in the Center's preliminary reports.

tallized through propaganda and education.

To determine the reliability of the usual survey covering topics not coming to an immediate vote, however, the most logical device appears to be a public vote on corresponding questions without the voter's foreknowledge of the decision he must reach. In Boulder, for example, neither respondent nor voter knew beforehand what questions he would be answering. This situation exactly parallels that in the usual interview.

This statement is not meant to infer that surveys on impending plebiscites concerning matters of opinion do not test the reliability of survey results on issues, but merely that such tests are not exactly comparable to surveys on issues which are not to be referred to the voters.³ It is in this sphere that sampling surveys can perform their most valuable service to democracy, measuring opinions which would not otherwise be measured.

"Public opinion polls do not exist for the purpose of predicting elections," Dr. George Gallup, Director of the American Institute of Public Opinion, wrote recently, "but these tests do provide a means of evaluating the accuracy and reliability of methods. The true function of polls is to measure and report the current trends of public opinion on the many vital issues which confront the nation."

Should further experiment prove the

³ One such plebiscite prediction was made by the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion early in 1942, when the vote on conscription of Canadians for overseas duty was forecast with an error under 4 per cent.

reliability of opinion surveys as decisively as they have proved the accuracy of election predictions,⁴ statesmen and academicians will be able to determine whether an endorsement of a candidate is also an endorsement of his policies. Politicians no longer will be able to claim that an overwhelming vote for a certain candidate is a mandate for the victor to continue this or that of his policies. Also, the Center hopes that accredited surveys will perfect the processes of democratic government by rendering citizens articulate at all times on all issues, rather than just every two or four years generally on personalities only.

DISCREPANCIES CONSIDERED

Two important exceptions to the almost perfect predictions of the sample occurred. First, the percentage of Boulderites approving a national sales tax registered a 7.2 per cent decline from the sample to the election. This discrepancy, which exceeds the margin of error of the sample must be attributed to more than chance. Conceivably it may be due to any one or combination of three things; prestige, position on the forms, and/or some inherent element of the question for which the sample was not properly representative.

Did respondents tell interviewers they thought a national sales tax would be "all right" for fear that opposing the tax would brand them unpatriotic,

⁴ In seven years the Gallup Poll has predicted 114 elections with an average error between 3 and 4 per cent, and the *Fortune* Survey in 1940 called the outcome of the Roosevelt-Willkie popular vote with an error of only 0.2 per cent.

especially in this war period?⁵ If so, such a patriotic prestige factor might not be present when a secret ballot is marked. Or, were answers less reliable because this was the first opinion question on both the questionnaire and ballot, soliciting an answer before the respondent or voter was "warmed up" to thought and expression?

Second, the percentage of undecided persons showed a decline on every question at the polls, dropping 6.1 per cent on the sales tax, 6.0 per cent on the pensions and 6.7 per cent on the world union. Chance cannot explain all the discrepancy. Either or both of two factors seems responsible in this case. Either the secret ballot drew opinions from people who were reluctant to express them to interviewers, or most people who had no opinions were not sufficiently interested to vote, although they had said they would.

Supporting the first possibility is an experiment conducted by the American Institute of Public Opinion in Lisbon Township, Maine, during the 1940 presidential campaign, in which a secret ballot technique used by interviewers reduced from 16 to 2 per cent the number of undecided persons interviewed in the usual questioning manner. Supporting the second possibility is the fact that, while 80 per cent of all adults willing to grant interviews⁶ claimed they were registered and were planning to vote, only 55 per cent of Boulder's

adults actually voted. Because there was virtually no difference in the percentages of no answers between voters who had and had not been interviewed, the possibility of the survey acting as an educating factor does not seem likely.

PRINCIPAL SHORTCOMINGS

Another weakness was the small size of the city of Boulder,⁷ which necessitated a sample which was too great a part of the total enumeration to be as convincing a test of the sampling technique as would have been possible in a larger city. For statistical reliability, nevertheless, the laws of probable error make it necessary to secure nearly as many cases in a small city as in a large one. In Boulder the Center interviewed such a proportionately large sample that 28 per cent of the 3,713 voters who marked opinion ballots had already been interviewed in their homes. Because some voters of this 28 per cent were undoubtedly interviewed in the 300-odd test cases secured in the "pilot study" and in training interviewers, it is likely that only about 23 per cent were included in the final sample of 1,224 cases. Such an assumption is based upon the probability that the interviewed voters were evenly distributed over all the sample surveys. Where a larger electorate could be sampled, as accurate a cross section could have been found in less than 1 per cent of the total voters. Foreseeing this

⁵ To avoid this prestige element, the Center might have asked: "Do you think the federal government should put a national sales tax of 2 per cent on everything that people buy, or do you think there are better ways for the government to raise money?"

⁶ Although 1,526 adults were willing to be interviewed, only the 1,224 who said they intended to vote were asked all questions and

were included in the reported sample. Of those who said they would vote, however, only 69 per cent went to the polling stations, according to those who indicated on their secret ballots that they had been interviewed previously.

⁷ According to the 1940 census, Boulder has a total population of 12,958, of whom 9,077 are 21 years of age or older.

situation, N.O.R.C. sought the consent of an election commission in a larger city. When this effort failed, the directorate preferred accepting Boulder's proffered cooperation to postponing the experiment indefinitely.

Added to the relatively oversize sample was the fact that the November 3 vote provided much less than a total enumeration. In the first place, only 69 per cent of the city's 1940 voters returned for this off-year election. In the second place, only 81 per cent of the local⁸ vote participated in the experiment, although 95 per cent were approached by N.O.R.C. representatives.

⁸ Excluded from the base were 441 absentee voters, whom the sample could not pretend to represent.

While considerably short of a total response, the cooperation of 81 per cent was considered rather successful by the Center, which looked upon this phase as more or less of an experiment within an experiment. Of those actually handed ballots at the polls, 86 per cent marked them, compared to 90 per cent of the eligible voters who answered the questions for interviewers.

Perhaps more through oversight of voters than non-cooperation, a fairly high percentage of omissions was found in the factual data on the back of the opinion ballots, probably because these ballots had to be turned over to be completed. Ten per cent failed to indicate sex, 9 per cent omitted the age classification and 17 per cent skipped evaluation or rental of their homes.

OUR FREEDOMS AND OUR OPINIONS

By PAUL T. CHERINGTON, McKinsey & Company

DESPITE industry's traditional interest in the respective nature of individuals and society, the record shows that business men are still baffled because the existing techniques for bringing the two into a satisfactory relationship are faulty.

People in groups have joint qualities which may not be the mere totaling of individual units. Public opinion, for example, has strange and elusive qualities which have puzzled students for centuries. It is doubtful whether anyone in an ordinary lifetime could learn enough to arrive scientifically at as many sound judgments, covering an infinite variety of topics, as all of us hold with such great tenacity. Even scholars who have gone into these same topics with great care and thoroughness disagree about them or at least arrive at suspended judgments. Nevertheless, we go on forming our judgments, holding them with great firmness, and at times even fighting for them. Government, ethics, morals, medicine, various branches of science, pedagogy, military strategy and tactics, and many other highly specialized subjects come within our scope and on them we are not afraid to express our views in general and in detail. This view of our own opinions, which most of us like to think are reasonably intelligent, does give ground for a little doubt concerning the factual background of at least some of the ideas on which our opinions are pretty firmly based. Nevertheless, group opinion, formed without undue pressure and expressed with accuracy and frankness, is the very founda-

tion of public opinion, and upon that many of our democratic institutions rest.

FREE SPEECH TODAY AND YESTERDAY

Freedom of speech and freedom of the press and some of our related rights we cherish as fundamental. The trouble is that we have allowed our ideas about these rights to remain static while the facts about them have greatly changed. These "rights" when the Constitution was adopted, represented some of the main features of both the formation and the expression of public opinion. If our forefathers could assemble, and read the papers and make speeches without danger of governmental wrath, they could form their opinions freely and could let them be known. And at the same time their representatives in government could by these same means be watched and adequately controlled. But this is no longer a true picture of any of the three most important elements of an effective public opinion. Public opinion now is formed by many devices other than assembly or speech or the press. Assembly and the press are less effective and influential than they were in shaping opinion, and other new phases of life have taken their place. Radio broadcasts, syndicated columnists, newsreels, public relations counsel, news weeklies, press bureaus, the Office of War Information, and many other devices now tell us many things, even if they do not indicate what we had better believe. In short, the tools of propaganda and the techniques available for making

effective use of them have been modernized.

In contrast with these new and powerful facilities for influencing public opinion there has been no corresponding growth—but an actual impairment—of the means available for its expression. "Assembly" no longer means what it did in Philadelphia in 1791. No auditorium in any city would hold such a representative cross-section of the voting population as could meet easily then. And even if such a gathering were now possible, the individual would be submerged in the crowd. People are far better educated, better informed, more disposed to form tenable opinions; but they are practically devoid of any adequate modern substitute for those simple means of expression which have ceased to be feasible.

In the same way, they have lost contact with their chosen representatives in public matters. They used to be able to walk in and listen to the lawmaking process going on. But now distances are too great, and obstacles too serious to make this possible for more than a handful.

HOW LINCOLN KEPT IN TOUCH

Lincoln sensed this even in his day and worked strenuously for a remedy. Most writers on Lincoln—more recently Sandburg—have discussed the President's reply to a critic who thought he ought not to waste his time and energy in public receptions and in talking with the people in the crowds of curiosity visitors in Washington. Lincoln's reply expressed the longing he apparently felt for the human contact he formerly had in his humbler days in Illinois; and in

the course of this reply he used three most significant expressions.

He first remarked, "... no hours of my day are better employed than those which bring me again within the direct contact and atmosphere of the average of our whole people."

To which he added, "Men moving only in an official circle are apt to become merely official—not to say arbitrary—in their ideas, and are apter with each passing day, to forget that they only hold power in a representative capacity. Now this is all wrong."

And he concluded with the observation: "I call these receptions my *public opinion baths*—for I have little time to read the papers and gather public opinion that way; and though they may not be pleasant in all particulars, the effect, as a whole, is renovating and invigorating."

The idea of a President getting guidance and renewal from contact with these poorly informed masses of people suggests some quality in the expression of grouped or massed opinions which is something more subtle than mere aggregates of individual views. It may have been that Lincoln's own part in the exchange of views was quite as important as what he got from the visitors. But it was a means of expression of the public mind which he at least found helpful in the formulation of his own thoughts about some of the difficult problems he faced.

ONE WAY TO RESTORE VOICE TO DEMOCRACY

The current elaboration of the forces shaping public opinion while the means of expression have, if anything, grown weaker, represents one of the great dangers to the continued effective operation

of democracy. Unless something is done to restore to democracy vocal powers comparable with its increased facilities for learning, it no longer can be the effective mechanism for popular government it once was. As suggestions concerning ways in which this balance may be restored, two specific developments are here mentioned.

The first development suggested for tightening up democracy, is a more orderly expansion of the use of cross-section statistical techniques for affording a voice to public opinion in time to do some good. Public opinion polls have been matters of dispute for several years, but they have made a real contribution to American democracy and are not only here to stay, but are destined to be made more use of as time goes on. Speaking as one who pioneered in this field for several years I raise the question whether this means of expressing public opinion does not have possibilities for more constructive use than have yet been explored.

Perhaps a valuable step at this stage in the development of the use of statistical methods would be the setting up of a special division in the Bureau of the Census to deal with statistical cross-sections. This device, which has been used for years in many other fields—in biology, agriculture, commerce, mining and everywhere when sampling has been feasible—is applicable to this field of people with respect to many things and probably with respect to their opinions.

It is, however, a field in which great care and skill are necessary; and one great advance in the techniques available for its profitable use would be to have access to carefully worked out statistical samples on which to base

national, regional and local surveys of divergent opinions. If these data could be developed in a separate cross-section division of the Bureau of the Census and made available to qualified workers in this field, it would save them from many errors and make their work more useful. Much of the material in the new Census, tabulated in smaller units than hitherto, and covering many aspects of living conditions never covered before, together with the sampling plan tried out in this Census for the first time with respect to some items in the more expanded schedules, make this proposal seem more practicable than ever before. The Census for obvious reasons would not be adapted to the actual conducting of opinion surveys. This is not a suitable undertaking for a government or political agency. It is essentially a job for impartial private enterprise.

PERFECTION OF TECHNIQUES

Another useful step in the wider use of this statistical device would be the further perfection of the techniques already in process of improvement for making the actual work of interviewing uniformly impersonal and accurate. Another would be the setting up of some adequate safeguard against too easy entry of incompetent and inexperienced people into the taking of polls, which because of the difficulty of adequate "checking" in time may be used for ulterior purposes.

One of the most important points of all in connection with the whole subject of polls or surveys of opinion is the fact that if accurately planned and conducted they can give an idea of public opinion collected in time to be of use in making critical decisions of governmental policy.

Business men have been making use of these statistical devices long enough to have put them beyond doubt as to their value, when carefully used and intelligently interpreted.

To summarize, one of the weakest factors in our democratic set-up is the fact that the influences bearing on public opinion are much farther developed and more powerfully implemented than are the means of expression of that opinion. In any democratic society public opinion is the central power. It drives the whole thing. But public opinion is now beat upon by press, radio, organized propaganda, bloc organization, noisy leaders and other skilful drivers. To record its reactions this much assailed "public opinion" or "voice of the people" has no correspondingly adequate means of expression. At intervals it can cast a secret ballot for a candidate of somebody else's choosing or can rebuke a man for a selfish act perhaps two years old. Some form of cross-section poll may offer a help toward bringing the voice of the people up to a degree of modernity comparable with its ears. What we really need is some good way to give the President a fireside chat—in which the public do all the chatting—from us to him.

KEEPING IN TOUCH WITH LAWMAKERS

A second suggested development grows out of the group of problems concerned with the increased insulation between the people and their chosen representatives in the government. Before democracy can really function properly, this insulation will need to be broken down. No better plan for this has been proposed than to put all public acts of all public servants under a mod-

ern type of scrutiny. To put all sessions of Congress (House and Senate), all important committee hearings of both houses and most public sessions of executive and even other branches of government "on the air" is an obvious solution for the present lack of contact. The few joint sessions of Congress which have been broadcast heretofore—including some of the President's addresses on the state of the nation, and the session declaring war on Japan—were well worth while.

The similar broadcasting of regular sessions would be incredibly dull unless the fact of being on the air should serve to tone them up materially. If a Congressman were sure that before he took his seat after his speech the telegrams from constituents would begin to flow in, it might make him more careful of what he said and did.

At the Declaration of War broadcast, the spunk and nerve of the one member of Congress who wanted to vote against the war declaration was a case in point. She was smothered, and people did not react favorably to her suppression, although their own opinions were quite different. Many people apparently were of the opinion that she had a right to her views, and a right to express them—mistaken as they considered those views to be.

Broadcasting legislative sessions could not ordinarily rank as entertainment; but that would not be the purpose. If it is to be done it would only be desirable for the development of democratic vigor.

State legislatures and even the councils and other bodies governing our larger cities might well undergo some of the same modernization. The chances

are they won't. But they well might if they wish to avoid the looming alternative of undemocratic attempts to prevent the impotence due to the impeded return flow of the results of democratized thought.

A FIELD FOR CREATIVE INGENUITY

In any case, these two suggestions are illustrative of some of the forms of reconstruction of our ways of life which will need thinking about in line with the principles of established managerial practice. It is such changes as these that this war and its problems have made vital.

Congress finds itself under criticism for its own pension vote and for its liberal interpretation of its need for gasoline under the rationing system. These matters are secondary, and the criticism itself may not be serious. But the widespread attitude of the people that members of both houses of Congress listen to "bloc" leaders rather than to the people themselves is not a secondary matter.

Some of the best organized of the

"pressure groups" of voters have as their representatives or lobbyists in Washington men who are intrinsically abler than the people's representatives with whom they have to deal. Hence, when these men come to tell the people's representatives what their particular bloc wants, they have the combined force of their own intrinsic abilities and of the impressive number of votes they claim to be able to influence. The mathematics of re-election can never be lost sight of by a member of Congress who seriously wants to return for another term—and most of them do.

To anyone who believes that democracy is anything more than a name it is a matter for serious concern that so many means available for shaping and controlling public opinion have been strengthened and modernized, while the means for expressing this opinion and giving it contact with government processes have remained primitive or at least medieval. It is a challenge to American inventive ingenuity to devise ways for curing democracy of inarticulation.

PUBLIC RELATIONS PROBLEMS OF ALIEN REGISTRATION

By J. H. POLLACK, Washington, D.C.

PEARL HARBOR resurrected America's "enemy alien." Entombed for a quarter century, the beggar in our midst with the loathsome sores, even as Lazarus, arose to the tune of trumpeting headlines. Overnight, almost a million aliens of German, Italian and Japanese nationalities living in the United States became pariahs, untouchables. During February 1942, the month of Singapore, Selective Service re-registration and War Saving Time, Uncle Sam had to take them in hand.

With merely two weeks to launch and six weeks to conduct the Identification Program, it had to be done with a minimum of antagonism and without leaving the impression that the 1940 Alien Registration was being duplicated. A thorny administrative problem arose when it was decided—possibly at the Army's suggestion—that the registration begin a week earlier in the eight western states than for the rest of the country. The program's objective was the "dual one of strengthening our internal safety and protecting the loyal alien, even if he had become technically an alien enemy." The government story had to be told quickly, correctly, comprehensively. One could not play with the lives of aliens now affected by the new law. Since there was no time to separate the sheep from the goats, some with slant eyes and Teutonic tongues had to come under greater surveillance.

Earl G. Harrison, director of the 1940 Alien Registration, served as the Special Assistant to the Attorney General in charge of alien identification. Before

the program opened Harrison declared, "Everything will be handled in the American way—but with the grim determination that should prevail in a democracy during war-time."¹

PUBLICIZING REGISTRATION

The Public Relations Unit of the Department of Justice, headed by M. E. Gilfond and his assistant, Jerre Mangione, likewise handled a delicate and unusual problem with rare skill. Mainly, the publicity was instructional, emphasizing that alien enemies must register within the specified periods. Glamorous publicity devices, such as using movie stars, were scrupulously avoided. Famous enemy aliens were not publicized, even though Arturo Toscanini and Jan Valtin did furnish some commentators with tidbits. Photographers were forbidden to take pictures of enemy aliens at post offices. Relatively few feature stories appeared. It was enough to get across the actual requirements of the law. This de-informationizing aspect was consistent with the Department of Justice's policy of not needlessly embarrassing those affected by the law. Unlike the 1940 Alien Registration, "teeth" rather than tolerance prevailed. "Internment for the duration" was held as a big stick over the heads of those failing to comply with the law. A wartime measure, the general tone of the pro-

¹ In recognition of his administrative acumen during both registrations, Harrison was appointed Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service by President Roosevelt.

gram was more sedate. It was unnecessary to "sell" the registration. Five field representatives in cities with large alien enemy populations—New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Boston and Philadelphia—worked between twenty and thirty days in carrying out Washington policy.

Early Department of Justice releases used the term "aliens of enemy nationalities" to describe prospective registrants, but editors found this clumsy. Instead, they utilized the term "enemy alien," a phrase fast creeping back into the language. Alternatives included "axis nationals," "foe aliens," "hostile aliens," "aliens of combatant countries" and "enemy guest." The Justice publicity department sought to discourage use of the word "registration." But digest-minded editors considered "Certificate of Identification" heavy, smacking too much of the State Department. "Internal passport" was suggested, but "Identification Card" proved the most popular.

Between January 15 and February 28, 1942, fifteen news releases were issued for the press associations, Washington correspondents, and five hundred selected organizations and individuals. The first general release was sent to over eleven thousand newspapers. A special release was prepared for cities where the registration seemed to lag. Two releases were airmailed to 225 newspapers in the eight far western states. One release listing the program's five main points was frequently featured as a front-page box. Approximately fifty thousand clippings about the program were published. Many small town newspapers printed the Department's routine releases verbatim. Some even

labeled the story "exclusive," gave a government official a by-line, assigned reporters with foreign-sounding names to cover the program.

TREATMENT BY PRESS

Little feature material appeared, except on the West Coast Japanese situation. Many feature editors considered the Identification Program too similar to the earlier registration to have human interest value. Nevertheless, some printed routine releases in their editorial columns; others ran questions and answers as a straight news story. Errors were surprisingly few. When one paper mistakenly reported the program was being handled by the "criminal division" of the Department of Justice and claimed aliens would be "held" for "questioning" at post offices, the newspaper apologized in an unabashed lead editorial. Most editors looked to Washington rather than the local post office for information.

The foreign language press was less critical. It prominently featured the fifteen English releases. Though time did not permit the translating of all fifteen of these releases, three of the more important ones were transcribed into German and Italian, and one general story was translated into twenty-seven languages. Mostly, German, Italian and Japanese newspapers in the United States did the translating themselves.

Chiefly because monthly magazines plan so far ahead, they were virtually ignored by the Department. Before the program opened, a standard two thousand-word story was prepared for 492 labor and 200 religious weeklies. These publications as well as the weekly trade press used it quite extensively. Not one

questioned the wisdom of the Identification Program, not even the *Christian Century* which had been critical of the 1940 Alien Registration. Many magazines felt other subjects more pressing. An editor of one of the country's foremost periodicals told a contributor: "I am afraid there is not going to be much interest here in the subject of aliens." Magazines commented on the program only incidentally, using it as a springboard to discuss the alien enemy situation generally. *Time* magazine characteristically instituted an "Enemy Alien Department."

RADIO PUBLICITY

Radio proved an extremely effective medium. Five live nationwide addresses by Justice officials were made and special audiences were built up for them. Local broadcasts resulted in "gravey" sectional publicity. For example: a model radio speech was prepared for the ninety-two U.S. Attorneys; a standard interview between a representative of the Office of Government Reports and a local postmaster was broadcast over fifty-eight stations in fifty-three cities; prominent citizens discussed the program over local stations.

Canned radio recordings likewise proved helpful. Administrator Harrison's January 26 address was boiled down to fifteen minutes and three hundred pressings made for stations in cities with heavy alien enemy populations not carrying the original broadcast. This same speech was also transcribed for the thirty-three radio stations broadcasting in German and the sixty-six in Italian. Unusually fruitful were the "Spot News" announcements stressing the few days left to file

applications. Obviously, different items had to be prepared for the 158 western stations than for the 776 stations in the rest of the United States. Towards the close of the program, national news commentators reiterated identification procedure on their regular broadcasts.

Newsreels were not neglected. Shortly before the program opened, Earl G. Harrison made a hundred-word announcement heard in virtually every motion picture house in the country. Even earlier, a special trailer was shown in thirty Los Angeles theatres in districts thick with alien enemy populations.

Possibly the most serviceable single method of publicizing the program was a standard poster with texts in English, German, Italian and Japanese. One side of the poster was used for the eight western states while the other side served for the rest of the country. Copies were sent to every post office in the United States. Thanks to forty metropolitan mayors, replicas were displayed in public buildings. Transit companies in leading cities reproduced the poster on subways, street cars and buses, while seventy-five per cent of the railroad companies asked to exhibit the poster, complied.

Other aids to clarify the program included a handbook of regulations (mimeographed at first, but subsequently printed), a one-page Summary of Presidential Proclamations affecting the conduct of alien enemies, and a hastily prepared Questions and Answers pamphlet.

Various communal organizations, among them the Common Council for American Unity, the National Refugee Service, and the American Committee

for the Protection of the Foreign Born, aided in interpreting the law to aliens affected by it. In most cases these groups acted upon their own initiative, for time did not allow Justice representatives to contact them on the same extensive scale as in the previous alien registration.

Miscellaneous publicity devices were employed. All governors and members of the United States Conference of Mayors were requested to issue proclamations on the program's requirements. Result: "gravy" state and local publicity. To enlist the active cooperation of employers, a standard letter with program material was sent to the National Defense Council of nine hundred Chambers of Commerce.² Department of Agriculture county agents helped reach the relatively few alien enemies residing in rural areas. The Work Projects Administration announced the identification requirements in adult education classes and the National Citizenship Education Program in its classes. Approximately two hundred and fifty priests with German and Italian congregations received the poster and informational material, as did the executive secretaries of Protestant Church Conferences.³

COOPERATION AIDED EFFICIENCY

Snags were averted by meeting organizations half way. For example, cloistered nuns were exempt, whereas

² A copy of President Roosevelt's statement repudiating the short-sighted policy of employers who discriminated against foreign-born workers was included.

³ The National Catholic Welfare Conference and American Jewish Congress were especially helpful in their promotion.

semi-cloistered ones had to register.⁴ Though it was suspected that the procuring of photographs might prove a special problem, fortunately such was not the case. True, some studios (particularly in smaller towns where no competition existed) did jack up the price of pictures and some photographers falsely told registrants that three poses were required. A special release was issued announcing that "only one pose" was necessary. Few other types of racketeers flourished. The releases with "teeth" in them—urging that anyone charging a fee be forthwith reported to the Department of Justice—seemed to scare them off.

Without the cooperation of the post offices, it is doubtful whether the program could have been handled so efficiently. They often remained open beyond their usual hours and on Sundays, set aside special rooms, booths, corridors, and engaged extra policing. One Texas post office even went so far as to hire a second clerk. The registration period for each individual ranged from half an hour to an hour and a half. Postmasters were told not to drag applicants in but to register only those who applied. The slowness of the registration seemed to "concern" many postmasters. Merely one alien enemy registered in Topeka, Kansas, the first day and but five in Paducah, Kentucky, including the last day. Generally, no stampedes prevailed. On the West Coast, Japanese were often registered at different places than German and Italian aliens. Some postmasters, despite

⁴ Though one of the requirements was three photographs "without a hat," where an alien was a member of an order requiring that a headgear be worn at all times, it was permissible to be photographed with the headgear.

previous warning, erroneously announced (at the program's conclusion) how many alien enemies failed to register. Their estimates, ranging from "one hundred per cent compliance" to "far from the total expected," were sometimes confusing and contradictory. Where defense workers had poured in to boom towns, more registered than in those places where aliens had moved, died or become citizens.⁵

REACTIONS OF THE ALIENS

The reactions of aliens to the program are interesting both as sociological phenomena and as human interest stories. In several places, United States soldiers were the first "enemy aliens" to register. One puzzled lad had difficulty in determining his nationality status, with his mother born in Italy, his father in Germany, and he himself on a boat in mid-ocean. Other instances were more tragic. Several women sobbed that their sons were killed at Pearl Harbor. An Italian farmer, unable to face the humiliation of being called an "enemy alien," hanged himself. (A few days previously he had purchased \$4,500 in defense bonds.) On the whole, though, aliens in mink coats and in patched pants understood the necessity of the program and registered.

Persons detected for having failed to register under the 1940 Alien Registration were usually given six months im-

prisonment. One Japanese so incarcerated requested confinement in a special prison where the jailer enjoyed his cooking. Another man who failed to report a change of address confessed he was being married at the time and registration "just slipped his mind."

Understandably, resentment against Japanese aliens, particularly in California, was the bitterest. Native sons, poised for reprisals, cried that Japanese farmers were pouring too much arsenic on their vegetables. Talk buzzed of a mass migration east of the Rockies but inland states were not overjoyed at the prospect. Chinese and Filipinos were identified with stickers and lapel buttons. Tokyo newspapers shrieked that Japanese were being lynched in the U.S. by "enraged American mobs."

Hostility towards German aliens was perhaps less intense, even though those rounded up by the FBI were sure-fire page one newspaper copy. An interesting problem was that of the anti-Nazi German aliens (like Lion Feuchtwanger) now technically "alien enemies." Expectedly, the press was friendliest to Italian alien enemies. In the Santa Cruz, California, country where Italian farmers cultivated ninety per cent of the nation's artichokes and brussels sprouts crops, it was feared that the evacuation might cause exceptional hardship.

⁵ In his July 17, 1942, report to the Attorney General, Administrator Harrison revealed that in accordance with the Presidential Proclamation of January 14, Certificates of Identification had been issued to the 934,000 German, Italian and Japanese aliens in the United States—263,930 German, 599,111 Italian, 47,963 Japanese and 23,096 whose nationality was in doubt.

When the program opened, it was estimated

on the basis of the 1940 alien registration records that approximately 1,100,000 "enemy aliens" lived in the United States and Puerto Rico. Complete records, however, were not available on how many deaths, naturalizations and departures from the country had taken place since then. The 1942 identification program likewise exempted those in hospitals and asylums.

ESSENTIAL FAIRNESS OF PROGRAM

Yet alien enemies were fortunate that the program was administered by such sympathetic, liberal, far-sighted men—men who were often unjustly criticized by hell-and-thunder columnists, stentorian Congressmen and militarists for not being “tough” enough. Unlike our previous experience, the 1942 registration took place promptly after war was declared. During World War I, the United States did not launch an alien enemy program until eight months afterwards, and then had no uniform method. Inevitably, some innocent aliens were then persecuted by overzealous patriots and night riders.

Of the million alien enemies in the United States, the overwhelming majority have been given a “clean bill of health.”⁶ Boards (composed of three prominent citizens serving without pay in each of the nation’s eighty-five judicial districts) are empowered to recommend internment, parole or outright release of apprehended aliens. Liberals urge extension of these civilian hearing boards for all alien enemies who could voluntarily appear before them, a practice presumably finding favor in England.

Perhaps the deadliest way to persecute an alien is economically. But persecution can be a double-edged sword driving the loyal into fifth column activities. Notwithstanding, alien enemies

are not without legal rights. The only federal restriction against their employment is in “secret, confidential or restricted government contracts and in the case of contracts for aircraft parts or accessories.” But the law, alas, has a way of lagging behind life.

There is no “Etiquette for Aliens.” How much anti-alien feeling actually exists, and how much is generated in political and journalistic quarters, is sometimes difficult to determine. Whether the alien surveillance will continue after the war is a prematurely academic question at this time. Some would classify aliens as friendly or unfriendly. Others regard aliens as Class B people even as the “metics” of Athenian democracy—persons living and trading in Athens on the payment of an annual tax but enjoying none of the privileges of citizenship. The identification program raised some scattered speculation as to whether every citizen should carry an identification card.

No “Ballad for Aliens” has yet been composed. During days of stress, possibly “Alien Enemy” lies deeper in our folklore than does “Alien Friend.” Many alien enemies may very well appreciate the virtues of this country more so than do many who are citizens by the accident of birth. Giovanni Schmidt, who helped erect America’s buildings and bridges, subways and skyscrapers, highways and byways, may nevertheless take comfort in an Attorney General’s humanitarian counsel: “Let us judge people by what they do and not by what they are. Let us not persecute these people as an outlet of our emotions against the bandits who are at the moment in control of the nations where they were born.”

⁶In accordance with Attorney General Biddle’s Columbus Day speech in New York City, the nearly 600,000 Italian aliens now residing in the United States have been removed from the alien enemy classification. This exemption, of course, does not apply to the approximately five hundred Italian aliens who have either been interned or are on parole.

WHO ARE THE BEST JUDGES OF THE PUBLIC?

By R. M. W. TRAVERS, Ohio State University

THE DEVELOPMENT of the technique of estimating the opinion of a total population from a knowledge of the opinion of a relatively small but representative sample has tended to overshadow any interest in the problem of determining the factors that make some people better judges than others of public opinion. This is an important problem, for while the sample ballot technique serves as a valuable guide to statesmen, administrators, and business men, there are nevertheless numerous situations in which decisions have to be made, not on the basis of such polls, but on the basis of a subjective judgment concerning the state of public opinion. The administrator in making his day to day decisions must depend to a considerable extent on his own judgments of public opinion, for the process of balloting the public is too laborious to use except on occasions of special importance.¹ Indeed the administrator must depend to a large extent on his own judgment of the public in deciding the degree to which new policies will be acceptable, and the success of a policy rests to some extent on the accuracy of these judgments. Even the administrator who wishes to introduce policies radically different from those previously adopted must be able to judge public opinion regarding the

numerous small details that might result in public opposition. While the techniques of the sample ballot and the general ballot cannot be neglected, the administrator who used the ballot box for deciding every minor issue would be a plague upon his public. Consequently, it seems that the ability to judge public opinion accurately is an important factor in determining success in many fields of work.

The present writer has been engaged for some time in conducting a series of researches² in an attempt to discover, first, the factors in personality that result in erroneous judgments of public opinion and, secondly, the qualities that are associated with the ability to make accurate judgments of public opinion. It seems appropriate here to gather together the conclusions of these researches regarding the qualities that characterize good and bad judges.

THE EXPERIMENTAL TECHNIQUE

In the studies under consideration, the technique used was that of asking a number of individuals to estimate what percentage of a specified group they believed would agree with a cer-

¹ It should be remembered that it is not only statesmen, business men, and those in administrative positions that need to make judgments of public opinion. Every individual in the pursuit of his daily life needs to make such judgments about his own social group in order to be able to make satisfactory social adjustments.

² These researches are reported in a number of articles as follows: "A Study in Judging the Opinions of Groups," *Archives of Psychology*, No. 266, New York, 1941, pp. 73; "The General Ability to Judge Group Knowledge," *American Journal of Psychology*, 1942, Vol. 40, No. 3; "A Study of the Ability to Judge Group Knowledge," *American Journal of Psychology*, 1943, Vol. 41, No. 1; "Group Identifications as Factors Influencing Judgments of the Opinion of a More General Population," *Sociometry*, 1942, Vol. 5, No. 3.

tain statement or might know a certain fact. For example, some subjects were asked to estimate the percentage of the adult population that would answer "Yes" to the question "Are you in favor of labor unions?" An attempt was then made to determine the qualities which distinguished those who made accurate judgments of public opinion from those who made large errors in their judgments. Although the ability to judge the opinion of a group was studied separately from the ability to judge the knowledge of a group, they will be considered together in this article. The per-

sonality factors that are related to the one are also related to the other. It is not surprising that this is so, for the common man often has difficulty in distinguishing knowledge and opinion.

The main factor that seems to influence the individual's judgment of public opinion is his own opinion. Similarly, the main factor that determines an individual's judgment of the percentage of a group knowing a certain fact is the individual's knowledge or ignorance of that fact. Table I shows this clearly. One hundred students were asked to estimate the percentage of the adult

TABLE I

The Relationship Between the Individual's Own Opinion and His Ability to Judge Public Opinion

	<i>In the case of those judges who themselves answered yes to the question</i>	<i>In the case of those judges who themselves answered no to the question</i>
Are you in favor of labor unions?	65	62
Are you in favor of government old-age pensions?	70	62
Do you think old-age pensions should be given only to old people who are in need?	60	45
Do you think freight trucks should be kept off the highways during certain hours on Sundays and holidays?	65	38
Do you approve of married women earning money in industry or business if she has a husband capable of supporting her?	44	38
If the question of national prohibition should come up again, would you vote for it?	45	30
Do you believe in the death penalty for murder?	63	50
Should Congress enact a law which would make lynching a federal crime?	60	45

population that would answer "Yes" to each of a number of questions. These questions are listed on the left of the table. In the first column of figures is given the average judgment of public opinion of all those judges who themselves answered "Yes" to each of the questions. In the second column is given the average judgment of those who answered "No." One hundred university students were the judges in this experiment.

It should be noted from this table that there is a very marked tendency for those who answer "Yes" to a question to overestimate the number of those who would also answer "Yes." Those who answer "No" tend to make an error in the reverse direction. This error seems to be a very general one. When the same students who acted as subjects were asked to judge the opinion of their own class with respect to 25 other issues, the same tendency was found in every instance.

The similar tendency for individuals who know a certain fact to overestimate the percentage of a group who also know that fact is illustrated in Table II. This table, unlike the previous one,

does not give the entire data but only a representative sample. The entire data is being published elsewhere.³

Here again the tendency is quite clear. In 27 items out of 28, those who knew an item of information tended to overestimate the percentage also knowing that item by about 20 per cent. In any case, both judgments of the knowledge of a group and judgments of public opinion tended to be grossly inaccurate.

It is worth noting that here, as elsewhere, the factors that determine the accuracy of a judgment concerning a group are the same regardless of whether it is opinion or knowledge or whether it is the individual's immediate social group or the total population that is being judged. The psychological process involved seems to be the same in all these cases.

PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES

These results indicate that individuals tend to judge others to be more like

³ R. M. W. Travers, "A Study of the Ability to Judge the Knowledge of a Group," *American Journal of Psychology*, 1943, Vol. 41, No. 1.

TABLE II

The Relationship Between the Individual's Own Knowledge and His Ability to Judge the Knowledge of a Group

	<i>In the case of those judges who themselves were acquainted with the fact</i>	<i>In the case of those judges who themselves were not acquainted with the fact</i>
The meaning of the word "solicitor"	79	73
The meaning of the word "caprice"	78	55
The population of the United States (within 5 million)	73	47
The country into which Germany marched in September 1939	71	57
The Socialist candidate for the Presidency in 1940	41	28

themselves than they really are. A practical consequence of this is that the chairman of a committee or any administrator is liable to overestimate the number of people who think as he does and who know what he knows. The unfortunate consequences of this are obvious. These results emphasize the importance of relying on the ballot rather than on intuition in judging the public whenever an issue of any importance has to be decided. Unfortunately, too many people do not realize how erroneous may be their judgments of public opinion, as was witnessed by the statements of many politicians during the 1940 elections who were willing to defend their own judgments of public opinion but who felt that the results of the sample polls were unreliable. Oddly enough, the present writer has not been able to find any evidence to support the theory that there is a relationship between the amount by which an individual's judgment of public opinion is biased and the degree to which he feels strongly about the issue. The fact that an individual has an opinion of his own is more important in biasing his judgment than the degree to which he feels strongly about the issue. Related to this is the fact that those who hold the same opinions as the minority tend to be poorer judges of public opinion than those whose opinions correspond to the majority. In general, the size of minority groups tends to be overestimated, and the members of minority groups themselves also tend to overestimate their own numbers.⁴

⁴ This may possibly account for the fact that Meier found that professional workers were poorer judges of public opinion than those in other occupational groups. See Meier, N. C. and Lewinski, R. J., "Occupational Differences

There are two probable causes for the high correlation between the individual's own opinion and his judgment of group opinion. The first possibility is that the individual tends to project his own opinions on to his social environment. The second is that the individual may tend to identify the opinion of the entire group with the opinion of the small section that he knows personally. It is likely that the small section that the individual knows personally will have opinions corresponding approximately to his own. In another study⁵ evidence is presented which indicates that the first of these two explanations is probably the more important one.

THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE

It is generally believed that the more intelligent an individual is the more capable he will be of making accurate judgments of public opinion. This view does not seem to be supported by the facts.

It is a relatively easy matter to measure the ability to judge public opinion. This is done by asking each subject to judge the percentage of the adult population that would answer "Yes" to each of a number of questions. Such questions may be taken from the Gallup and Fortune polls. The errors that an individual makes in each of these judgments can be added together to give a total score. It is obvious that an individual who makes large errors of judgment will have a large total score while an individual who makes no errors at

in Judging Public Opinion," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1938, 2, 442-449.

⁵ "Group Identifications as Factors Influencing Judgments of the Opinion of a More General Population," *Sociometry* 1942, Vol. 5, No. 3.

all will have a total score of zero. This total score is a measure of the individual's ability to judge public opinion. It is then possible to study the relationship between such a measure of the ability to judge a group and measures of intelligence. In every case studied, the relationship between these two measures has been found to be negligible. The correlation between the ability to judge opinion and the measure of intelligence provided by the Otis Test was found to be 0.04 which, for all practical purposes, indicates a zero relationship. The correlation between a similar measure of the ability to judge the knowledge of a group and measures of intelligence was found to be 0.19, which again is small and insignificant since it was based on only 31 cases. In both cases, the intelligence of the individuals varied from average up to very superior levels. No doubt if the groups studied had included individuals of very inferior intelligence, these relationships might have shown significant departures from zero. The conclusion then is that, within the range of intelligence studied, which is considerable, no significant relationship exists between intelligence and the ability to judge either the opinion or the knowledge of a group.

These results indicate that in those jobs where success depends upon the ability to make accurate judgments

about groups, a measure of intelligence alone is a poor criterion of the ability required.

PERSONALITY ADJUSTMENT IMPORTANT

There is some indication from the data, although the facts are not completely clear, that the individual's ability to judge a group depends to some small extent on the degree to which he has a well adjusted personality. In any case, the relationship is exceedingly small. Table III shows the correlation of measures of the ability to judge the opinion and the knowledge of a group with measures of emotional and social adjustment. The data were derived from students' judgments of their classmates. The Bell Adjustment Inventory was used to measure these two adjustment factors. The two correlation coefficients in heavy type express significantly large relationships. In the case of both of these there is less than one chance in a hundred that a relationship of that magnitude would occur by chance. The signs of the correlations have been adjusted to make them what they would be if, in the case of both variables, high scores were good scores.

It must be remembered that social adjustment and emotional adjustment are not independent but are related variables. It would be expected that the individual's adjustment would influ-

TABLE III
Correlations Between Measures of Adjustment and Measures of the Ability to Judge a Group

	<i>The Ability to Judge Opinion</i> 56 cases	<i>The Ability to Judge Knowledge</i> 31 cases
Social Adjustment	0.38	-0.17
Emotional Adjustment	0.20	0.46

ence his ability to judge groups since a common symptom of severe maladjustment is a distorted picture of the individual's social environment. However, the facts indicate that the relationship is slight. It seems probable that personality maladjustment must be very severe before it influences appreciably the individual's ability to judge those around him.

In this paper, an attempt has been made to summarize what is known concerning the factors that make individuals good and poor judges of the knowledge and opinion of groups. These factors are the same regardless of whether it is knowledge or opinion that is being judged, and regardless of whether the judgment refers to the individual's immediate social group or to the public in general. A main determinant of the individual's judgment of a group is his own opinion or his own knowledge with respect to the item that is being judged. Members of minority groups tend to make larger errors in judging public opinion than do members of majority groups.

Some individuals show consistently smaller errors than others in their judgments of groups. The average error that an individual makes is a measure of his

ability to judge public opinion. The best judges of public opinion do not seem to be more or less intelligent than the poorest judges. The fact that an individual is outstandingly intelligent does not imply that he will be a good judge of the public. This is an important fact to be taken into consideration in the selection of individuals for administrative positions.

The evidence indicates that the best judges of public opinion tend to have slightly better adjusted personalities than the poorest judges. However, the relationship is much smaller than had been anticipated. It is known that extreme personality maladjustment is associated with a distorted picture of the social environment, but, except in cases of major maladjustments, the distortion seems to be slight. Other things being equal, it would be advisable to choose administrators from amongst those who have well adjusted personalities.

Finally, it is important that other studies should be undertaken to determine the kind of training that results in an improvement in the ability to judge the knowledge and opinion of groups, for such training should be a part of the preparation for all occupations in which it is important to make such judgments with accuracy.

BASIC INSTRUCTIONS FOR INTERVIEWERS*

By DOUGLAS WILLIAMS, National Opinion Research Center

To Our Interviewers:

The field of public opinion measurement is comparatively new. Its purpose is to find out what the public thinks on given subjects. The area selected in which to measure the attitude of the people may be as large as the United States, as small as a single town.

To determine what people think on certain topics, the *National Opinion Research Center* will send questionnaires to its staff of interviewers. Each interviewer will make the number of interviews specified and return the completed quota within the time limit set. When the questionnaires reach headquarters, the results are tabulated on mechanical punching and sorting machines, and analyzed.

The basis of opinion research is that the views of a part of the population will faithfully reflect the views of the whole population—*provided that the part of the population interviewed is a truly representative sample of the whole.*

Translated, this means that the quota of interviews we assign on a survey contains in it the same kinds of people and population groups as exist in the total area—and in the same proportion. For example, if 7.5 per cent of the people in the United States live in the New England States, then 7.5 per cent of our sample is drawn from the New England States in a national survey. If, in the New England States, 23.9 per cent of the people live in rural areas, then 23.9 per cent of our interviews are obtained in rural areas in New England. The same principle applies for sex, age groups, economic (standard of living) levels, and other factors which we use to control the make-up

* Herein are reproduced the "Basic Instructions" used by the *National Opinion Research Center* interviewers as a guide to their interviewing techniques. These instructions serve as background and reference material during the personal training period which all interviewers representing the Center undergo. It is hoped that this material will be of interest to those students of public opinion who have not had an opportunity to observe some of the techniques of polling procedure. The author is head of the interviewing staff of the National Opinion Research Center.—Ed.

of our sample. The net result is that our cross-section is, indeed, "a population in miniature, drawn to scale." Accordingly, the number and characteristics of the quota assigned to you, when combined with the quotas of other interviewers in your territory, will represent a true cross-section of that territory.

SELECTING RESPONDENTS

The RANDOM Theory of Sampling. On the assignments which you receive, the quota which you are to complete will be divided into so many men and so many women, so many people in different age groups, so many in different economic levels, etc. Within these groups, however, you select your respondents at *random*—in the home, on the street, in the office, in a store, etc. In order to insure that yours is a random selection of respondents, most—if possible all—of the people in your cross-section should be strangers. It is the objectivity of this method that ensures our results being representative of the country as a whole. This procedure, and the size and characteristics of our sample, are statistically sound, and have been proven so.

As an interviewer, you do not know ahead of time, or care, what opinions a respondent is likely to have. Once having approached a man, your job is only to find out what his views are—be they in your mind good, bad or indifferent. Occasionally a new interviewer has the mistaken idea that a respondent should be articulate; that his views should be valid, informed or worthy if the interview is to be a successful one. This is not so. If you happen to be interviewing on a subject on which you are well-posted, and a respondent's answers reveal he is uninformed or uninterested in the topic, you have only to record the answers given. Your job is done by very virtue of the fact that the questionnaire reveals this lack of information or interest on the part of the respondent.

PROPER SPREAD OF RESPONDENTS

Because our sample is not large, it must be exact. This necessitates a spread of respondents. Thus, your interviews should be collected from

different parts of town. All of your respondents in, for example, the C economic level, should not be gathered from one street, or two streets next to each other. In other words, we want a geographic spread even in the locality in which you interview.

Further, in the interest of getting a proper spread, you should vary the type of place in which you interview; go to offices, homes, stores, approach people on the street, in parks, etc. Make sure your sample includes people in a variety of occupations. Don't interview a series of clerks in shops, for instance, because they are easily available. Scatter your age groups. If half of your quota is to be composed of people between 20 and 40, see that these respondents cover this range pretty well; don't let them all bunch around 30 to 35, for example.

Fulfilling Your Quota Properly. When you receive an assignment, you will not only be told how many people to interview, but within this number, how many men and how many women, how many in certain age groups, how many in particular economic levels, and on some surveys there will be other classifications.

ECONOMIC LEVEL

To make sure you get the correct distribution of respondents, one of the most—perhaps the most—important tasks is to interview the proper proportion of people in the various economic, or standard of living, groups. Before describing the economic levels that *National Opinion Research Center* uses, a few considerations affecting this economic grouping should be understood. In the first place, a person's standard of living is not necessarily determined by his own income or earning power alone, but by the total income of the family of which he is a member—and by the size of the family. For example, a single man earning \$1,500 a year is in quite different circumstances than a man earning \$1,500 who has a wife and two children. A college student might be earning no money at all, but if his father was a prominent industrialist, the student would probably be classed in a high economic level. In other words, don't regard a person himself, in the singular, as being in a certain economic group, but rather consider him as a member of a family which is in a certain economic group.

The second point is that the amount of money a family must have to qualify for certain economic levels varies greatly between farm and city, and among different sections of the country. A \$4,000 a year income does not represent nearly the same purchasing power in New York City, for example, as it does in Shreveport, Louisiana.

For these reasons, *National Opinion Research Center* does not use income levels solely to designate into which standard of living groups people fall, but we use what we call *economic groups*. Without further ado, we will define what we mean by these groups, so that you will be able to place each of your respondents in the group to which he belongs in the particular community where you are interviewing.

ECONOMIC GROUPS

The A group is composed of the wealthy and prosperous families in the community. These people have all the comforts and necessities that money can buy, and most or all of the luxuries common to the community. (The word "luxuries" should not be interpreted in too rare a sense. They are not restricted in our definition to a yacht, or a stable of horses, or a hunting preserve, etc. We mean families able to afford some of the following things [or similar things]: a servant or servants, membership in the country club, a second house at the shore, on the lake, or in the mountains, a trip to Florida or Canada in season, etc.) The A's run from millionaires down to anyone with sufficient income to afford any reasonable luxury sometimes enjoyed in his part of the country. Depending on the community, these constitute from 4 per cent to 8 per cent of the population.

Class B is the next lower group. Like the A's, these families have all the comforts and necessities. They differ from the A's in that they have to pick and choose between the luxuries. In other words, if a luxury runs into considerable money, they have to weigh having one luxury against another. The B group typically constitutes from 20 per cent to 25 per cent of the community.

The C's are the great middle class. These people have all of the necessities of life and most of the comforts, but typically they are

not able to afford luxuries. Some *C's* occasionally save enough to reach up for a few simple luxuries. The *C's* represent from 45 per cent to 50 per cent of the population.

The *D* group is composed of poor people. Often they have irregular employment, or if regular, their wages are at the bottom of the scale. They cannot afford many of the comforts, or even necessities, of life. On many surveys part of your *D* quota will be composed of those "On Relief." This means people on home relief, WPA projects (not supervisory jobs, however), and those receiving old age benefits. The *D's*, then, scale from those who can obtain some of the necessities of life with a struggle on down to "reliefers." *D's* constitute 20 per cent to 25 per cent of the population.

The *Cl* group represents colored people (Negroes). Only classify them as such. Do not designate them economically.

An important point to keep in mind is that economic groups refer to style of living only, not intelligence. In your personal training period, the whole subject of economic levels will be gone into very thoroughly and specifically as it applies to your particular locality.

WARNINGS

Types of Interviews NOT to Make. Don't try to interview people who are in a hurry; nor people who have such difficulty with the English language that it is questionable whether you understand each other. *Never* interview the same person more than once every six months. Only interview one person in a family on the same survey.

Don't interview people in groups. The presence of even one other person may influence the respondent to change his answers. Also, a third person may interrupt your interview with observations of his own, which will cause confusion and waste time.

APPROACH

The approach is very important, because it can determine the success or failure of an interview. We are not going to give you a prepared, or "canned" introduction to use. For one thing, different approaches work better with different types of people. Further, you should use an approach best suited to yourself.

A "canned" introduction would sound awkward and stilted, and in an interview you should always be at ease and natural.

However, here are some fundamental principles to be followed in introducing yourself to a respondent. In order to gain his full cooperation, your attitude should be more or less informal; one of friendly interest. Above all things, remember that an interview is not an intelligence quiz or memory test. Thus, your manner should not be grim—it should be one of interest in getting his opinions on a few topics. The respondent should get the impression it is just a common, everyday occurrence.

If a respondent protests that his opinions are not worthwhile, or that he doesn't know anything about the subject, tell him that they are important to us—that our business is finding out what people all over the country think—and that you would appreciate getting his views, no matter what they are.

In a few rare cases you may find it helpful in your introduction to explain that you are not selling anything.

Some interviewers find it helpful to begin by giving their name. Their idea is that by introducing themselves, personally, they lend a friendly and informal aspect to the interview.

INTRODUCTION

The introduction should be short. Its only purpose is to explain the reason for your call, and gain the respondent's cooperation. This only necessitates two or three sentences, so don't waste unnecessary time on it. A long introduction might result in the respondent's refusing to be interviewed. Get to the first question as quickly as possible. The actual questions are where the real interest lies. If, in your introduction, you start to tell the respondent all about opinion research in general and *National Opinion Research Center* in particular, you may be boring him. Wait till he asks you, then answer him. People listen better to answers to their own questions than to unsolicited explanations.

The introduction should be positive. Don't be halting and hesitant. Your manner should indicate that you are doing an interesting job, and the respondent will get a kick out of it too. Explain the nature of your visit briefly, but clearly, and start off with the first question.

You will, of course, adapt your approach to the particular person you are interviewing. So the following example is only to help you visualize the idea of an introduction in general:

Interviewer: "Good morning (My name is Henry Jackson). I am working on a survey in this neighborhood, and I'd like to get your opinions on these few questions. For instance, the first one is: 'Where do you get most of your news, from the radio, or in the newspapers?'"

Respondent: "Over the radio. I seldom read newspapers."

Interviewer records answer, and says: "Thank you. Now I'd like to know, 'Do you think young people in high school today are receiving better schooling, about the same kind of schooling, or not as good schooling as their parents did?'"

Respondent: "Well, I'd say about the same. What's all this about anyhow?"

Interviewer places a cross after "about the same" on his questionnaire, and says, "I'm working for *National Opinion Research Center*, which is a non-profit organization connected with the University of Denver. The Center does these surveys all over the United States."

Such an explanation should suffice. If it seems desirable in particular jobs to say more, we will tell you so in the special specifications pertaining to that job.

MANNER DURING THE INTERVIEW

You must be completely neutral. The purpose of public opinion research is to find out the truth about how people really think and feel. So you must be careful that the inflection of your voice, or any unconscious mannerisms or remarks of yours, do not "lead" the respondent to answer in a certain way.

Always ask a question exactly as we have worded it, without any changes whatsoever. Even if you discover what you think is a better way of asking the question, still ask it as it is printed. In the first place, there is no certainty that your change would suit our purpose. Secondly—and very important—in order to analyze our results all over the country, on a comparable basis, we have to be sure that *all* our interviewers ask the questions in exactly the same way.

Remember that the questions have been care-

fully drafted and thoroughly pre-tested so that they are free from bias, and are answerable by a person of simplest intelligence.

*Never suggest a possible answer to the respondent.** This is a prime requisite of interviewing. We don't want any answers which have been influenced by the interviewer. We want only the respondent's real feeling on the matter. If he has none, then that's exactly the information we are after. As a matter of fact, "Don't know" or "No opinion" answers are often more significant than positive answers.

However, always give the respondent a full chance to make up his mind before he answers. If he has trouble understanding the question, don't explain it; just re-ask it, as it is worded. If he still cannot make up his mind, then mark him "Don't know," and go on to the next question.

Do not change the order of the questions on the questionnaire. A question asked out of order could influence the answer to a later question.

ATTITUDE

Be conversational, matter-of-fact. In an interview the respondent's mind should be functioning normally; he should not give you "proper" answers—answers he feels that he should make. We want his honest opinion. Make him feel at ease so he'll tell you how he really feels about the questions you ask. Establish the interview on a conversational, matter-of-fact, every-day plane; don't be too deadly serious. An interview is *not* an academic discussion in the realm of pure learning.

Make your pencil and questionnaire an inconspicuous part of the interview, so that the respondent won't be inclined to hold back because his views are being formally recorded.

Do not show surprise at people's answers. This might influence them to start answering as they think they "ought to," rather than coming forth with their real opinions.

If some timid souls accompany their answers with a "Is that right?" or "What do you think?" pass it off easily by saying that it's the respondent's opinion you want, you are not allowed to express your own views, etc.

* Some questions have a check list of possible answers. If they are to be read off, in order that the respondent may make a choice, your special instructions will say so. Such questions, of course, are an exception to the above rule.

To keep the interview on a conversational plane, you must know the questions well enough so that you don't have to "read" the questions, but can "ask" them as if they were your own. Keep the interview flowing along smoothly. Ask the next question while jotting down the answer to the previous one. Then the respondent can be making up his mind, and not spend idle moments waiting for you.

You must be able to talk to all sorts of people in *their language*. You would conduct yourself somewhat differently with a foreign-born, unemployed factory worker on relief than you would with a bank president's wife. (The opinions of the man on relief are every bit as important as the bank president's wife's; which is why you must be sure you have gained the former's confidence, so that he will express himself freely to you.)

If a respondent turns out to be a smart aleck, don't bother to try to get a completed interview. If a respondent talks too much, and on topics far removed from the questionnaire, you can cut him off politely with something like this: "That's an interesting reaction. Now, I'd like to know what your answer is to this question?" Our questionnaires won't be long, but it would be unfortunate if a respondent wasted so much time that half-way through the interview he decided he had to break away.

"REASON WHY" AND "COMMENT" ANSWERS

In some questions you will not only check a "Yes" or "No", "Approve" or "Disapprove", etc., for an answer, but you will also ask the respondent why he feels as he does. In a "why" question, you can disregard what we previously said about using only our exact words. On the questionnaire we may use only the word "why" to save space, but you should say "What is your main reason for thinking this?" "May I ask why?" etc., so that the question will not appear too blunt.

In "why" questions, record the respondent's answer in *his own words*. Don't try to interpret it in your own words. This does not mean that you should include every word and phrase he uses, as, of course, that would be too lengthy. It is important, however, that you do not try to summarize his answer in your own language. The respondent's own language, including slang and colorful expressions, are essential to us in our analysis of his attitude. In order to

decide, on the basis of all returns, what shades of meaning are important, we have to know what respondents actually said.

In all "why" answers, be sure the respondent has declared himself as specifically as he can; vague or meaningless reasons are of little help to us.

Some questions will have a line after them for "comments." These are for the purpose of recording voluntary expressions of opinion only. "Comments" are *never* asked for—"why" questions are *always* asked. Because a "comment" line does not necessarily have to have anything recorded in it, in case the respondent has no remark to make concerning his answer, interviewers are apt to be careless on this score and forget to record "comments" that the respondent does make. Be careful about this. "Comments" are important. Like "why" questions, they should be recorded in the respondent's own words. The distinction is that in "comments" we prefer to have the respondent's voluntary, unsolicited reasons for, or remarks pertaining to, his opinion.

Incidentally, in many cases the "whys" or "comments" are more illuminating than the respondent's actual answer.

"DON'T KNOW" ANSWERS

We have already noted that "Don't know" answers are often significant, and that if a respondent really has no opinion on a question, then that's the information we want.

You will sometimes find people who find it necessary to give real, not stalling, "Don't know" answers to a comparatively high proportion of a questionnaire. This is likely to embarrass them to the point where: (1.) they will start picking just any answer, as long as it isn't "Don't know"—or, (2.) they will decide not to finish the questionnaire so they won't appear stupid.

In such cases interviewers should not refer to "Don't know" answers, but should use phrases as "no opinion," "haven't made up your mind yet," "haven't come to a decision yet," etc. Such phrases sound more dignified and freer from ignorance than a blunt reference to "Don't know."

It sometimes happens that when certain questions are asked of some types of people, it may be the first time the matter has ever been broached to them. Their thoughts on the mat-

ter are not crystallized. They cannot be articulate immediately. Thus, you will find some respondents thinking out loud before giving their answer. These may say, "Well-ll-l, I don't know. . . ." This is just an introductory phrase, a mulling through their minds, preparatory to the expression of their real opinion. So be sure you give each person a bona fide chance to come to a decision. Do not record "Don't know" answers too quickly in the case of this type of respondent.

QUESTIONNAIRE SPECIFICATIONS

On every job it is vitally important that you read, and reread several times, the instructions accompanying the survey. Several extra questionnaires will be included in every assignment, so that you may try out a few practice interviews before starting to complete your assigned quota. (*Do not* send in these practice interviews, however; only those that comprise your formal quota.) The specifications for each survey contain warnings about possible mistakes, points of emphasis and "angles" of the questionnaire with which you cannot familiarize yourself unless you thoroughly study the specifications.

It is also important to read the specifications again several times throughout the duration of the survey. Interviewers often unconsciously develop faults, or fall into habits contrary to the specifications, on the second or third day. A rereading of the specifications serves as a self-check.

CHECKING YOUR COMPLETED QUESTIONNAIRES

There is no excuse whatsoever for a questionnaire not being recorded properly and completely. Every question that calls for an answer should have a check or answer written after it. Questions that do not require an answer should be left blank. Every bit of factual information should be filled in. We use a small, but sufficient, sample of the population for our cross-section. Only a few omissions on a few questionnaires would be enough to throw off our results.

So after completing a questionnaire with a respondent, run your eye over it quickly to make sure it is *properly* and *completely* filled out in every instance, that you have forgotten nothing, and have made no mistakes. If something is amiss, correct it immediately, before leaving the respondent. Do not change, edit or

correct questionnaires after the interview is over.

Again, at night, in looking over your completed questionnaires preparatory to mailing, check them again. If you find anything wrong, such questionnaires will have to be done over the next day.

If a question that should have been asked is left unanswered—if a question with a check list has two possible answers checked where only one was supposed to be—if some of the factual information about the respondent is missing—we in the office can make no assumptions as to what the right information is.

The factual data is used to control our cross-section. This factual data also enables us to group the answers separately of those in certain age groups, economic levels, etc. In other words, to analyze a survey intelligently, we have to "break down" the results by various categories of people.

Another thing we do is "cross tabulate" certain questions with each other. For instance, by the use of mechanical sorting machines we would "pull out" all the people who answered "yes" on a particular question, and find out how they answered another question. Thus an unanswered question can hurt our results in more ways than one.

This all adds up to the fact that we need all that we ask for. Do not send us any questionnaires on which your recording operation has not been done completely.

ANALYZING INTERVIEWER'S WORK

Because of the nature of this business, there is a premium on honest, accurate and conscientious work. In order to assure ourselves and those for whom we do work that our interviewing is on a uniformly high standard it is necessary that we subject the questionnaires returned to us to the closest scrutiny, interviewer by interviewer.

Each questionnaire has two lines at the bottom. After getting all the information on the questionnaire, ask the respondent for his or her name and address. If necessary, explain that *National Opinion Research Center*, in order to check on the work being done for them, sends out postcards to a proportion of the people interviewed on each survey—to find out if the questions were asked and if the interviewer was courteous. Should a respondent be reluctant to give you his name and address, don't

press for it. It is all right to include some interviews without names and addresses in the quota you send in. However, in most cases people will give them readily. If they don't give their name and address themselves, don't record it. We would not want to send a card to anyone without his knowing his name and address had been taken.

Finally, leave every respondent happy, and with the feeling that he has been questioned by a very capable and intelligent interviewer.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

Age and Economic Levels—If any respondent wants to know why you require the factual information at the bottom of each questionnaire, explain that we need it for statistical purposes. At the risk of being obvious, let us caution you to use your own judgment as to which economic group a respondent should be classed in. Don't ask him.

You can easily tell a person's age by observation. If you're in doubt, ask him in which group he is (two or more groups appear on the questionnaire), not what his exact age is.

One factor concerning the age distribution of respondents should be brought out now. Suppose on a survey your quota of men to be interviewed was 25. Suppose further they were to be divided economically as follows:

A	2
B	6
C	12
D	4
On Relief	1
	—
	25

If your age grouping was to be half over 40, and half between 20 and 40, this would not mean half and half in each economic level (for example, 6 C's over 40 and 6 C's between 20 and 40). The age distribution is to be applied against the quota as a whole. Generally speaking, it takes a man a few years to attain enough earning power to be classified in the higher economic levels, so that people in the upper income brackets tend more to be over 40 than people in the lower levels.

Occupation. In recording a respondent's occupation, fill in the information explicitly. We want to know the nature of the business in which the respondent is employed; and,

further, just what type of work the respondent does in that business. Thus, for example, "clerk" is not enough—"clerk in 5 and 10c store" would be. "Salesman" is not enough, but "life insurance salesman" would be. "Drug store" is incomplete, "proprietor of drug store" is complete. "Treasurer" is an incomplete designation, but "treasurer of coal mining company" would be correct. "Teacher" is too indefinite; "high school teacher" is specific. "Telephone company" is too vague—"telephone lineman" is what we want.

If the respondent is not a working person, get the occupation of the chief earner of the family, and the relationship of the respondent to him. For instance, "wife of taxicab driver," "daughter of lawyer," "college student—son of a dentist," and so forth. If the respondent is one who *used* to work, give his former occupation. Thus, "Retired—former president of bank," "Unemployed bricklayer," etc.

Automobile Ownership. Each respondent should be checked as to whether or not there is a car in his immediate family. If there are two cars, just check "car" in the same way. If the car is one used for business purposes only, then check "no car." We do not include commercial automobiles, farm trucks, or the like, for this purpose.

Telephone Ownership. In the factual information there will be a question, "Is your name in the telephone book (or your family's)?" The purpose of this is to find out if there is a phone in the respondent's own home. We ask it this way to avoid affirmative answers from people who don't have their own phone, but use one in a boarding house, or the family's upstairs, etc. If a respondent does have his own phone, but isn't listed in the phone book because he has just moved, or for some similar reason, of course, you mark him "Yes."

Number in Family. This means the number of people, including himself, in the respondent's immediate family. In other words, those living under the same roof with him.

Farmers. If you are assigned any farmers to interview, it will not be specified into what economic levels they fall. It is up to you to see that the farmers you get represent a true cross-section, economically, of your particular rural territory. Check each farmer on your questionnaire according to his correct economic designation, but on your quota sheet just put down the total number of farmers interviewed.

FILLING OUT THE QUESTIONNAIRE

In filling out your questionnaire, *write clearly*. However, if a respondent has a particularly long comment, it is all right to extend it out into the margin, or on the back of the questionnaire, if it is unused—or even to finish it on a piece of paper attached to the questionnaire. For questions in which the answer is checked, use an *X*, not a *V*. Make sure the *X* is in the correct box.

Do not forget to put your initials in the indicated space. Never let a respondent fill out any answers himself, or sign his name to the questionnaire. Also, don't let him look over your shoulder while you are interviewing. If he sees other questions than the one you're asking him, or a check list of possible answers which is not to be asked, he may be distracted or prejudiced.

PLACE OF INTERVIEW

Regarding the place of interview, consider the geographical limits of any town to which you are assigned as its corporate limits. If we assign you a quota of farmers, make sure they are *really* farmers, who make their living from farming, not people with some other occupation who have their residence in the country.

Always fill in the "place" of the interview on each questionnaire. Give both the town and state. If the interview was with a farmer, mark it "farm near Cincinnati, Ohio," or whatever the nearest town is.

When going to a new town for the first time, be sure to cruise around it to get a comparative idea of its economic levels. An *A* in the new town might be only a *B* in the town where you live.

Because questionnaires vary in length, and because the number of interviews that can be gathered in a day in a downtown section as against a rural section vary, we are not going to try to establish an "average" number of interviews that can be obtained in a day. We will always try to give you ample time to complete your assignment. If something should

happen so that you cannot finish it on time, as sickness, let us know immediately, by telegraph collect.

It is important that you keep track of your quota as you go along, so that you won't get too many of any particular type of people. One easy way to do this is to make the following type of outline on a separate piece of paper, or on the back of an envelope in which you are carrying your questionnaires:

Men					Women				
On					On				
A	B	C	D	Relief Cl.	A	B	C	D	Relief Cl.
Over 40									
20-40									
Total									

When you interview a *C* man, put a tally under *Men* in the *C* category, and opposite *Over 40* or *20-40*, whichever he may be. If you have to interview 15 *C* men, your final score for them might look like this:

C Men		
Over 40	IIIIII	I
20-40	IIIIII	IIII
Total	15	

The above system will allow you to check your progress at any time with the requirements of your quota sheet.

PHONE, FRIENDS, SUBSTITUTES

As is obvious, no interviews may be conducted over the phone. All must be personal. The use of friends to take your place, or other substitutes, is not permitted. If for some reason you cannot work on a survey for us, let us know by telegraph collect. The information you collect on surveys is strictly confidential. Please do not reveal your own results, or a respondent's opinion, in any way, to anybody. And do not consult anyone on any difficulties you may have except ourselves.

BOOKS IN REVIEW

Edited by DANIEL KATZ

MACKINDER, HALFORD J. *Democratic Ideals and Reality*. New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1942. 219 pp.

SOROKIN, PITIRIM A. *Man and Society in Calamity*. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1942. 352 pp.

COLE, G. D. H. *Europe, Russia, and the Future*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1942. 233 pp.

The common ground in the three books here under review is that they deal, in their separate ways, with the post-war world and reconstruction.

Mackinder's contribution is a reprint of a work originally issued in 1919 and carries a (new) introduction by Edward Mead Earle and a (new) foreword by George Fielding Eliot. The book is characterized by a strong common-sense which, as is true of most common-sense when it is first uttered, bears the mark of genius. Mackinder seems to have been the first man to grasp the fact that any vigorous nation which could consolidate an unchallenged power in the heart of the land-mass of the Eastern hemisphere would sooner or later—and presumptively sooner—be able to dominate the world. The events of recent years have turned what, at the date of writing, was prescience of the highest order into what is now obvious to all but incredibly stupid people. Mackinder, however, was no slavish devotee of the notion that geography is the practically sole determinant of human destiny. On the contrary (as the title of his book only partially suggests if, indeed, it suggests it at all) he was summoning the democratic nations to action with a

view to nullifying the effects which geography might otherwise impose. Their failure to pay heed to him brought on the present calamity.

Mackinder was wholly free of the delusion, sponsored by Admiral Mahan, that the course of history not only had been, but would necessarily be, determined by the possession of sea-power. He saw clearly that any country that could get control of the central land-mass of the world could defy sea-power and could presently acquire as much power on sea, as well as on land, as was required for world domination. The lesson for countries not situated in the center of the world-island is patent—the periphery of the world-island must be kept free of domination by any power of the center and must be kept accessible to alternative concentrations of power as, for instance, in the Western hemisphere.

Mackinder is much less happy in the realm of economics than in that of politics and, in dealing with economic questions, indulges in a dogmatism by no means so soundly based as his political concepts would seem to be. His claim to attention rests solely in his principal thesis, but this claim will be ignored at the most extreme peril, if not certainty, of disaster to the Western World.

Professor Sorokin's book, *Man and Society in Calamity*, is a not very impressive study of individual and social psychology under stress. The reactions of men overridden by any or all of the four horsemen of the Apocalypse are

examined historically in verification of the by no means startling thesis that calamity brings out the worst in some people, and the best in others, while it leaves a third group subjectively unchanged. The latter, the emotionally stable, are the principal reliance for the hopes of humanity.

Sorokin indulges in much talk about the "polarization" of the effects of disaster (by which he means the tendency of most people, in calamitous circumstances and according to their nature, to act *consistently and emphatically* in a base, or noble, way) but this book is, at least relatively, free of the esoteric jargon on which Sorokin ordinarily leans so heavily in the apparent conviction that magniloquence is a guarantee of wisdom. The book, nevertheless, would be much improved if the author had been more careful of his little, rather than his big, words, had seen that the printer had used only those that made sense, and had spelled correctly those that he had used. Hasty construction, composition, and proofreading is apparent throughout and give the perhaps not erroneous impression that this is a slap-dash job.

G. D. H. Cole wrote *Europe, Russia, and the Future* under the strong emotional stress of the gallant Russian fight against the Nazi hordes and remarks that he had written quickly, amid many other preoccupations, for fear of missing the right moment for saying the things he wanted to say. His fear was wholly misdirected. It would have been much better to have waited until he had cooled off. Cole notes, indeed, that he has never been greatly concerned over making mistakes. This is for-

tunate for his own peace of mind for, in this book, he is merely emoting. He has for years labored under the delusion that if one only called a thing Socialism, rather than some less appealing epithet, he automatically made it blest. He therefore sees the greatest difference between what might seem to be the Tweedledum of German totalitarianism, which he hates, and the Tweedledee of Russian totalitarianism, which he loves, because, as he avers, the little fellows are going in different directions, that one is Socialistic and the other isn't. This is as may be. His position is now, of course, very popular, since most people apparently cannot stomach the thought that, while Britain, the United States, and Russia are each necessary to the current salvation of the other, none of them need be enamored of the political institutions of the others.

Cole has a chapter on the essentials of democracy (and of democracy he professes to be passionately fond) and in this chapter he says some very good things. He there insists, for instance, on the necessity of decentralization if freedom is to be preserved. But all the rest of his book is a strong plea for collectivism. Mr. Cole is a paragon of versatility and among his preoccupations is the writing of mystery stories. In my opinion the present book is the best of such stories that he has yet done.

Frank D. Graham
Princeton University

LOEWENSTEIN, KARL. *Brazil Under Vargas*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1942. 381 pp.

The publication of a scholarly and penetrating study of the organization and operation of the Vargas regime is

of special interest now that Brazil has joined us in the war. Though Brazil has long been among our best friends in South America, there have been disturbing reports in recent years about the ideological tendencies in her present government. As Professor Loewenstein says, "it will raise our confidence in the Brazilian partner and in the final outcome of the war if we know that our most valuable ally to the south is closer, much closer, to our way of life than to that of the totalitarians."

The spiritual gulf between Vargas' Brazil and the totalitarian states of Europe is the outstanding fact that emerges from Professor Loewenstein's study. It is true that the Vargas regime is a dictatorship, operating in a constitutional framework established by itself and changed at will by presidential decree. All branches of the administration, national and local, have been brought under the President's control; political parties have been dissolved, the press is censored, and a Tribunal of National Security has been set up to deal with offenses against the state. But there are many ways in which this dictatorship's operation differs from that of the Third Reich or the Fascist regime in Italy. For example, the "Fuehrer" principle "with its regimentation and automatism—both wholly alien to the liberal and individualistic temperament of the Brazilians . . . is as much ridiculed as in this country." Liberalism and individualism, combined with the Brazilian's tolerance and keen sense of humor, would seem to make hopeless the imposition of anything resembling a fascist ideology, and as a matter of fact there appears to be little serious ef-

fort to create an ideology for the "New State."

Professor Loewenstein emphasizes the importance of the democratic tradition which Brazil inherited from the imperial regime and the Republic. Though he perhaps overestimates the extent to which democracy actually worked in those earlier periods, it is clear that there would have to be a much greater change in ways of thought than there has been before the Brazilian people would abandon democracy as a political ideal. The continuing strength of the liberal tradition, even among the group now in power, is evident in the respect for the integrity of the Courts and for fairness in judicial procedures which have generally, if not always, characterized the Vargas government. It is also evident in the moderate treatment of political opponents. The Tribunal of National Security, however arbitrary and unfair the laws governing its procedure, is a generally respected Court rather than an instrument of terror, and it has not passed a death sentence since its organization. Many persons known to be unfriendly to the regime carry on their business unmolested and even hold appointments in the universities, so long as they make no trouble. There are fewer political exiles than in some Latin American countries where republican forms are observed. This is due partly to the fact that there is relatively little real opposition, for the propertied classes seem well satisfied with the present state of affairs and the regime is definitely popular among the masses of the people.

In the field of public opinion management, newspapers are controlled through censorship and through the

government's control of the supply of news print, but "constraint or regimented uniformity is little in evidence." Books published in Brazil may be suppressed if they are objectionable to the government, but foreign books circulate freely. Only a moderate amount of governmental propaganda seems to be carried on through the press, the radio and the motion picture. It was the author's impression that "the solid front of intangibles which constitutes public opinion makes outright regimentation or indoctrination of the public mind impossible in Brazil."

In short the Vargas regime appears as a typical South American dictatorship, which has copied some of the practices of fascism but is still fundamentally the sort of government which has long been familiar to students of Latin American history. The cases of gross abuse of irresponsible power which the author cites might easily be matched in the history of other nearby countries or of Brazil itself. In general, the officials are the same sort of people who held office under the Empire and the Republic. The regime does not appear to represent a radical change in the direction of Brazil's political evolution.

The author covers a wide range of subject matter—federal-state relations, the administration of justice, economic nationalism, and labor policies. Two interesting chapters deal with the German element in Southern Brazil and the rather harsh measures of compulsory assimilation which the government has adopted. Professor Loewenstein feels that this element is still a serious menace and that the result of an axis victory could only be to make Brazil practically a German colony. The Ital-

ians, on the other hand, have been well assimilated and present no real problem.

The book was written before Brazil entered the war but after she had thrown in her lot with the united nations at the Rio Conference. President Vargas' decision closed a long period during which the government's policy had been somewhat ambiguous and had often been characterized by apparent partiality to the Axis. Professor Loewenstein attributes this policy, partly to a natural desire to avoid committing Brazil to what seemed likely to be the losing side, and partly to the strength of pro-axis elements in the administration and particularly in the army, which has enjoyed much political power since the revolution of 1930.

Many readers will wish that the author had devoted more attention to the historical background and the underlying social and political traditions which would help to explain the real significance of the regime in Brazil's political evolution. A study of the actual workings of republican institutions before 1930 and of the conditions under which the suffrage was exercised might have made the change from constitutionalism to authoritarianism seem less far-reaching than it does on the surface. Such a study, however, would have involved a formidable amount of additional research, in a field in which little has thus far been done. It would be unfair to criticize a fine piece of work because it does not do more than it purports to do. As it stands the book is one of the most important which have appeared in the Latin American field in recent years.

Dana G. Munro
Princeton University

GORDON, MATTHEW. *News Is A Weapon*.

Introduction by Elmer Davis. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1942. Pp. viii, 268.

The title of Mr. Gordon's book is the thesis of it. And the argument which is established from cover to cover is that, "Our enemies know full well that news is an important weapon in modern warfare and they are unceasingly applying their knowledge as they wage total war."

To the average American citizen the phrases *propaganda techniques* and *psychological warfare* are either meaningless or have connotations of the mysterious or the occult. In helping to correct this irrational and fallacious attitude, which exists in the minds of the general reading public, Mr. Gordon has made a contribution to our contemporary war literature. The point is simply and emphatically brought out that news is an instrument of war, and that "motivated news" is a principal propaganda technique of our enemies. By "motivated news" the author means those news reports which are issued to achieve specific objectives.

News Is A Weapon, then, is primarily concerned "with the operations of the enemy news arm in an effort to expose enemy methods and, by example, illustrate the enemy tricks, tactics, techniques, and strategy." These techniques (which have drawn the attention of propaganda analysts since the development of modern communicational media) are: confusing the opponent and his allies; starting a story on the home front that the opponent is on the brink of defeat; engendering suspicion between the allies; the news of negotiations of a separate peace; issuing

stories telling how badly off they (the enemy) are and how they might be ready to crumble from within (the grand strategy behind such a piece of motivated news, however, is "to sell the idea that there was no further use in sending supplies to our allies, their opponents"); "kite-flying" or a "trial balloon" which is distributing invented information about the sinking of ships and other important military information for the purpose of possibly obtaining an official confirmation or denial of the directed news; starting terror propaganda, or stories of "secret weapons," for the purpose of undermining troop morale.

Other tricks which the enemy uses in order "to get attention for the news they distribute and to make that news appear valid," are: giving the impression of impartiality; trying to gear themselves in their foreign broadcasts to our traditional concepts; using "the neutral date line," i.e. trying to make it appear as if some particular news originated in Stockholm or Berne whereas the story actually was born in Berlin or Tokyo; giving out a story, waiting until it has been used by an American press association, and then turning around and crediting "the entire story to American sources" just as if the Axis had had nothing to do with it; et cetera.

The author is conscious of the strategic importance of the American press associations and radio networks in the formation of American public opinion. Mr. Gordon, a newspaper man himself, charges the various news editors of this country with "the high duty" of knowing that news is an instrument of war, of being objective, and in general of

being cognizant of the responsibility placed in their hands.

News Is A Weapon is the product of the boiling down of a 450,000 word documentation which comprised the author's private accumulated case histories of the operations of the enemy news arm. The examples are extremely well chosen; the style is remarkably clear. As a matter of fact, there is not one ambiguous sentence in the book. For those persons who are still inclined to diminish the intelligence and the foresight of the enemy this book will be valuable in changing their minds.

On the other hand, *News Is A Weapon* will not likely find a permanent place in the library of the social scientist—apart from being interesting reading. The first step in the scientific method, and this applies to both the social and the physical sciences, is the observation of data. Mr. Gordon's book, from this point of view, represents that and nothing more. The second step in the scientific method is merely the classification of data at hand. Mr. Gordon makes no effort whatsoever in attempting to systematize the various techniques which the enemy is using. The interpretation of a developed system, and the putting forth of a remedial program, are both completely left out of the picture.

When examining the table of contents one would expect to find, upon reading *News Is A Weapon*, a certain method of treatment and development of the subject matter. Such, however, is not the case. It makes little difference whether or not the chapters are read in sequence.

Elmer Davis, in writing the introduction, states that Mr. Gordon's work

is a "contribution to the civilian defense program" because it will help to make the civilian population conscious of the fact that the enemy uses "news as a weapon against American understanding, American resolution, American morale, for precisely the same end as is served by such other weapons as submarines and bombing planes." This, I believe, is true.

Richard S. F. Eells
Washington, D.C.

SAYERS, MICHAEL AND KAHN, ALBERT E.
Sabotage! The Secret War Against America. New York, Harper and Brothers, 1942. 266 pp.

This book is a popular report on Axis sabotage in the United States, and, in particular, on physical sabotage and psychological sabotage. There can be no doubt that the authors industriously collected material and tried to place a clear-cut case before the American public, with the laudable intention of bringing about a thorough understanding of sabotage methods. An illuminating and objective book on sabotage is a much needed public service indeed, and it is a pity that the authors, despite their good intentions and despite their unquestionable ability, fall somewhat short of this goal.

Without denying that much of the material presented is reliable, it must, nevertheless, be pointed out that many of the facts which the authors relate are not correct. What is worse, some of the erroneous indications, such as the date of Zimmermann's appointment as German Minister of Foreign Affairs or the political importance of the Nazi party in 1921, could easily have been checked. It seems also quite unjustifiable to ac-

cept the famous Moscow Trials at face value, and to prove the efficiency of the German Secret Service by the official charges which the Stalin government made against the Communistic "old guard" as saboteurs in German pay. Even if the proceedings of the Moscow Trials can be used as a sort of handbook on industrial sabotage (though surely not as a historical source on events that actually took place), it seems to this reviewer that the quoted passages on agricultural sabotage belong to the realm of pure fantasy and show that the authors do not quite understand the essence and the limitations of sabotage: namely, that sabotage can never be applied against the type of objective which is composed of numerous units that, taken separately, have no military value whatsoever. Sabotage is efficient only if directed against key points and bottle-necks.

The authors link the Moscow trials, and in this they follow the accusations of the Russian State Attorney, to a German journalist who for the past few years has worked in the United States and whom they depict as a particularly dangerous and pernicious German secret agent. As a matter of fact, however, this story is incorrect in many important points. The authors could have received more reliable information directly from the person involved, which, astonishingly enough, they claim they did, though they also admit that they "uncovered" most of their story themselves. After all, one should not label persons as spies and saboteurs from mere hearsay.

There are many errors of this kind which must make any careful reader distrustful of other material which he

cannot check. It seems to this reviewer, also, that the achievements of the "spying" which was broken by the F.B.I. in the summer of 1941 are overestimated, and that the authors leave out very important angles of that case, such as the fact that that spy whom they designate as the "brains" of the ring quite obviously fabricated much of his "secret information" himself, by using blueprints for toy submarines and indications culled from popular magazines; he *posed* as a spy in order to get money from the Germans. Without a doubt, he would have sold them everything he could lay his hands upon, but it is very doubtful whether this low crook actually gave them anything of real value. The authors unfortunately have drawn heavily on unreliable sources, such as Riess' book, *Total Espionage*, and even had their sources been better, they have used them very uncritically. Also, their journalistic style, which never employs any qualification, is symptomatic of their intention to "write the story up," as are their repeated attempts to draw far-reaching conclusions from limited evidence.

It should be realized that overrating the efficiency of the work of the German secret service in this country is as bad as underrating it, not only for "morale," but also for devising appropriate measures of defense against such activities. It is most important that the defensive side of the sabotage problem be discussed—that we investigate whether all necessary defensive steps have been taken. What the American public really needs is sober information on sabotage methods, on their effects, and on our official and private counter-measures—in short, a scientific analysis of the

whole sabotage problem. It does not need a dramatized best-seller which gives the impression that this country is riddled with secret agents of the utmost efficiency. In their report on psychological sabotage the authors do far better, though here also they fail to get beneath the surface.

These critical remarks certainly do not do justice to the patriotic intention of the authors, nor to much excellent material which their book does contain, such as several highly interesting spy-letters. The authors could improve the book greatly, and the service they are rendering to the nation as well, if in

the next edition they would critically re-check all their data and give a proportionate and well-rounded picture of the situation. The enemy within is assuredly a dangerous and paralyzing force. But it is foolhardy to exaggerate the fear of this enemy in the minds of American readers, and thus create a sabotage-psychosis which can have the most disastrous and disintegrating consequences—which can, in fact, be psychological dynamite of greater power than anything the Nazis could possibly use against, and in, this country.

Stefan T. Possony

The Institute for Advanced Study

GALLUP AND FORTUNE POLLS

Compiled by THE OFFICE OF OPINION RESEARCH

This section contains a compilation, topically arranged, of poll results released by the American Institute of Public Opinion, by *Fortune*, and by the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion. The AIPO and CIPO results cover the period from July through September 1942. (Previous AIPO questions were reported in the July 1938, October 1939, and all subsequent issues of the *QUARTERLY*. CIPO questions were first reported in the Spring 1942 issue.) The *Fortune* questions are those which appeared in the July and September 1942 issues. (Previous *Fortune* questions were reported in the March 1940 and all subsequent issues of the *QUARTERLY*.) Dates appearing in connection with AIPO and CIPO questions are those carried in the date lines of

Institute releases to subscribing newspapers; dates following *Fortune* questions indicate the issue of the magazine in which the information appeared.

In considering these polls data, the reader should bear in mind certain salient points of reference set forth on pages 75 and 76 of the March 1940 issue of the *QUARTERLY*. The *QUARTERLY* wishes to express its appreciation to George Gallup and the American and the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion and to the editors of *Fortune* and Elmo Roper for their cooperation in making these survey results available in convenient form to other students of public opinion.

Part One: Domestic Issues

I. POLITICAL

THE PRESIDENT

Do you approve or disapprove of the way Roosevelt is handling his job as President today? (Sept. 2, '42—AIPO)

	Approve	Disapprove	Undecided
Nov. 1941	72%	19%	9%
Jan. 1942	84	9	7
Mar.	78	13	9
May	78	13	9
July	78	13	9
Aug.	70	16	14

By section of country:

	Per Cent Approving Roosevelt	
	July	August
N. Eng. & M. Atl.	76%	70%
E. Cent.	77	69
W. Cent.	77	70
South	81	72
Far West	79	71

Some people say President Roosevelt has not been tough enough in dealing with heads of government departments concerned with the

war effort. Do you agree or disagree? (Sept. 20, '42—AIPO)

Agree	52%
Disagree	31
Undecided	17

By political affiliation:

	1940 Willkie voters	1940 Roosevelt voters
Agree	58%	50%
Disagree	25	35
Undecided	17	15

CONGRESS

If you were elected to Congress, what laws would you want to have passed? (Sept. 23, '42—AIPO)

52% of all voters questioned had specific suggestions, listed below in the order of frequency of mention:

1. A law to establish ceilings over both prices and wages.
2. Legislation for greater control and regulation of labor unions.

3. A law to draft 18 and 19 year old men into the armed services.

4. A tax bill to bring in increased revenue for war.

5. An anti-liquor law.

6. Repeal of the A.A.A.

7. Legislation to bring about government economy in non-war spending.

8. Legislation to consolidate overlapping bureaus of government and increase efficiency.

9. Nation-wide gas rationing.

10. Old age pension legislation.

1942 ELECTIONS

Estimated Voting Turnout (Sept. 30, '42—AIPO)

	1940 Election (Estimated) Voted	1942 (Estimated) Will Vote
Upper		
Economic Group	89%	62%
Middle		
Economic Group	87	54
Lower		
Economic Group	79	45

Estimated distribution of seats in House of Representatives if Congressional elections were held today (August). (Aug. 16, '42—AIPO)

	Est. Dem. Seats	Est. Rep. Seats	Other Party
N. Eng.	10	18	—
M. Atl.	54	50	1
E. Cent.	47	30	—
W. Cent.	14	36	4
South	118	4	—
Mountain	12	4	—

Pac. Coast

21 12 —

National

276 154 5

Estimated distribution of seats in House if Congressional elections were held today (September). (Sept. 9, '42—AIPO)

	Est. Dem. Seats	Est. Rep. Seats	Dem. Other Party	Gain or Loss
N. Eng.	9	19	—	—5
M. Atl.	51	53	1	—10
E. Cent.	25	52	—	—8
W. Cent.	10	40	4	—6
South	118	4	—	+2
Mountain	13	3	—	+3
Pacific Coast	21	12	—	+3
National	247	183	5	—21

New York State Estimated Election Line-up (Sept. 27, '42—AIPO)

	First Report	Second Report
Dewey	54%	53%
Bennett	36	37
Alfange	10	10

City vs. Upstate:

	New York City	Upstate
Dewey	42%	65%
Bennett	41	33
Alfange	17	2

By 1940 political affiliation:

	1940 Roosevelt Voters	1940 Willkie Voters
Dewey	33%	77%
Bennett	52	22
Alfange	15	1

2. GOVERNMENTAL POLICY

BONDS AND TAXES

Should every family not on relief pay a Federal income tax? (Aug. 24, '42—AIPO)

	1940	August 1942
Yes	51%	70%
No	41	25
Undecided	8	5

By income group:

	Upper & Middle	Lower
Favor	73%	66%

Opposed	23%	27%
Undecided	4	7

In order to help pay the cost of the war, should the Federal government put a national sales tax of two per cent on everything that people buy? (July 3, '42—AIPO)

Two Per Cent Tax

	Favor	Opposed
May	54%	46%
Today (end of June)	58	42

Three Per Cent Tax

	<i>Favor</i>	<i>Opposed</i>
May	46%	54%
End of June	52	48

Sectional views:

Two Per Cent Tax

	<i>Favor</i>	<i>Opposed</i>
N. Eng. & M. Atl.	54%	46%
E. Cent.	56	44
W. Cent.	62	38
South	65	35
Far West	56	44

Should all people receiving wages, salaries or other income, be required by law to put ten cents out of every dollar of their income in war savings bonds and stamps? (Sept. 18, '42—AIPO)

Yes	52%
No	43
Undecided	5

Employed persons only:

Yes	51
No	45
Undecided	4

Is the income of your family higher or lower today than it was a year ago? (July 19, '42—AIPO)

Higher Same Lower

Professional men	40%	46%	14%
Business men	31	54	15
White Collar	41	45	14
Skilled workers	46	40	14
Semi-skilled	41	41	18
Unskilled	31	54	15
Farmers	45	45	10
National Average	39	46	15

Cash income of non-farm families:

7%	earn \$100 a week or more
13	" \$ 60-99.9 a week
22	" \$ 40-59.9 a week
17	" \$ 30-39.9 a week
19	" \$ 20-29.9 a week
8	" \$ 15-19.9 a week
7	" \$ 10-14.9 a week
7	" Under \$10 a week

Median average—\$35 a week (\$1800 a year)

3. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC

PRICE-WAGE CONTROL

In your opinion, how good a job has Leon Henderson done as head of the Office of Price Administration? (Aug. 12, '42—AIPO)

Good job, or doing best he can with his powers	54%
Poor job	16
No opinion	30

To keep the cost of living from going higher do you favor keeping salaries and wages, and the prices of farm products, from going higher? (Sept. 15 & 25, '42—AIPO)

	<i>Favor</i>	<i>Op- posed</i>	<i>Quali- fied</i>	<i>Un- decided</i>
Baltimore	82%	4%	7%	7%
Chicago	85	4	4	7
St. Louis	87	9	2	2
Omaha	78	3	6	13
Los Angeles	73	4	11	12
Entire Country	71	11	12	6

Do you think the current system of price ceilings will prevent price rises, or will the ceilings have to be revised upward, and by what per cent? (Sept. '42—FMP*)

Ceiling will prevent price rises	33.6%
Prices will have to be revised upward	
by 10 per cent or less	12.8
by 10-20 per cent	37.3
by 20-50 per cent	13.3
by over 50 per cent	3.0
	66.4%

* Fortune Management Poll

Do you think the general price ceilings can be made to work by means of price ceilings on wages, price ceilings on farm products, government subsidies, or by any other means? (Sept. '42—FMP)

Price ceilings on wages	90.5%
Price ceilings on farm products	83.6
Government subsidies	26.4
Price ceilings on everything	6.3
Strong government—less politics	2.7

Additional taxes, forced savings	2.0%
Other methods	5.5
Price ceilings could not work no matter what was done	5.9

Is your company having considerable, some, or no difficulty in meeting costs under present price ceilings? (Sept. '42—FMP)

	Actual	Percentage of those concerned	
Considerable	14.5%	59.2%	76.5%
Some	44.7		
None	17.3		
Does not concern my business	23.5		

SHORTAGES

Have you developed or are you now developing substitutes for materials you cannot get or for articles you cannot sell? (Sept. '42—FMP)

	Average	
Yes	25.6%	51.2%
Some	25.6	
No	12.5	
Does not concern my business	36.3	

	Manufacturing men	
Yes	33.7%	63.1%
Some	29.4	
No	14.6	
Does not concern my business	22.3	

	Commerce & Retailing men	
Yes	18.2%	47.9%
Some	29.7	
No	10.5	
Does not concern my business	41.6	

RATIONING

Would you be willing to accept gasoline rationing and reduced driving if the President should ask the country to do so, in order to conserve rubber? (Sept. 16, '42—AIPO)

Yes	84%
No	13
Undecided	3

Do you think we will have gasoline rationing throughout the entire country within the next six months? (Aug. 8, '42—AIPO)

	All U.S.	Rationed Areas	Non-rationed Areas
Yes	47%	52%	45%
No	41	34	44
Undecided	12	14	11

Do you think it necessary to ration gasoline throughout the country in order to conserve tires? (Aug. 8, '42—AIPO)

	All U.S.	Rationed Areas	Non-rationed Areas
Yes	49%	63%	41%
No	44	29	52
Undecided	7	8	7

Without giving any names, have you heard of any cases where service stations or garages sell gasoline to customers without punching the full amount on ration cards? (July 8, '42—AIPO)

Yes, have knowledge of violations	43%
No, have no knowledge of them	57

Do you think there should be any punishment of service station operators or garages who disobey gasoline ration rules? (July 8, '42—AIPO)

Yes	69%
No	17
Undecided	14

Punishments recommended by those answering "yes":

They should lose selling privileges, have their licenses revoked	26%
They should be fined	25
Should have jail sentences	3
Should be let off with a warning	1
Operators should be fired	1
No opinion as to what punishment should be	13

If the Government needs tires, would you offer to sell some of your tires to the government for a fair price? (Aug. 1, '42—AIPO)

Yes	73%
No	22
Undecided	5

By occupation:

	Farmers	City-Dwellers
Yes	62%	76%
No	30	19
Undecided	8	5

LABOR UNIONS

At the present time, workers who take jobs in some war factories that have unions must join the union before they can start work. Do you think that workers who start to work in a factory because the government has told them to, should have to join the union, or should they be able to go to work without joining the union? (Sept. 11, '42—AIPO)

Should be made to join the union	17%
Should not have to join	76
No opinion	7

What is your opinion of Mr. Petrillo's rulings? (Aug. 26, '42—AIPO)

Favorable	8%
Unfavorable	75
No opinion	17

Do you approve or disapprove of the government taking legal action to stop Petrillo? (Aug. 26, '42—AIPO)

Approve	73%
Disapprove	12
Undecided	15

MANPOWER DRAFT

Do you think a law should be passed giving the government the right to require workers not employed in war industries to take jobs in war industries? (Aug. 2, '42—AIPO)

General Public All Workers

Yes	71%	72%
No	23	23
Undecided	6	5

Should a law be passed giving the government the right to require workers to move to any place in the country to take jobs in war industries? (Aug. 2, '42—AIPO)

General Public All Workers

Yes	53%	53%
No	39	40

Undecided 8% 7%

WAR MEASURES

As long as the war lasts, would you favor, or oppose, the appointment of a committee of judges with full power to set aside any peacetime laws and regulations which they felt were slowing up the war effort? (Aug. 29, '42—AIPO)

Favor	58%
Oppose	23
No opinion	19

If the question of national prohibition should come up again, would you vote for it or against it? (Sept. 19, '42—AIPO)

Would vote for prohibition	38%
Would vote against prohibition	62

It has been suggested that the government issue an order forbidding double feature movies for the duration of the war, in order to save film. Would you favor or oppose such an order? (Sept. 12, '42—AIPO)

Favor	71%
Oppose	11
Undecided	18

Do you believe everyone in the United States should be required to carry an identification card containing, among other things, his picture and his fingerprints? (July 14, '42—AIPO)

	Feb.	July
Yes	69%	72%
No	25	22
Undecided	6	6

What punishment should be given to spies caught in this country? (July 29, '42—AIPO)

Death Penalty	85%
Imprisonment	8
Deportation	1
Miscellaneous	3
No Opinion	3

4. DOMESTIC ISSUES IN CANADA**POLITICAL**

Do you think that the war effort would be helped if the Cabinet were chosen from all political parties and not just from the Liberal party as at present, or do you think it would

make no difference? (Sept. 9, '42—CIPQ)

Would help war effort	59%
Would hurt war effort	8
Would make no difference	26
Undecided	7

Do you think Prime Minister King should, or should not, invite Conservatives and CCF members into his government to form an "All-Party government"? (Sept. 9, '42—CIFO)

Yes, he should	60%
No, he should not	25
Undecided	15

If a Dominion election were held today, would you prefer to see your riding elect a: Conservative? Liberal? CCF? New Democracy (Social Credit)? or other party candidate? (Sept. 5, '42—CIFO)

	1940 Election	January Poll	August Poll
Liberal	55%	55%	39%
Conservative	31	30	23
CCF	8	10	21
New Democracy	3	*	6
Others	3	5	11

* Not polled separately. Results included in 5 per cent "Others."

Do you happen to know the name of your local member of Parliament in Ottawa? (July 15, '42—CIFO)

	Canada	U.S.
Correct	67%	50%
Incorrect	33	50

By voters:

	Voted	Didn't Vote
Correct	74%	44%
Incorrect	26	56

Results in Quebec:

	Quebec	Rest of Canada
Correct	77%	64%

Parliament at Ottawa has adjourned until next January. Do you approve this, or do you think that they should remain in session longer in wartime? (Sept. 12, '42—CIFO)

Approve adjournment	31%
Should remain longer in session	52
Undecided	17

By political affiliation:

	Liberal	Conservative
Approve	36%	29%
Should remain in session	47	58
Undecided	17	13

Do you think that people in Canada should be allowed to join the Communist party and

enter candidates in future elections, or do you think the present law which outlaws the Communist party should continue in effect? (Sept. 16, '42—CIFO)

People should be allowed to join	23%
Ban should remain	62
Undecided	15

Men vs. Women:

	Men	Women
People should be allowed to join	30%	17%
Ban should remain	58	66
Undecided	12	17

PRICE-WAGE CONTROL

Do you think you have a clear idea of what this law (Wage and Price ceilings) involves as far as you personally are concerned? (July 8, '42—CIFO)

	December	Today
Yes	55%	64%
No	45	36

Do you think the law which keeps prices and wages from going higher should remain in effect after the war? (July 18, '42—CIFO)

Yes	50%
No	33
Undecided	17

If the rubber shortage became very serious, do you think the government should take the tires from automobiles that are not necessary to the war effort, or for making a living? (July 11, '42—CIFO)

Yes	84%
No	8
Undecided	8

By car-ownership:

	Car Owners	Non Car-Owners
Yes	84%	84%
No	10	7
Undecided	6	9

Do you think the government should take these tires without paying for them, or do you think the owner should get a fair price for his tires? (July 11, '42—CIFO)

Without pay	10%
Should pay a fair price	87
Undecided	3

PROHIBITION IN CANADA?

Would you favor or oppose a law to prohibit the sale of all alcoholic beverages (Including wine and beer) in Canada? (Sept. 23, '42—CIPO)

	February	September
Dry	20%	29%
Wet	72	65
Undecided	8	6

Would you favor or oppose a law prohibiting the sale of all alcoholic beverages in Canada for the duration of the war? (Sept. 23, '42—CIPO)

Favor	43%
Oppose	51
Undecided	6

Would you approve or disapprove if the Canadian government took over complete control of the manufacture and sale of all alcoholic beverages, including wine and beer? (Sept. 26, '42—CIPO)

Approve	59%
Disapprove	29
Undecided	12

By population:

	Approve	Disapprove	Undecided
Cities over 100,000	52%	35%	13%
Farm and small town	62	24	14

It has been suggested that women should not be allowed in places where alcoholic beverages are sold by the glass. Do you agree or disagree? (Sept. 30, '42—CIPO)

Agree	60%
Disagree	35
Undecided	5

In the United States, professional baseball games are played on Sunday. Would you approve or disapprove if professional baseball were allowed in Canada on Sunday? (July 25, '42—CIPO)

Approve	49%
Disapprove	42
Undecided	9

By age:

	Approve	Disapprove	Undecided
21-29 (years)	66%	25%	9%
30-39	59	33	8

40-49	50%	40%	10%
50-59	41	49	10
60 up	33	61	6

FRENCH HERITAGE Vs. ENGLISH

Do you think Canada would be fighting in this war if she were completely independent and not a part of the British Empire? (Aug. 19, '42—CIPO)

	English Canadians	French Canadians
Yes, would be fighting	81%	33%
No, would not be fighting	14	59
Undecided	5	8

Do you think of Canada as an independent country or as still dependent on Great Britain? (Aug. 19, '42—CIPO)

	English Canadians	French Canadians
Independent	52%	25%
Dependent	42	70
Uncertain	6	5

If you were asked to vote today on the question of conscription of men for overseas service, would you vote for it or against it? (Aug. 29, '42—CIPO)

English Speaking:	For	Against	Undecided
April 20	68%	22%	10%
May 30	75	15	10
Latest (August)	78	15	7

French Speaking:

April 20	9	88	3
May 30	6	91	3
August	6	90	4

If Hitler offered peace now to all countries on the basis of not going farther, but of leaving matters as they are now, would you favor or oppose such a peace? (Sept. 2, '42—CIPO)

Oppose	86%
Favor	9
Don't know	5

French point of view:

	English Canadians	French Canadians
Oppose	93%	59%
Approve	3	31
Undecided	4	10

GALLUP AND FORTUNE POLLS

657

Who in your opinion is the greatest living Canadian? (Aug. 26, '42—CIPO)

(c) The Army? 26% 55% 19%
(d) In business? 26 53

Don't know, or can't decide 30%
"There is no great Canadian" 9
King 22
McNaughton 15
Bennett 3
Beaverbrook 2
Rene Chalout 2

Since the war started, the government has taken a bigger and bigger share in the control of business, industry, and agriculture. Some people say this control should continue after the war. Do you agree or disagree? (Aug. 15, '42—CIPO)

French vs. English speaking Canadians:

English French
Canadians Canadians

	English speaking	French speaking
Don't Know	36%	7%
There is none	11	1
McNaughton	17	8
King	14	50
Chalout	*	8
Bennett	4	*
Beaverbrook	3	*
Raymond	*	4
Cardinal Villeneuve	*	4
Dardin	*	4
Pouliot	*	3
Houde	*	2
Bourrassa	*	2
St. Laurent	*	2
Ilisley; Drew; Ralston; Mulock;		
Hanson; Coldwell;		
Aberhart; Hepburn;		
Bracken	9 (1 % each)	*
All others	6	5

Agree
Disagree
Undecided

48% 37%
41 51
11 12

If the Allies win the war, do you think that France should have an equal voice with Russia, the United States, China, and England in deciding the peace terms? (Aug. 22, '42—CIPO)

French English
Canadians Canadians

Yes (equal voice)
No
Undecided

78% 36%
8 52
14 12

Asked of French Canadians only: Which of these three men has accomplished most for the people of France? (Aug. 22, '42—CIPO)

Pierre Laval	1%
Marshall Petain	46
General DeGaulle	45
Undecided	8

Asked in Quebec only: In general, do you believe that the French-Canadians have been well treated in: (Aug. 15, '42—CIPO)

	Yes	No	Undecided
(a) The civil service?	26%	60%	14%
(b) War industries?	29	54	17

Do you think these broadcasts (short wave from Paris and Vichy) express the feelings of the French people or the German government? (Aug. 22, '42—CIPO)

French people	19%
German government	47
Not certain	34

Part Two: The War

1. AMERICAN ESTIMATES

UNIFIED COMMAND

Should the President, as commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the country, name a military leader to direct both the army and the navy? (July 18, '42—AIPO)

	May	July
Favor Unified Command	41%	48%
Opposed	41	36
Undecided	18	16

Do you think that Roosevelt and Churchill

should have the final decision on the military and naval plans of the war, or do you think these plans should be decided by the military and naval leaders of the United Nations? (Aug. 7, '42—AIPO)

Roosevelt and Churchill	21%
Military and naval leaders	64
Undecided	15

THE DRAFT

On the whole, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the handling of the draft in your community? (Sept. 26, '42—AIPO)

Answers of those with opinions:

Satisfied	79%
Dissatisfied	21

If the government had to choose between drafting 18 and 19 year old men, or married men with children, which should it choose? (Sept. 6, '42—AIPO)

18-19 year group	77%
Married men with children	13
Undecided	10

If the government had to choose between drafting 18 and 19 year old men, or married men without children, which should it choose? (Sept. 6, '42—AIPO)

18-19 year group	43%
Married men without children	47
Undecided	10

SEPARATE AIR FORCE?

Assuming that land, sea and air power is each important in winning the present war, which of these is the most important? (Aug. 9, '42—AIPO)

Land power	7%
Sea power	14
Air power	69
Undecided	10

An airplane expert says that if the Allies build enough airplanes that we can win the war with a strong air force alone. Do you agree or disagree? (Aug. 21, '42—AIPO)

Agree	40%
Disagree	49
Undecided	11

Would you approve or disapprove of a separate air force for the United States? (Sept. 5, '42—AIPO)

Approve	57%
Disapprove	27
Undecided	16

SECOND FRONT

Would you like to see England and the United States attempt a large-scale attack on Germany in Western Europe in the near future, or do you think they should wait until they are stronger? (July 31, '42—AIPO)

Attempt Attack Now	48%
Wait till we are stronger	34
Undecided	18

How do you account for the success of German submarines in sinking our ships along the Atlantic Coast? (Aug. 5, '42—AIPO)

Greater part of navy diverted elsewhere; navy not large enough yet to handle situation; patrol ships more necessary elsewhere	27%
Spies in this country, fifth-column work, loose talk	18
Germans had large number of submarines already built and uses them cleverly	17
Our navy caught off guard; not smart enough	13
Insufficient cooperation between army and navy	2
Miscellaneous	5
No Opinion	26

2. CANADIAN ESTIMATES

Do you think that Roosevelt and Churchill should have the final decision on the military and naval plans of the war, or do you think these plans should be decided by the military

and naval leaders of the United Nations? (Aug. 8, '42—CIPO)

Roosevelt and Churchill	23%
Military and naval leaders	66
Undecided	11

GALLUP AND FORTUNE POLLS

659

By education:

	Public	High School	College
Roosevelt & Churchill	26%	22%	20%
Military and Naval Leaders	61	70	74
Undecided	13	8	6

One hears and reads a lot of arguments for and against opening a second front against the Germans. What is your opinion on this? (July 1, '42—C.I.P.O.)

Should open second front now	46%
When ready but not before	18
Should leave to the authorities or No opinion	29
Against second front	6
It has already started	1

Quebec vs. Ontario:

	Quebec	Ontario
For second front	53%	46%
Only when ready	12	16
Leave to authorities or No opinion	22	31
Already started	2	1
Against	11	6

From what you have heard or read, how do you account for the British defeats in North Africa? (July 22, '42—C.I.P.O.)

	Canada	U.S.
Not enough men and equipment	33%	26%
German leaders and strategy were better	32	25
Allies unprepared	8	7
Allies overconfident	3	5
Lack of fighting spirit	1	8
Poor quality of equipment	3	*
Miscellaneous	15	9
No Opinions	21	33

* Less than one per cent.

Are you satisfied that you are getting as much important war news as you should, or do you think too much of this news is being censored? (Sept. 19, '42—C.I.P.O.)

Satisfied with news	56%
Not satisfied	36
Undecided	8

Do you feel that Ottawa is giving the people

enough information about the sinkings in the St. Lawrence River? (Sept. 19, '42—C.I.P.O.)

Yes (enough information)	46%
No	40
Undecided	14

In Quebec:

Yes (enough information)	30%
No	58
Undecided	12

It has been suggested that men in Canadian prisons who are eligible for parole in the next two or three years be paroled now to enlist in the armed forces. Would you approve or disapprove if this were done? (July 29, '42—C.I.P.O.)

	Canadian public	U.S. public
Approve	57%	66%
Disapprove	31	21
Undecided	12	13

French vs. English Canadians:

	French Canadians	English Canadians
Approve	47%	60%
Disapprove	41	29
Undecided	12	11

AIR RAIDS AT HOME?

Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way air raid precautions are being handled in this community? (July 25, '42—C.I.P.O.)

Residents of cities of 10,000 population or more:

Satisfied	44%
Dissatisfied	36
No opinion	20

Do you think an air raid on this (your) province is at all likely this summer? (Aug. 5, '42—C.I.P.O.)

Think air raid likely	24%
Think air raid unlikely	65
Undecided	11

By province:

	Ontario	Quebec	Maritimes
Air raid likely	16%	36%	15%
Unlikely	77	51	65
Undecided	7	13	20

3. BRITISH REACTIONS

(Based on Surveys by British Institute of Public Opinion)

In general, do you approve or disapprove of Mr. Churchill as Prime Minister? (July 24, '42—AIPO)

	<i>Satisfied</i>	<i>Dissatisfied</i>	<i>Undecided</i>
January 1942	89%	7%	4%
February	82	11	7
April	82	13	5
June (before Tobruk)	86	9	5
July	78	15	7

Who is the world's greatest living man? (July 6, '42—CIPO)

Churchill	42%
Stalin	24
Roosevelt	20
Hitler	4
Cripps	3

If anything should happen to Churchill, who would you like to see succeed him? (Aug. 10, '42—CIPO)

	<i>Dec. '41</i>	<i>May '42</i>	<i>Today</i>
Eden	38%	37%	34%
Cripps	*	34	28
Bevin	7	2	3
Beaverbrook	11	2	3
Attlee	3	2	3

* Less than one per cent.

Some people say that even if invading the Continent this summer might cost more than invading next summer, the results would make the cost worthwhile. Do you agree or disagree that the cost would be worthwhile? (July 1, '42—CIPO)

Agree	49%
Disagree	17
Don't know	34

Should the Allies try to invade Europe this year? (July 31, '42—AIPO)

Yes	60%
No	12
Undecided	28

APPRAISAL OF AMERICANS

Do you think Americans are more democratic than Britishers? (Aug. 24, '42—CIPO)

Yes	52%
No	33
Undecided	15

Do you think most Americans adopt a superior attitude toward the British without any grounds? (Aug. 24, '42—CIPO)

Yes	37%
No	44
Undecided	19

Would we be better off if we were more like the Americans in many respects? (Aug. 24, '42—CIPO)

Yes	41%
No	39
Undecided	20

As a result of participating in the war, will the United States want: (Aug. 24, '42—CIPO)

(a) More than their fair share of credit for helping to win the war?

Yes	36%
No	44
Undecided	20

(b) More than their fair share of world markets after the war?

Yes	26%
No	45
Undecided	29

(c) More than their fair say in settling the peace terms?

Yes	28%
No	49
Undecided	23

(d) More than their fair share of power and influence in the post-war world?

Yes	29%
No	46
Undecided	25

Do you think Americans are too willing to let others do their fighting? (Aug. 24, '42—CIPO)

Yes	28%
No	55
Undecided	17

4. AUSTRALIAN REACTIONS

(Based on Surveys by Australian Institute of Public Opinion)

In your opinion, how good a job has Prime Minister Curtin done? (Aug. 10, '42—CIFO)		the government is organizing the war effort? (July 6, '42—CIFO)	
Excellent job in these difficult times	33%	Satisfied	65%
Has made some mistakes but on the whole has done well	43	Dissatisfied	20
Has done some good things, but on the whole another might do better	14	Undecided	15
He has not been a success	5	Do you think the war news gives a sufficiently clear idea of how the war is going? (Sept. 19, '42—CIFO)	
No opinion	5	Yes	40%
Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way		No	48
		Undecided	12

Part Three: Post-War Prospects

I. IN THE UNITED STATES

INTERNATIONAL POLICIES

As a result of this war, do you think the U.S. will be more powerful, less powerful, or have about the same amount of power as before the war? Will Russia? Germany? Britain? Japan? China? Italy? (July '42—FOR)

	More	Same	Less	Don't Know
U.S.	72.6%	16.8%	3.9%	6.7%
Russia	57.3	16.7	7.1	18.9
China	54.8	21.4	8.1	15.7
Britain	25.3	27.9	34.0	12.8
Italy	1.2	7.6	77.5	13.7
Japan	1.7	3.4	85.8	9.1
Germany	1.1	2.3	89.2	7.4

Would you like to see the U.S. join the League of Nations after the war is over? (July 6, '42—AIPO)

	Favor U.S. in League	Opposed
Oct., 1937	33%	67%
July, 1941	50	50
July, 1942	73	27
Republicans only:		
	Favor U.S. in League	Opposed
Oct., 1937	23%	77%

July, 1941	44%	56%
July, 1942	70	30

By section:

Favor U.S. in League

	1937	1942
N. Eng. & M. Atl.	33%	71%
East Central	33	72
West Central	31	76
South	44	78
Far West	27	74

After the war is over, how do you think we should treat Hitler? How do you think we should treat the Nazi leaders in Germany? (July 1, '42—AIPO)

Punishment for: Hitler Nazi leaders

Hang or shoot	39%	35%
Imprison or put in asylum	23	31
Exile	6	2
Treat as Nazis have treated others	5	5
Won't be alive—will have committed suicide or been killed by then	6	2
Slow torture; mental and physical suffering	3	2
Be lenient in punishment	2	2
Not our affair	2	2
Court martial	1	2
No opinion	10	12

ECONOMIC LIFE

Five years after the war is over, do you think we Americans will be leading about the same sort of life as we did before the war, or will it be a better life, or a worse life? (July '42—FOR)

	Total	Prosperous	Upper middle class	Lower middle class	Poor	Negro
Better	41.5%	43.4%	42.4%	41.4%	38.2%	46.5%
Same	26.2	22.5	24.6	28.0	25.6	26.3
Worse	23.4	25.3	26.2	23.4	24.8	12.8
Don't know	8.9	8.8	6.8	7.2	11.4	14.4

On the whole, after the war, do you think an average young man will have more opportunity, about the same opportunity, or less opportunity to get ahead than a young man had after the last war? (July '42—FOR)

	Total	Prosperous	Upper middle class	Lower middle class	Poor	Negro
More	46.0%	47.5%	44.8%	46.3%	44.5%	50.0%
Same	26.3	30.0	27.8	26.8	26.3	18.7
Less	17.2	18.1	20.3	18.5	15.9	7.1
Don't know	10.5	4.4	7.1	8.4	13.3	24.2

Five years after the war, do you think that your standard of living will be higher, lower, or about the same as before the war? (July '42—FOR)

	Total	Prosperous	Upper middle class	Lower middle class	Poor	Negro
Higher	25.2%	16.0%	24.4%	27.3%	25.8%	27.5%
Same	41.4	35.9	42.1	43.0	41.4	36.8
Lower	25.9	45.0	31.7	23.5	22.0	18.6
Don't know	7.5	3.1	3.8	6.2	10.8	17.1

Five years after the war do you think there will be more, fewer, or about the same number of rich people in the U.S. as before the war? (July '42—FOR)

	Total	Prosperous	Poor	Pacific Coast	Mountain States
More	15.7%	9.0%	20.1%	12.7%	20.5%
Same	24.1	24.0	24.8	22.7	32.3
Fewer	50.0	62.0	41.0	61.0	39.7
Don't know	10.2	5.0	14.1	3.6	7.5

Five years after the war, do you think that there will be more, less, or about the same amount of unemployment in the U.S. as before the war? (July '42—FOR)

	Total	Prosperous	Poor	Executive	Factory Labor
More	29.6%	26.5%	29.7%	27.5%	29.1%
Same	24.2	27.1	20.3	24.0	23.0
Less	36.1	39.9	37.6	42.5	40.4
Dont know	10.1	6.5	12.4	6.0	7.5

After the immediate postwar adjustment and conversion, do you think unemployment in the U.S. will be small, fairly large, or great? (Sept. '41—FMP)

Small	20.6%
Fairly large	58.6
Great	20.8

Asked of those replying "fairly large" or "great": Do you think business should get together and assume major responsibility for eliminating unemployment, or should business rely upon the government to do so by large-scale expenditures? Which do you think actually will occur? (Sept. '41—FMP)

Should:

Business	90.5%
Government	7.5
Both	2.0

Will:

Business	15.7%
Government	81.2
Both	3.1

After the war do you think farmers as a group will be better off, worse off, or about the same as they were before the war? Factory workers? Business leaders? Office workers? (July '41—FOR)

	Better off	Same	Worse off	Don't know
Farmers	43.0%	32.7%	13.5%	10.8%
Factory workers	36.6	30.1	21.9	11.4
Business leaders	22.2	34.2	25.8	17.8
Office workers	20.8	45.6	20.1	13.5

ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

After the war, do you feel our form of government will be about the same, changed only in a few minor ways, or quite different? (If changed) Do you think these changes will be in the direction of socialism, fascism, communism, or something else? (July '42—FOR)

About the same	40.9%
Changed in minor ways	29.8
Quite different	21.2
Don't know	8.1

and job insurance? Do you think it will provide any or all of these? (Sept. '42—FMP)

Free medical care:

Should	23.7%
Should not	76.3
Will	59.5
Will not	40.5

Old-age pensions for everyone:

Should	48.7%
Should not	51.3

Modifications expected:

Socialism	19.2%
A bigger and better democracy	6.3
Fascism, communism, dictatorship	3.6
Other	3.7
Don't know what direction	18.2

Will	90.5%
Will not	9.5

Job insurance:

Should	35.5%
Should not	9.5

After the war, do you think that labor should or should not be given the closed shop? Do you think it will or will not? (Sept. '41—FMP)

Should	3.6%
Should not	96.4
Will	50.3
Will not	49.7

Will	84.0%
Will not	16.0

After the war, do you think there *should* be a law limiting the amount of money any individual is allowed to earn in a year? Do you think there *will* be such a law? (July '42—FOR.)

	Should	Will
Yes	31.9%	28.6%
No	60.3	48.3
Don't know	7.8	23.1

After the war, do you think the federal government should or should not provide free medical care, old-age pensions for everyone,

Do you think some form of socialism would be a good thing or a bad thing for the country as a whole? (July '42—FOR.)

	<i>Total</i>	<i>Prosperous</i>	<i>Poor</i>	<i>Executive</i>	<i>Factory Labor</i>
Good	25.4%	23.3%	24.5%	39.9%	29.9%
Bad	40.4	58.4	31.8	46.8	35.9
Don't know	34.2	18.3	43.7	13.3	34.2

Do you think you personally would stand to gain or lose by some form of socialism? (July '42—FOR.)

	<i>Total</i>	<i>Prosperous</i>	<i>Poor</i>	<i>Executive</i>	<i>Factory Labor</i>
Gain	15.4%	9.0%	19.6%	10.9%	23.9%
No difference	24.7	18.7	22.8	32.2	27.4
Lose	31.9	59.5	21.9	48.7	24.2
Don't know	28.0	12.8	35.7	8.2	24.5

To provide which of the following things do you think the federal government should and should not collect enough taxes after the war? (July '42—FOR.)

	<i>Should</i>	<i>Should not</i>	<i>Don't Know</i>
Medical care for everyone who needs it	74.3%	21.0%	4.7%
An old-age pension for every citizen over sixty-five	73.8	21.7	4.5
Jobs for everyone who is able and willing to work but cannot get a job in private employment	67.7	25.2	7.1
Compensation for everyone unable to find work until he can find work	57.8	34.4	7.8

After the war is over, do you think the government should own and operate all railroads, only regulate them, or leave them entirely alone? All banks? All telephone companies? All coal mines? All automobile companies? All grocery stores? (July '42—FOR.)

	<i>Leave alone</i>	<i>Regulate</i>	<i>Own and regulate</i>	<i>Don't Know</i>
All banks	25.2%	56.5%	8.3%	10.0%
All coal mines	37.7	37.3	8.5	16.5
All railroads	38.8	36.9	10.6	13.7
All telephone companies	46.9	31.7	7.2	14.2
All automobile companies	58.8	24.2	2.9	14.1
All grocery stores	61.5	25.2	2.2	11.1

After the war do you feel it likely or unlikely that: (July '42—FOR.)

	<i>Likely</i>	<i>Unlikely</i>	<i>Don't know</i>
We will do away with national elections	3.4%	87.4%	9.2%
We will have government regulation of newspapers	17.7	65.9	16.4
We will have a secret service that keeps checking up on everybody	44.6	43.1	12.3

BUSINESS AFTER THE WAR

Is anyone in your organization studying your postwar production and market in terms of the following: (Sept. '41—FMP)

	<i>Manu- facturing</i>	<i>Finance</i>	<i>Utilities</i>	<i>Commerce & retailing</i>	<i>Other lines</i>
Consumption	36.9%	10.4%	35.5%	29.5%	22.8%

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Price levels	20.1%	7.5%	13.4%	18.5%	18.2%
Standard of living	15.9	12.2	16.1	23.7	14.8
Substitutes	22.9	2.8	9.1	12.1	14.8
New products	58.2	7.5	15.1	27.2	35.8
New methods	49.4	15.7	26.3	28.4	30.2
New technical devices	38.6	6.3	28.5	8.8	22.0
Others	4.8	3.5	2.7	2.0	3.6
Does not apply to my business	17.0	70.9	44.1	45.0	35.6

In the years following the war, do you feel your dollar volume (at 1939 value of dollar) will be much greater, somewhat more, the same, or less than your 1939 volume? (Sept. '42—FMP)

Much greater	11.3%	} 55.5%	the reserves for after the war? (Sept. '41—FMP)	
Somewhat more	44.2		Conversion to peacetime production	28.1%
Same	16.0		Maintaining employment during change-over	33.6
Less	28.5		Sales promotion	28.6
			Write off excess plant	8.7
			Buy government-owned plant	3.9
			Other	6.1
			Do not have adequate reserves	8.7
			Do not see possibility of building up adequate reserves	27.0
			Does not apply to my business	23.4

If you already have or could be sure of building up adequate reserves under the present scale of taxes, which of the following or combinations of the following would you use

2. IN CANADA

From what you have seen or read, do you think the soldiers who returned from the last war were, on the whole, fairly or unfairly treated? (July 4, '42—CIFO)

Fairly treated	39%
Unfairly treated	45
Don't know	18

Do you think the soldiers who return from this war should be treated more generously than the veterans of the last war? (July 4, '42—CIFO)

More generously	66%
Would not treat more generously	21
Undecided	13

If Russia should defeat Germany, which one of these things do you think Russia would then try to do: (Aug. 1, '42—CIFO)

Try to spread Communism all through Europe?	27%
Work with Britain and the United States in making it possible for the countries	

of Europe to choose their own form of government? 57%
Undecided 16

If you were the one to decide, what would you do with Germany after she has been defeated? (Aug. 12, '42—CIFO)

End Germany as a nation	38%
Put her in a strait jacket	25
End of Nazidom	11
Make a New Germany	8
Miscellaneous	11
No opinion	7

Post-war generation more lenient:

	Under 36 years of age	36 years and over
End Germany as a nation	37%	40%
Put her in a strait jacket	19	29
End of Nazidom	13	9
Make a New Germany	12	7
Miscellaneous	12	9
No Opinion	7	6

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- ROBB, JANET HENDERSON. *The Primrose League, 1883-1906* (Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, no. 492). New York: Columbia University, 1942. 258 pp.
History, activities and political and social significance of Tory pressure group. Bibliography, pp. 241-52.
- RYAN, JOHN AUGUSTINE. *Distributive Justice: The Right and Wrong of Our Present Distribution of Wealth*, third edition, revised. New York: Macmillan, 1942. 357 pp.
Complete revision of standard work on Catholic conceptions of reasonable profits, wages and economic practices and of "monopolistic injustices." By Director, Department of Social Action, National Catholic Welfare Conference. Bibliography at end of each section.
- ROUCEK, JOSEPH SLABEY, and associates. *Sociological Foundations of Education: A Textbook in Educational Sociology*. New York: Crowell, 1942. 771 pp.
By a score of U.S. professors. Bibliographic footnotes.
- SCHILDER, PAUL. *Goals and Desires of Man: A Psychological Survey of Life*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1942. 305 pp.
General theory of personality based on the author's large psychiatric and psychoanalytic experience in private practice, in the university clinic of Vienna and in Bellevue Hospital, New York City. Bibliography, pp. 285-92.
- SCHURZ, WILLIAM LYTLE. *Latin America: A Descriptive Survey*. New York: Dutton, 1941. 378 pp.
Having lived for many years in South America and the countries bordering the Caribbean, Mr. Schurz, a U.S. government official, is able to give a first-hand account of the land, its people, government, economy and international relations. Bibliographic footnotes.
- SUTHERLAND, ROBERT LEE. *Color, Class, and Personality*. Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1942. 135 pp.
The research centering on the personality of Negro youth, in the American Youth Commission series, is here discussed and summarized. The results are fairly representative of modern sociological knowledge of Negro-white relations.
- WARNER, WILLIAM LLOYD; and LUNT, PAUL S. *The Status System of a Modern Community* (Yankee City Series, vol. 2). New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942. 246 pp.
Formal analysis of positional relations and interaction in Newburyport, Massachusetts, based on extended observation by a group of social scientists.
- WESTPHAL, ALBERT CHARLES FREDERICK. *The House Committee on Foreign Affairs* (Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, no. 493). New York: Columbia University Press, 1942. 268 pp.
An analytical study of the committee and its work, by historian, College of the City of New York. Bibliography in footnotes.
- WILLIAMS, THOMAS HARRY. *Lincoln and the Radicals*. Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1941. 413 pp.
History of the struggles for the political and military control of the conduct of the Civil War. Bibliography, pp. 387-94.
- WORKS, GEORGE ALAN; and LESSER, SIMON O. *Rural America Today: Its Schools and Community Life*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942. 450 pp.
School problems receive intensive consideration, but in addition there are chapters on such related subjects as rural health, recreation, and social welfare, the problems of rural youth, rural Negroes, and community planning. Dr. Works is professor of education, University of Chicago; Mr. Lesser is a free-lance writer on social problems. Bibliography at ends of chapters.

PART V. CHANNELS OF PROPAGANDA

Agents Who Specialize in Managing Propaganda

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF SCHOOLS OF SOCIAL WORK. STUDY COMMITTEE.

Education for the Public Social Services. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1942. 324 pp. Analysis of the U.S. schools of social work and their relation to the social services, sponsored by the American Association of Schools of Social Work under a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation. Bibliographic footnotes.

BENGALEE, SUFI MUTIUR RHAMAN. *The Life of Muhammad.* Chicago: Moslem Sunrise Press, 1941. 286 pp.

His life, character and teachings described for the Western world by a Mohammedan writer. Bibliography, pp. 281-82.

CARLSON, OLIVER. *The Man Who Made News: James Gordon Bennett.* New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1942. 440 pp.

Biography of James Gordon Bennett, Sr., 1795-1872, by U.S. free-lance journalist, author of studies of Brisbane and Hearst. Bibliography, pp. 423-28.

CLARK, DELBERT. *Washington Dateline.* New York: Stokes, 1941. 322 pp. Miscellaneous observations of a Washington correspondent.

DALE, HAROLD EDWARD. *The Higher Civil Service of Great Britain.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1941. 232 pp.

A partially quantified description of this profession and the life of its members as of 1939. The author was formerly Principal Assistant Secretary, British Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. Chapter 7, pp. 178-91, is on "Relations with the Public and the Press." Bibliographic footnotes.

DREWRY, JOHN ELDRIDGE. *Concerning the Fourth Estate*, introduction by Walter C. Johnson. Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia Press, 1942. 167 pp. A second edition of this collection of essays

on various phases of journalism by Dean of University of Georgia School of Journalism. Annotated reading list, pp. 156-67.

The Officer's Guide, ninth edition. Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing Co., 1942. 492 pp.

The question of censoring soldiers' mail has been handled in this edition, as have the duties of the Instructor and of the Public Relations Officer.

TAFT, HORACE DUTTON. *Memories and Opinions.* New York: Macmillan, 1942. 336 pp.

Autobiography of the founder of the Taft [private prep] School, a brother of the late President and Chief Justice Taft.

SAVORD, RUTH. *Special Librarianship as a Career.* New London, Conn.: Institute of Women's Professional Relations, Connecticut College, 1942. Pamphlet, 15 pp.

An article sponsored by the Special Libraries Association. Bibliography, pp. 14-15.

WELLMAN, FRANCIS L., editor. *Success in Court.* New York: Macmillan, 1941. 404 pp.

Skills of the lawyer are discussed by ten experienced attorneys.

WILLIAMS, BLANCHE COLTON. *Clara Barton: Daughter of Destiny.* Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1941. 468 pp.

Heavily documented biography of founder and promoter of U.S. Red Cross.

WILSON, LOGAN. *The Academic Man: A Study in the Sociology of a Profession.* New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1942. 248 pp.

By professor of sociology, Tulane University. Bibliographic footnotes.

Agencies Used in Disseminating Propaganda

BRENNECKE, ERNEST, JR.; and CLARK, DONALD LEMEN. *Magazine Article Writing*, new edition, rewritten and enlarged. New York: Macmillan, 1942. 486 pp.

- College text by two Columbia University professors of English.
- DUNLAP, ORRIN ELMER, JR. *The Future of Television*. New York: Harpers, 1942. 194 pp.
Probable effects of television upon the radio industry.
- DYSON, WALTER. *Howard University, The Capstone of Negro Education: A History, 1867-1940*. Washington, D.C.: Graduate School of Howard University, 1941. 553 pp.
By Howard University historian. Bibliography, pp. 500-25.
- FUSSLER, HERMAN HOWE. *Photographic Reproduction for Libraries: A Study of Administrative Problems* (University of Chicago Studies in Library Science). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942. 218 pp.
Report on recent use of microphotography, by Head, Department of Photographic Reproduction, University of Chicago Libraries. Bibliography, pp. 205-07.
- GAUM, CARL GILBERT; GRAVES, HAROLD F.; and HOFFMAN, LYNE S. S. *Report Writing*, revised edition. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1942. 332 pp.
Revision of a 1929 textbook for students in technical colleges, by three teachers of English.
- GÜLICH, WILHELM. "Politik und Forschung: Die dynamische Bibliothek als Quelle politischer Erkenntnis," *Zeitschrift für Politik*, January 1941, pp. 3-32.
"Politics and Research: The Dynamic Library as a Source of Political Insight." By organizer of the Library of the Kiel Institute of World Economics (Kieler Institut für Weltwirtschaft).
- JONES, JOHN PRICE, editor. *The Year-book of Philanthropy, 1941-42*. New York: The Inter-River Press, 1942. 148 pp.
Information and statistics covering American philanthropy since 1920, with numerous charts and tables.
- LESTER, ROBERT MACDONALD. *Forty Years of Carnegie Giving: A Summary of the Benefactions of Andrew Carnegie and of the Work of the Philanthropic Trusts Which He Created*. New York: Scribner's, 1942. 186 pp.
Secretary of the Carnegie Corporation provides factual summary of Carnegie gifts from 1901 to 1941. The book does not attempt to appraise the results of the use of the \$679,000,000 spent by the trusts, but it shows for each major trust the circumstances leading to its establishment, the nature of its organization and work, and a list of the trustees and officers who have executed the trust.
- LOWDERMILK, R. R. *The School-Radio Sound System*. Washington, D.C.: Federal Radio Education Committee, U.S. Office of Education, 1942. Pamphlet.
Selection and proper use of equipment.
- PEABODY, GEORGE E. *How to Speak Effectively, With Some Simple Rules of Parliamentary Practice*, second edition, revised and enlarged. New York: Wiley, 1942. 108 pp.
By professor of extension teaching, Cornell University.

PART VI. MEASURING THE EFFECTS OF PROPAGANDA

- BURT, HAROLD ERNEST. *Principles of Employment Psychology*, new edition. New York: Harpers, 1942. 568 pp.
By professor of psychology, Ohio State University. Cites most of the standard aptitude tests and the simpler personality inventories. Bibliography at ends of chapters.
- ELKIN, ADOLPHUS PETER. *Our Opinions and the National Effort*. Sydney: Australasian Medical Publishing Co., 1941. 80 pp.

"For this survey of Australian opinion on various aspects of the war effort, opinions were obtained from various segments of the population on such things as the validity of Allied war aims, willingness to participate personally in civilian war projects, satisfaction with the government's conduct of the war, the adequacy and reliability of the news. The author concludes that the Australian public was, at the time of the survey (summer of 1941), far from united and not wholeheartedly behind the war effort."—Donald Rugg, *American Journal of Sociology*, 48:297 (September 1942).

FOSTER, ROBERT GEIB; and WILSON, PAULINE PARK. *Women After College: A Study of the Effectiveness of Their Education*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1942. 305 pp. Analysis of case histories on careers and personality problems of 100 representative Detroit women who were college graduates, with some discussion of the role of the college in relation to their numerous neurotic difficulties. Bibliography of "related studies," pp. 273-75.

GLEASON, ELIZA ATKINS. *The Southern Negro and the Public Library: A Study of the Government and Administration of Public Library Service to Negroes in the South* (University of Chicago Studies in Library Science), foreword by Louis Round Wilson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941. 218 pp.

"It is one thing to say that the residents of New Orleans (population 458,762, 1930 Census) had access to 273,683 volumes in its public library in 1939. It is quite another thing to know, however, that 129,632 Negroes in New Orleans had only 14,697 volumes for their exclusive use . . . and they constituted the only collection of books directly available to Negroes in the city. . . .

"The present study was made to determine just what public library service was available in 1939 to the 8,805,635 Negroes in 13 southern states in which segregation of service is prevalent." Mrs. Gleason has been librarian of Talladega College and was

under appointment as director of the Library School of Atlanta University at the time of publication of this volume. Bibliography, pp. 199-202.

HOLLINGWORTH, LETA STETTER. *Children Above 180 IQ, Stanford-Binet: Origin and Development*. Yonkers-on-Hudson, N.Y.: World Book Co., 1942. 332 pp.

A posthumously published volume by a Columbia University professor of educational psychology. Contains reports on the history of 12 children carried through some years, followed by a number of the author's previously published papers and by chapters on general problems of the adjustment of gifted children. Bibliography at ends of chapters.

NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER, UNIVERSITY OF DENVER (COLORADO). Incorporated October 27, 1941, with a grant from the (Marshall) Field Foundation, this is "the first non-profit, non-commercial organization to measure public opinion in the United States. Through a national staff of trained interviewers, representative cross-sections or samples of the entire population will be personally interviewed on questions of current importance." Director: Harry H. Field.

Its series of publications, available for 5c or 10c a copy, includes: 1. Announcement of Purposes. 2. National Survey, Report No. 1: Opinions and Attitudes of the American People toward the War in Europe (December 1941). 24 pp. 3. National Survey, Report No. 2: Attitudes of the American People toward Important Post-War Problems (March 1942). 32 pp. 4. Rocky Mountain Survey, Report No. 3: Regional Opinions on Post-War Problems and on Foreign Products of Particular Importance to the Mountain Area (April 1942). 24 pp. 5. Supplement to Report No. 3: Regional Opinion on Federal Regulation of Gas and Electric Companies, Banks, Labor Unions, Chain Stores, and Railroads; also, Federal *versus* State Control of Old Age Pensions, Unemployment Insurance, Public Schools and Water Rights (May 1942). 8 pp. 6. National Survey, Report No. 4: Anti-Inflation

Measures (June 1942). 24 pp. 7. Supplément to Report No. 4: Opinion toward Federal Regulation, After the War, of Gas and Electric Companies, Banks, Labor Unions, and Railroads; and on Federal versus State Control of Old Age Pensions, Unemployment Insurance, and Public Schools (June 1942). 8 pp. 8. National Survey, Report No. 5: Post-War Problems. 32 pp. 9. Special

Graphic Supplement, Report No. 6: Current and Post-War Problems (October 1942). 16 pp., 12 charts. 10. Distorted Maps: A. Outline Map of U.S., Showing States as They Would Appear if Area Were Proportional to Number of Persons 21 Years of Age and Over. B. Same, Based on Total U.S. Population, 1940 Census. C. Same, Based on Popular Vote for President, 1940.

PART VII. PROPAGANDA AND CENSORSHIP

GARBER, WILLIAM. "Propaganda Analysis—To What Ends?" *American Journal of Sociology*, 48:240-45 (September 1942).

"The proper way to understand the phenomenon of propaganda is not primarily through the study of the rhetorical and psychological tricks employed, but rather by an analysis of the total social context of the propaganda under investigation, conceiving the whole as a dynamic field of stresses and strains wherein the force of propaganda plays its part."

PRICE, BYRON. "Governmental Censorship in War-time," *American Political Science Review*, 36:837-49 (October 1942).

By Director, U.S. Office of Censorship.

PRICE, BYRON; BENTON, WILLIAM B.; and LASSWELL, HAROLD DWIGHT. *Censorship*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942. Pamphlet.

Radio round-table discussion.

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